On 2016-04-28 3:49 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
If only there was an asymptotically good design that didn't require
any estimation at all. See
https://www.schneier.com/cryptography/fortuna/ for details.
The money shot is:
"At first, it might appear that the only way to prevent this attack is
by dis
Thor Lancelot Simon on Wed, Apr 27 2016:
So we eat things like the first several seconds of frames from
the network; dmesg output; TOD; IP addresses; hostnames; and other
configuration and nonsecret data [...]
On 2016-04-28 3:19 AM, Sven M. Hallberg wrote:
Nice. I think this highlights how a
On Wed, Apr 27, 2016 at 10:19 AM, Sven M. Hallberg wrote:
> Thor Lancelot Simon on Wed, Apr 27 2016:
>> So we eat things like the first several seconds of frames from
>> the network; dmesg output; TOD; IP addresses; hostnames; and other
>> configuration and nonsecret data [...]
>
> Nice. I think
Thor Lancelot Simon on Wed, Apr 27 2016:
> So we eat things like the first several seconds of frames from
> the network; dmesg output; TOD; IP addresses; hostnames; and other
> configuration and nonsecret data [...]
Nice. I think this highlights how a hang-up on entropy estimation has a
chilling
On Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 04:49:54PM +0200, Sven M. Hallberg wrote:
> > I developed a different approach, which I call Linux Random Number Generator
> > (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main improvements
> > compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient entropy dur
