[cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Peter Gutmann
I recently got a another of the standard phishing emails for Paypal, directing me to https://email-edg.paypal.com, which redirects to https://view.paypal-communication.com, which has a PayPal EV certificate from Verisign. According to this post

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 5:10 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: I recently got a another of the standard phishing emails for Paypal, directing me to https://email-edg.paypal.com, which redirects to https://view.paypal-communication.com, which has a PayPal EV certificate from

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread wasa bee
given the images seen on the links, both certs are signed by the same entity (i cannot see the pubKey ID but issuer names match), yet have the same serial number 3014267. Isn't the (serial number + issuer pub key identifier) supposed to be unique and identify a cert uniquely? is it common practice

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Erwann Abalea
The serial number you find in the subject of an EV certificate is the registration number of the company (Paypal Inc, in Delaware). There's absolutely no problem in having different certificates with this repeating serial number (in the subject), as long as they are delivered to the right company.

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Peter Gutmann
Erwann Abalea eaba...@gmail.com writes: Looks like paypal-communication.com is a legit domain owned by Paypal, Inc. Even though, according to the second article I referenced, Paypal said it was a phishing site and said they'd take it down? Peter. ___

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Tom Ritter
On 13 August 2013 07:00, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote: Erwann Abalea eaba...@gmail.com writes: Looks like paypal-communication.com is a legit domain owned by Paypal, Inc. Even though, according to the second article I referenced, Paypal said it was a phishing site and said

Re: [cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Natanael
That's trademarks, not copyright, and they get it transfered IF they request it and the original owner did not have a valid reason to use that domain with the trademarked name/phrase. And either way, reusing previously malicious domains for legit purposes is probably THE WORST method ever of

Re: [cryptography] not a Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread John Levine
In article e1v9ac6-0005vx...@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz you write: I recently got a another of the standard phishing emails for Paypal, directing me to https://email-edg.paypal.com, which redirects to https://view.paypal-communication.com, which has a PayPal EV certificate from Verisign.

[cryptography] Certificate Transparency Hack Day

2013-08-13 Thread Ben Laurie
The Certificate Transparency hack day will take place at Google’s London offices on Wednesday, the 28th of August, 2013. Please sign up on this formhttps://docs.google.com/a/google.com/forms/d/1jvO5OdkvRhyTV6XU4Q-YaRKlTSF7rh94LzRFbICHRg8/viewform by August 22nd, to let us know you plan to attend.

[cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
Dear people of the cryptography@randombit.net mailing list: For obvious reasons, the time has come to push hard on *verifiable* end-to-end encryption. Here's our first attempt. We intend to bring more! We welcome criticism, suggestions, and requests. Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder,

Re: [cryptography] not a Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Ben Lincoln (F70C92E3)
On Tue, August 13, 2013 6:25 am, John Levine wrote: I agree that it was not a great idea for Paypal to invent paypal-communication.com rather than a subdomain of one of their existing well-known domains such as communication.paypal.com. Using a different second-level domain is generally a

Re: [cryptography] not a Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Andy Steingruebl
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Ben Lincoln (F70C92E3) f70c9...@beneaththewaves.net wrote: Unfortunately, it does look somewhat suspicious from a phishing perspective, especially if a link to a paypal.com subdomain redirects to it, which (to an end user) looks a lot like what happens when a

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread ianG
Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. Q: do you have some sense of how long the accesses take? E.g., I'm at the end of a long ping, will I expect the actions to take ms, s, or ks? iang On 13/08/13 18:56 PM, Zooko Wilcox-OHearn wrote: Dear people of the

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 8/13/13 11:02 AM, ianG wrote: Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. How so? Centralization via commercial operators doesn't seem to have helped in the email space lately. Peter -- Peter Saint-Andre https://stpeter.im/

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 5:16 PM, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im wrote: On 8/13/13 11:02 AM, ianG wrote: Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. How so? Centralization via commercial operators doesn't seem to have helped in the email space lately. It helps

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Peter Saint-Andre
On 8/13/13 12:53 PM, ianG wrote: On 13/08/13 20:16 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: On 8/13/13 11:02 AM, ianG wrote: Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. How so? Centralization via commercial operators doesn't seem to have helped in the email space lately.

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Nico Williams
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 12:02 PM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote: Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. A few points: - if only you access your own files then there's much less interest for a government in your files: they might contain evidence of crimes and

Re: [cryptography] not a Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread or perelman
Hi Guys, if you love crypto-currency, I would be glad if you check out our new startup at http://bitblu.com. I would love for feedbacks of anykind. Thanks a lot! On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:40 PM, Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.comwrote: On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Ben Lincoln

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Nico Williams
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Peter Saint-Andre stpe...@stpeter.im wrote: Although presumably there would be value in shutting down a privacy-protecting service just so that people can't benefit from it any longer. When the assumption is that everything must be public, any service that

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread Richard Guy Briggs
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 01:09:15PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: On 8/13/13 12:53 PM, ianG wrote: On 13/08/13 20:16 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: On 8/13/13 11:02 AM, ianG wrote: Super! I think a commercial operator is an essential step forward. How so? Centralization via commercial

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-13 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-08-14 6:10 AM, Nico Williams wrote: - it's really not easy to defeat the PRISMs. the problem is *political* more than technological. For a human to read all communications would be an impossible burden. Instead, apply the following algorithm. Identify people of interest. Read

Re: [cryptography] not a Paypal phish using EV certificate

2013-08-13 Thread Seth David Schoen
James A. Donald writes: Although websites often use huge numbers of huge cookies, one can easily optimize one's cookie use. I can see no reason why anyone would ever need more than a single 96 bit cookie that is a random number. They might want to make the content and purpose of the cookie