- Forwarded message from Andrew Miller -
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 11:48:24 -0500
From: Andrew Miller
To: bitcoin-developm...@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] New paper: Research Perspectives and Challenges
for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies
Message-ID:
We (Joseph Bonnea
It's hard to make a cryptocurrency hash that's ASICproof.
Cheap/multisource serve/PC COTS hardware has large memory
size, and intrinsic random access latencies that can't be
much improved upon for physical reasons (embedded memory
is limited in size due to die yield reasons, so large
LUTs are a
- Forwarded message from WAVE movement -
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2013 13:33:55 +
From: WAVE movement
To: "doctrinez...@zerostate.is" ,
"zs-me...@zerostate.is"
Subject: [Doctrinezero]
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/10468112/The-internet-mystery-that-has-the-world-baffled.
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-trial-crypto-legend-diffie-takes-the-stand-to-knock-out-patent/
Newegg trial: Crypto legend takes the stand, goes for knockout patent punch
Taking a bet on Whit Diffie, as the trial against "patent troll" TQP wraps up
Monday.
by Joe Mullin - Nov
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http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/10/shamir/
Cryptographer Adi Shamir Prevented from Attending NSA History Conference
Categories: Science, Secrecy
In this email message to colleagues, Israeli cryptographer Adi Shamir
recounts the difficulties he faced in getting a visa to attend the 2013
Crypto
Guys, in order to minimize Tor Project's dependance on
federal funding and/or increase what they can do it
would be great to have some additional funding ~10 kUSD/month.
If anyone is aware of anyone who can provide funding at
that level or higher, please contact exec...@torproject.org
__
http://www.nature.com/news/researchers-split-over-nsa-hacking-1.13911
Researchers split over NSA hacking
Cryptographers condemn US National Security Agency’s tapping and tampering,
but mathematicians shrug.
Ann Finkbeiner 08 October 2013
The National Security Agency is the largest employer of
'm not exactly willing to jump in and expend more effort to get another
-0.1 to +0.7 CPB...
Cheers,
--
Saso
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
___
KM_PUSHPAGE flag.
That was a leftover, removed it now. Thanks for spotting this.
Cheers,
--
Saso
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 01:12:19PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> > I don't see how a ham running a repeater backbone can
> > prevent end to end encryption other than sniffing for
> > traffic and actively disrupting it. I'm not sure
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/joseph-lorenzo-hall/2409-nist-sha-3
What the heck is going on with NIST’s cryptographic standard, SHA-3?
by Joseph Lorenzo Hall [1]
September 24, 2013
(Warning: this is a fairly technical post about cryptographic standards
setting.)
The cryptographic community has be
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 08:12:16PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> The US only applies to itself. Further, over the air, it's noise, the crypto
> is undetectable and unprovable. And it's (guerilla) software, not physical
> commercial product. Nor is this the old 'FCC says you can't encrypt
> ham bands' a
t in sync between a pair of communicating
stations over unencrypted 802.11b - there was no IKE or other public
key exchange, just synchronized symmetric ciphers and digests)
- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org"
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:11:33AM -0400, John Young wrote:
> Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict traffic
> volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that.
You need to be able to estimate the rate of information leakage.
This seems to be rela
https://github.com/ShaneWilton/dissentr
Note: This project was created as part of a 36-hour hackathon - and primarily
as a proof of concept. While the ideas may be sound, and the prototype may work
as designed, the protocols involved in this specific project have not been
peer-reviewed, and so
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 11:02:45AM +0300, ianG wrote:
> On 23/09/13 07:12 AM, Dev Random wrote:
> >I've been thinking about this for a while now and I don't see a way to
> >do this with today's mobile devices without some external help.
> >
> >The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete
e password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
AC894EC5:
//mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
_
http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf
Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ?
Georg T. Becker1
, Francesco Regazzoni2
, Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1
1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland
3H
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html
Sep. 9, 2013
SP 800-90 A Rev 1 B and C
DRAFT Draft SP 800-90 Series: Random Bit Generators
800-90 A Rev. 1: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators
800-90 B: Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
http://www.mathbulletin.com/research/Breakthrough_in_cryptography_could_result_in_more_secure_computing.asp
Breakthrough in cryptography could result in more secure computing
(9/10/2013)
Tags: computer science, research, security, cryptography
Nigel Smart, Professor of Cryptology
New research
ain point. At this point,
I'd be very leery of taking anything NSA says or reveals about it practices at
face value, but there it is.
-- Jerry
___
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cryptogra...@metzdowd.com
http://
- Forwarded message from Eric Young -
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 20:58:20 +1000
From: Eric Young
To: Eugen Leitl
Cc: cypherpu...@al-qaeda.net, i...@postbiota.org, zs-...@zerostate.is,
Cryptography List
Subject: Re: [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced,
HW
On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 01:50:54PM -0500, Nicolai wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 02:20:35PM +0200, David D wrote:
>
> > TrueCrypt can be assumed "ok" based on Greenwald using it.If Snowden
> > knew of a hole in TrueCrypt then Greenwald would not be using it. IMO.
>
> I don't think this is
_
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cryptogra...@metzdowd.com
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- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
___
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
Security and Pervasive Monitoring
The Internet community and the IETF care deeply about how much we can trust
commonly used Internet services and the protocols that these services use.
So the reports about large-scale monitoring
Forwarded without permission, hence anonymized:
"
Hey, I had a look at SEC2 and the TLS/SSH RFCs. SSH uses secp256/384r1
which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the
parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!
TLS specifies you can use those two curves as well.
Just got word from an Openswan developer:
"
To my knowledge, we never finished implementing the BTNS mode.
It wouldn't be hard to do --- it's mostly just conditionally commenting out
code.
"
There's obviously a large potential deployment base for
BTNS for home users, just think of Openswan/Open
Forwarded with permission.
So there *is* a BTNS implementation, after all. Albeit
only for OpenBSD -- but this means FreeBSD is next, and
Linux to follow.
- Forwarded message from Andreas Davour -
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 09:10:44 -0700 (PDT)
From: Andreas Davour
To: Eugen Leitl
o
not bother with the extra effort required to produce the Koblitz
curves).
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Eugen* Leit
alistic
hacks.
That is so obnoxious, murmurs the cryptography mail
lists, so opportunistically off-topic, moderator do your
censoring, let's get back to the good stuff. Despite
the murmurrings there recurs calls for "cut the cowardly
shit, let's fight." One guess who said
On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 10:48:02AM -0700, David Johnston wrote:
> It interesting to consider the possibilities of corruption and
> deception that may exist in product design. It's a lot more alarming
> when it's your own design that is being accused of having been
> backdoored. Claiming the NSA co
in mind I should really start on my weekend soon.)
peace,
--
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Eugen*
liberationtech. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36
SkoopYL02AkK/GRirC14C2cXieC8JwjrevIoBQmCLUutNK6
XC4sOGrFZ7Z37sXL+1jT
=4NbV
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
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Euge
Assuming you want to build a family of large-state PRNGs by
using random high-dimensional (N>>3) automaton networks
(>>10^3 nodes or more) where each node state is computed by a
logical function (e.g. XOR) of the node and its neighborhood --
1) is there prior work on that?
2) which methods wo
On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 10:47:10AM -0700, coderman wrote:
> of all the no such agency disclosures, this one fuels the most wild
> speculation.
It is reported that the journalists deliberately withheld details
which are available in Snowden's original documents. Somebody
better leak these, fast.
-dev mailing list
tor-...@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http:/
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 09:47:09AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
> On 2013-08-14 6:10 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
> > - it's really not easy to defeat the PRISMs. the problem is
> >*political* more than technological.
>
> For a human to read all communications would be an impossible burden.
We're
opm...@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com htt
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 03:18:51PM -0400, Riad S. Wahby wrote:
> John Young wrote:
> > Since nearly all government and commercial data centers
> > have generator back-ups, how are emissions from generators
> > controlled?
>
> On assumes that transient emissions, e.g., from a starter motor, follow
anything else," Sahai said.
--
--
Noon Silk
Fancy a quantum lunch? https://sites.google.com/site/quantumlunch/
"Every morning when I wake up, I experience an exquisite joy — the joy
of being this signature."
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- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.c
Implemented as a RetroShare plugin.
https://github.com/zeroreserve/ZeroReserve
ZeroReserve
Friend 2 Friend Payment and Bitcoin exchange
Prerequisite for building is a successful RetroShare build and sqlite3.
To build, checkout the sources to the plugins directory of Retroshare and build
with
ive away potential subscribers.
For those who dislike posting to the "The Base", here's an alternative
domain for the same list: https://cpunks.org/mailman/options/cypherpunks
> Adam
>
> On Sun, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:07:26AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> >- Forwarded message
o the Cypherpunks mailing list. If
you're interested, you can join via
https://al-qaeda.net/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks
Hello,
In the past couple days I've exchanged emails with John Young and
Eugen Leitl on some brokenness in the Cypherpunks mailing list. This
discussion brought
e password by emailing
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
_
word by emailing
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
___
On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 01:43:49AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> Heh, might as well just give up. http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
>
> (I know what you meant, just couldn't resist.)
Certainly a classic, but these days you can really bootstrap
your toolchain in a cleanroom quit
In case you come across particular hair-raising crypto horrors,
please submit them to the author listed on http://www.cryptofails.com/
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On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 10:29:49PM +0300, ianG wrote:
> Not to mention, Intel have been in bed with the NSA for the longest
> time. Secret areas on the chip, pop instructions, microcode and all
> that ... A more interesting question is whether the non-USA
> competitors are also similarly friendl
ling list
tahoe-...@tahoe-lafs.org
https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.c
Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
settings at
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
----- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
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http://www.cryptofails.com/
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is particularly common
algorithm.
I'm not implying QUIC plagiarizes MinimaLT, there are differences in the
protocol, just choice of the algorithm implies QUIC authors are aware of
MinimaLT.
--
++ytti
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.
On Mon, Jul 01, 2013 at 01:31:51PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote:
> The only answer is to take key management out of the users' hands. And
> do it automatically as part of the work flow.
You need at least a Big Fat Warning when the new fingerprint
differs from the cached one, and it's not just expir
On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 07:09:57PM -0700, Yosem Companys wrote:
> Speaking of which...
>
> If you had an extra $2-3K to give to a liberationtech or crypto project,
> who do you think would benefit the most?
A BTNS implementation. There aren't any.
___
c
Comments?
https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/5dd304276ba5745ec21fc1e6686a0b28da29e6fc
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On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 09:38:18AM +0200, David Adamson wrote:
> Danilo Gligoroski wrote:
>
> > 1. Indeed these discussions among the security community
> > 2. Eventually some contacts with journalists will help the cause (one live
> > demonstration on some security/crypto conference like Usenix,
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 10:26:07AM +0300, ianG wrote:
> Is it unreasonable for us to expect Skype to go another way? Are we
> asking too much?
It is unreasonable for an closed source product by a commercial
vendor to go any other way. Fortunately, we have more or less
useful open source/P2P alte
onference. Please forward this message to other mailing lists and
> people.
>
>
> We are shocked with Prof. Hamid Arabnia and his puppet’s activities
> http://worldcomp-fake-bogus.blogspot.com Search Google using the
> keyword worldcomp fake for additional links.
>
> __
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 07:03:04PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
> But my point actually was b...@al-qaeda.net??? Come on that is watch list
Of course it is pure watch list bait. That's the point.
> bait and an invitation NOT to join list blah, whatever it is about.
If you think it's a deterrent, th
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 05:50:18PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>> Isn't exactly that a nice property of a "cypherpunks" list?
>
> No it is not, it is a way to persuade people to leave, or not join the
> listserv.
We have to agree to disagree on that one. A 'punk' of any
kind will tend to thumb his no
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 12:46:49AM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> The original Cypherpunks mailing list seems dead.
>
> Is there any list that it's successor?
De facto it's cypherpu...@al-qaeda.net
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B0
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Eugen* Le
man.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbio
q+Q7d9+NAZB1MEwnY
=1fHP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-
---
illumos-zfs
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P
ng now? I bet
thousands, as a self signed certificate is a valid way of encrypting the
traffic.
Please google, remove this requirement.
Source:
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=21291&ctx=gmail#strictSSL
----- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leit
http://www.indiegogo.com/CryptX2
CryptX2: an Open Source Hardware Encrypted Storage Device
The CryptX2 is a self contained hardware encrypted storage device designed with
the highest level of security possible.
$825
Raised of $18,750 Goal
17 days left
Flexible Funding campaign
Contribute
(ob caveat snake oil crypto)
http://www.nature.com/news/quantum-cryptography-conquers-noise-problem-1.11849
Quantum cryptography conquers noise problem
Encoded photons sent a record distance along busy optical fibres.
Zeeya Merali
20 November 2012
Quantum cryptography could keep messages ult
http://h30565.www3.hp.com/t5/Feature-Articles/Your-GPU-s-Fingerprint-Could-Lead-to-New-Security-Methods/ba-p/8418
Your GPU's “Fingerprint” Could Lead to New Security Methods
by Andy Patrizio (apatrizio) on 29-10-2012 08:00 AM
starlight_dreamstimefree_141720.jpg
In the online world, a World of
__
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48
oltage such that they randomly flip state back and
>forth.
+1.
--
Dan White
- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ati
mbine some of the operations above into single ones. Dynamic
multiple issue and such CPU architectural tricks might get it down
even more. Nevertheless, it still looks like it'd be expensive enough
getting GF(2^128) right to make GF(2^128) unattractive.
Still, maybe somebody should hack this up for the public good, whether
we turn o
tream cipher.
Robert Ransom
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.or
ntel boxes around 7-10 cycles per
> byte when doing GCM.) Full-on multiplication of two arbitrary
> GF(2^128) values is slowest still.
The obvious way to implement GF(2^128) multiplication of a large
number of secret inputs y by one learned-at-runtime secret c is:
* Compute a table of c*X^i fo
On Fri, Oct 05, 2012 at 10:58:40AM +0200, Guus Sliepen wrote:
> > 1. Measure. Don't speculate.
>
> I found a benchmark here:
> https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/rfcs/benchmark.txt
>
> So it seems that is not as slow as I suspected: it can forward packets at a
> rate of 7 Gbit/s on
> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
>
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9333 x107
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__
- Forwarded message from Jim Klimov -
From: Jim Klimov
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 19:12:16 +0400
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Pawel Jakub Dawidek , Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
Reply-To: jimkli...@cos.ru
Organization: JSC
- Forwarded message from Pawel Jakub Dawidek -
From: Pawel Jakub Dawidek
Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2012 16:00:05 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
Cc: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner
announced)
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
On Thu
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 15:39:18 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
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- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 15:19:59 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner
announced)
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:7.0.1
I've recently become interested in cjdns http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cjdns
which apparently used NaCl in UDP over tun when tunneling.
I'm not aware of any review of the entire system, including
key generation etc.
Has this been done yet? Thanks.
___
- Forwarded message from Jim Klimov -
From: Jim Klimov
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 13:44:21 +0400
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
Reply-To: jimkli...@cos.ru
Organization: JSC COS/HT
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- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 22:19:19 +0200
To: Dr Adam Back
CC: Eugen Leitl , cryptography@randombit.net
Subject: Re: ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 15:54:08 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced
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- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 15:41:47 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced
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Thunderbird/7.0.1
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov -
From: Sašo Kiselkov
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 15:39:39 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl
Subject: Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced
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illumos-zfs
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
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http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/behind-intels-new-randomnumber-generator/0
Behind Intel's New Random-Number Generator
The random-number generator uses digital circuits to stump the smartest
hackers
By Greg Taylor, George Cox / September 2011
Image: Carl DeTorres
Imagine that it'
2876-a25d3366
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org
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