[CTRL] The Lessons of 9/11
-Caveat Lector- http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul174.html The Lessons of 9/11 by Rep. Ron Paul, MD Before the US House of Representatives, April 22, 2004 We are constantly admonished to remember the lessons of 9/11. Of course the real issue is not remembering, but rather knowing what the pertinent lesson of that sad day is. The 9/11 Commission soon will release its report after months of fanfare by those whose reputations are at stake. The many hours and dollars spent on the investigation may well reveal little we dont already know, while ignoring the most important lessons that should be learned from this egregious attack on our homeland. Common sense already tells us the tens of billions of dollars spent by government agencies, whose job it is to provide security and intelligence for our country, failed. A full-fledged investigation into the bureaucracy may help us in the future, but one should never pretend that government bureaucracies can be made efficient. It is the very nature of bureaucracies to be inefficient. Spending an inordinate amount of time finger pointing will distract from the real lessons of 9/11. Which agency, which department, or which individual receives the most blame should not be the main purpose of the investigation. Despite our serious failure to prevent the attacks, its disturbing to see how politicized the whole investigation has become. Which political party receives the greatest blame is a high stakes election-year event, and distracts from the real lessons ignored by both sides. Everyone on the Commission assumes that 9/11 resulted from a lack of government action. No one in Washington has raised the question of whether our shortcomings, brought to light by 9/11, could have been a result of too much government. Possibly in the final report we will discuss this, but to date no one has questioned the assumption that we need more government and, of course though elusive a more efficient one. The failure to understand the nature of the enemy who attacked us on 9/11, along with a pre-determined decision to initiate a pre-emptive war against Iraq, prompted our government to deceive the people into believing that Saddam Hussein had something to do with the attacks on New York and Washington. The majority of the American people still contend the war against Iraq was justified because of the events of 9/11. These misinterpretations have led to many U.S. military deaths and casualties, prompting a growing number of Americans to question the wisdom of our presence and purpose in a strange foreign land 6,000 miles from our shores. The neo-conservative defenders of our policy in Iraq speak of the benefits that we have brought to the Iraqi people: removal of a violent dictator, liberation, democracy, and prosperity. If all this were true, the resistance against our occupation would not be growing. We ought to admit we have not been welcomed as liberators as was promised by the proponents of the war. Though we hear much about the so-called benefits we have delivered to the Iraqi people and the Middle East, we hear little talk of the cost to the American people: lives lost, soldiers maimed for life, uncounted thousands sent home with diseased bodies and minds, billions of dollars consumed, and a major cloud placed over U.S. markets and the economy. Sharp political divisions, reminiscent of the 1960s, are arising at home. Failing to understand why 9/11 happened and looking for a bureaucratic screw-up to explain the whole thing while using the event to start an unprovoked war unrelated to 9/11 have dramatically compounded the problems all Americans and the world face. Evidence has shown that there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and the guerilla attacks on New York and Washington, and since no weapons of mass destruction were found, other reasons are given for invading Iraq. The real reasons are either denied or ignored: oil, neo-conservative empire building, and our support for Israel over the Palestinians. The proponents of the Iraqi war do not hesitate to impugn the character of those who point out the shortcomings of current policy, calling them unpatriotic and appeasers of terrorism. It is said that they are responsible for the growing armed resistance, and for the killing of American soldiers. Its conveniently ignored that if the opponents of the current policy had prevailed, not one single American would have died nor would tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have suffered the same fate. Al Qaeda and many new militant groups would not be enjoying a rapid growth in their ranks. By denying that our sanctions and bombs brought havoc to Iraq, its easy to play the patriot card and find a scapegoat to blame. We are never at fault and never responsible for bad outcomes of what many believe is, albeit well-intentioned, interference in the affairs of others 6,000 miles from our shores. Pursuing our policy has boiled down to testing our resolve. It is said by
[CTRL] Fwd: Lessons Of History, Part II
-Caveat Lector- www.ctrl.org DECLARATION DISCLAIMER == CTRL is a discussion informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. Archives Available at: http://www.mail-archive.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ A HREF=""ctrl/A To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om ---BeginMessage--- -Caveat Lector- * * * * * * * * * * * * REMINDER * * * * * * * * * * * * * On the days that I don't publish, like today, you will receive Bill Bonner's DAILY RECKONING. This will help you to keep pace with the changes in the markets. Bonner and I agree on most things in the field of economics, so the two letters will reinforce each other. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Lessons Of History, Part II The Daily Reckoning Paris, France Wednesday, 15 October, 2003 - *** Dow still on echo-bubble trajectory... gold up... *** 'Spending our way to disaster'... Americans now borrowing $3 for every $1 of extra income... the what's-my- monthly-payment nation... from 'job-loss' to 'jobless' recovery... *** The British in Iraq... Stop picking on Rush... and more! - Spending our way to disaster, begins a CNN story. The consumer debt bubble in the United States could make the stock bubble seem like nothing, it continues, stealing not just our thunder, but our lightning and hailstones too. The American consumer has become deeply addicted to spending, running up ever-higher levels of debt in order to live in a fashion that is beyond his means. And the world has become equally addicted to the consumer continuing to burn through cash. It's a dangerous situation - potentially a bubble that dwarfs even the U.S. asset bubble that burst in 2000 - and it will be a challenge for policy-makers to keep it from ending badly. It will be more than a challenge, we think. It will be impossible. Back in the '60s, Americans borrowed about $1 for every $3 of extra income they earned. By the '80s, they were up to borrowing $1.50. But when the something-for-nothing mentality really took hold of the country in the late '90s, when the ratio rose to the point where Americans were borrowing $4 for every $3 in new income. Then, in the last couple of years, Americans borrowed even more - about $4.50 for every 3 bucks of extra income. And most recently, according to Kurt Richeb?her, for every $3 increase in income, debt was clocked running at nearly $9. The consumer didn't worry about it, because interest rates fell so much he was able to refinance his house... reschedule his debts... and buy a new car at zero- percent interest. We're a what's-my-monthly-payment nation, says Northern Trust's Paul Kasriel. House prices - rising more or less in line with increases in the money supply - and low interest rates made it possible to keep the spending frenzy going. Consumers could 'take out equity' while actually reducing their monthly payments. CNN notes that Wells Fargo now offers NowLine Visa, which gives homeowners access to a home equity line that can be used for everyday expenses like gas, groceries, clothes, etc. Thus does 'the world's mouth' gobble down its own houses, one brick at time. Would it surprise you, dear reader, if it developed a case of indigestion? Just as you can't get something for nothing, neither can you use nothing to pay back what you borrowed when you thought you had something. Instead, creditors will want hard-earned cash. Over to you, Addison... - Addison Wiggin with news on the markets... - Here's news: Powerful interests are said to be resisting change at the New York Stock Exchange. Ya don't say. - After Dick Grasso ceremoniously departed as head honcho of the exchange - following scrutiny over his $187 million deferred-compensation package - many of the nation's wish- they-were-powerful windbags started calling for major reforms. Yesterday, state pension fund managers met with new acting interim chairman, John Reed, and tried to strong arm him into exacting changes in the way the NYSE is governed. Their beef? Securities firms that are
[CTRL] Immigration lessons from the first U.S. war with Iraq
-Caveat Lector- http://www.laweekly.com/ink/03/06/news-crogan.php Immigration lessons from the first U.S. war with Iraq by Jim Crogan THE ARRESTS LAST WEEK OF HUNDREDS OF people from Muslim countries is the harshest evidence yet of how U.S. immigration policies have clashed with civil liberties since 9/11. And, ironically, one of the best examples of a more open immigration process â possibly too open, says a former State Department employee who supervised it â came at the close of this countryâs last war with Iraq in 1991. In the years following the Gulf War, the U.S. allowed 12,500 Iraqis to enter the U.S., including up to 6,000 exâprisoners of war. A good number were opponents of Saddam Hussein who most certainly would have been killed had they been forced to leave the camps in Saudi Arabia and return to Iraq. But regardless of their status, most were allowed to immigrate to the United States after passing only cursory scrutiny, according to current and former U.S. officials interviewed for this story. No one has come forward with evidence that immigrants sympathetic to the Hussein regime may have slipped into the U.S. and are plotting harm, but the deal made with Saudi officials who wanted nothing to do with providing safe haven for Iraqi soldiers a decade ago raises questions and offers important historical perspective. For one, it shows how some of the same players in todayâs dispute with Iraq â Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney â had previously adopted a loose policy that allowed thousands of refugees to enter the U.S. without insisting on thorough investigations or even routine monitoring. In the post-9/11 climate, that more humanitarian approach has been entirely supplanted with a policy dominated by fears of terrorism. Just last month, The New York Times broke a story about an intelligence program to track thousands of Iraqi immigrants, though it was not clear from the story, nor was it made clear later by the State Department, whether special emphasis will be given to the ex-soldiers with military and weapons training now in the U.S. Several military and State Department sources told the Weekly that the looser resettlement policies of a decade ago could make it nearly impossible to track down all of those who entered the country after the Gulf War. Trying to piece together what happened in the immediate days following the Gulf War isnât easy. Spokesmen at the State Department and CIA said they could find no one who was around at the time, or who could produce records that would show what took place. One of the key players at the time was Rob Frazier, who has since left his government post and now works as a private computer-security consultant in Virginia. In August 1991, he arrived at his American Embassy posting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and, as a political official, the task fell to him to deal with refugees staying at two camps. One camp, outside Rafha, a town 600 miles north of the Saudi capital, and a few kilometers from Iraqâs southern border, was home to some 34,000 Iraqi men, women and children. The second camp, at Al-Artawiyah, situated almost halfway between Riyadh and Rafha, housed 13,000 exâIraqi soldiers. These former POWs had been among the 83,000 Iraqi soldiers captured by U.S. and coalition forces during Desert Storm. Most of them were quickly repatriated after the war ended, but those remaining at Al-Artawiyah refused to go home, claiming that Saddam Husseinâs internal-security forces would persecute or kill them for their political or religious beliefs. Frazier says the handling of these former combatants posed a real dilemma for U.S. officials. "We had a case where enemy soldiers refused to go back home." Frazier, who wrote the State Departmentâs human rights reports on conditions inside Saudi Arabia for 1991, 1992 and 1993, made regular car trips to both camps. The conditions at Al- Artawiyah, Frazier says, were harsh. Even though these men were now claiming political asylum, the Saudis ran the facility as a prisoner camp, causing a lot of anger inside. Saudi officials wanted the international community to move these people out of their territory. In late 1991, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, made a final plea to the ex-prisoners to return home. That appeal was rebuffed. It was then, Frazier says, that a political deal was struck: The U.N. commission agreed to step in and take responsibility so long as the U.S. and other countries agreed to resettle the refugees outside Saudi Arabia. It was an unprecedented arrangement, "but a decision was made that something had to be done," Frazier says. In December 1992, Al-Artawiyah was closed and the remaining Iraqis moved in with the civilian population at Rafha, a merger that produced some creative bookkeeping that benefited all the countries involved. The ex-prisoners were reclassified as civilian refugees. The U.S.
[CTRL] The Lessons Of Blowback
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-78169sep30.story?coll=la%2Dnews%2Dcomment%2Dopinions The Lessons of Blowback Even carefully planned actions can have unintended consequences. Let's not do something that ultimately benefits terrorists. By CHALMERS JOHNSON, Chalmers Johnson is author of "Revolutionary Change" and "Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire." SAN DIEGO -- One of the objectives of terrorism is to provoke the ruling elites of a target regime into disastrous overreaction. When it works, as it has in Israel over the past year, the results can be devastating for all sides. Who does this ultimately benefit? The terrorists. Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian guerrilla leader whose writings influenced political terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s, explained why. If the government can be provoked into a military response to terrorism, he wrote, this will alienate the masses, causing them to "revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things." The overreaction doesn't necessarily have to alienate only domestic "masses." If we inflict great misery on innocent people in the Middle East, there will almost certainly be what the CIA refers to as "blowback"--unintended negative consequences of our actions. Vacillating supporters of the terrorists might be drawn into committing terrorist acts. Moderate governments throughout the Islamic world, especially in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, would almost certainly face growing internal dissent and could even be overthrown. Perhaps the prime example of terrorism succeeding is the Philippeville massacre of Aug. 20, 1955, in which Algerian revolutionaries killed 123 French colonials. A conscious act of terrorism carried out by revolutionaries who until then had enjoyed only slight popular backing, the Philippeville massacre led to a massive and bloody retaliation by the French. It also converted a leading French reformer (Jacques Soustelle, then governor-general of Algeria) into an advocate of suppression. The French crackdown eliminated most of the moderates on the Muslim side and caused influential French citizens back home to turn against their country's policies. This chain of events ultimately provoked a French army mutiny, brought Gen. Charles de Gaulle back to power as the savior of the nation and caused a French withdrawal from Algeria. Franco-Algerian relations are still strained today. No political cause can justify the killing on Sept. 11 of thousands of innocent people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. But neither would our killing innocent people in retaliation be justifiable. Terrorists attack the vulnerable because their intended targets (the military might of a rich country) are inaccessible. By attacking the innocent, terrorists intend to draw attention to the sins of the invulnerable. Like the anarchism of the 19th century, terrorism is propaganda by deed. The perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks are all dead. Now we must identify, apprehend and convict their accomplices. If it is discovered that a state harbored or backed them, then a declaration of war against that state would be appropriate. So far, the available evidence pointing to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization is circumstantial: Bin Laden has issued edicts calling on Muslims to kill Americans; one of the hijackers had ties to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, whose leader is a known associate of Bin Laden's; and U.S. and German intelligence officers have intercepted telephone conversations in which Al Qaeda groups were told of the attacks. But there has been no evidence linking the attackers to Afghanistan. Of the 19 hijackers, 11 have been identified by the FBI as probably Saudi Arabians, three others as, respectively, an Egyptian, a Lebanese and a citizen of the United Arab Emirates. The countries of origin of the others are unknown. So far, the United States has reacted to the terrorist attacks with an almost classic repetition of the French blunders following Philippeville. From his first remarks to the nation on the evening of Sept. 11, President Bush has been pointlessly, even comically, belligerent (the U.S. wants Bin Laden "dead or alive," we must "smoke them out of their caves and get them running"). By initially calling his retaliation plan "Operation Infinite Justice," he gave it a needlessly religious and messianic coloration. He seems to lack insight or candor about what we actually face and the seriousness of the problem (we were attacked because we are a "beacon of freedom" and our attackers are without motives, merely "evil doers, those barbaric people"). The president has rebuffed calls from countries such as China and Iran that the U.S. obtain United Nations sanction for its retaliatory actions. Instead, his hyperbole has led thoughtful listeners to question what sort of actions he intends to pursue. "Our war on terror," Bush said to Congress and the nation on Sept. 20, "begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not
[CTRL] Bush Lessons Learned In Chile Used In Florida
Source: "Subject: CIA Activities in Chile" September 18, 2000 © CIA (Publication from its official website.) http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/chile/ "At the direction of the White House and interagency policy coordination committees, CIA undertook the covert activities described below. There were sustained propaganda efforts, including financial support for major news media, against Allende and other Marxists. Political action projects supported selected parties before and after the 1964 elections and after Allende’s 1970 election. In April 1962, the “5412 Panel Special Group”—a sub-cabinet body charged with reviewing proposed covert actions—approved a proposal to carry out a program of covert financial assistance to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) to support the 1964 Presidential candidacy of Eduardo Frei. Also in 1962, the CIA began supporting a civic action group that undertook various propaganda activities, including distributing posters and leaflets. In December 1963, the 5412 Group agreed to provide a one-time payment to the Democratic Front, a coalition of three moderate to conservative parties, in support of the Front’s Presidential campaign. In April 1964, the 5412 Group approved a propaganda and political action program for the upcoming September 1964 Presidential election. In May 1964, following the dissolution of the Democratic Front, the “303 Committee,” successor to the 5412 Group, agreed to give the Radical Party additional covert assistance. In February 1965, the 303 Committee approved a proposal to give covert assistance to selected candidates in upcoming Congressional elections. In 1967, the CIA set up a propaganda mechanism for making placements in radio and news media. In July 1968, the 303 Committee approved a political action program to support individual moderate candidates running in the 1969 Congressional elections. As a result of 1968 propaganda activities, in 1969 the “40 Committee” (successor to the 303 Committee) approved the establishment of a propaganda workshop. In the run up to the 1970 Presidential elections, the 40 Committee directed CIA to carry out “spoiling operations” to prevent an Allende victory. As part of a “Track I” strategy to block Allende from taking office after the 4 September election, CIA sought to influence a Congressional run-off vote required by the Constitution because Allende did not win an absolute majority. As part of a “Track II” strategy, CIA was directed to seek to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office (see discussion below). While Allende was in office, the 40 Committee approved the redirection of “Track I” operations that—combined with a renewed effort to support the PDC in 1971 and a project to provide support to the National Party and Democratic Radical Party in 1972—funneled millions of dollars to strengthen opposition political parties. CIA also provided assistance to militant right-wing groups to undermine the President and create a tense environment. Support for Coup in 1970. Under “Track II” of the strategy, CIA sought to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office after he won a plurality in the 4 September election and before, as Constitutionally required because he did not win an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress reaffirmed his victory. CIA was working with three different groups of plotters. All three groups made it clear that any coup would require the kidnapping of Army Commander Rene Schneider, who felt deeply that the Constitution required that the Army allow Allende to assume power. CIA agreed with that assessment. Although CIA provided weapons to one of the groups, we have found no information that the plotters’ or CIA’s intention was for the general to be killed. Contact with one group of plotters was dropped early on because of its extremist tendencies. CIA provided tear gas, submachine-guns and ammunition to the second group. The third group attempted to kidnap Schneider, mortally wounding him in the attack. CIA had previously encouraged this group to launch a coup but withdrew support four days before the attack because, in CIA’s assessment, the group could not carry it out successfully."
[CTRL] No Lessons
-Caveat Lector- Via NewRepublic Kosovo no War, no Foreign Affairs News Keywords: KOSOVO, Source: Anchorage Daily News Published: July 2, 1999 Author: George C. Wilson Posted on 07/12/1999 18:19:25 PDT by rollin Anchorage Daily News July 2, 1999 No War, No Lessons After Kosovo, Stevens Says By George C. Wilson, Legi-Slate News Service Washington -- There are no military lessons to be learned from NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic because it was not a war at all, Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, said Thursday. The World War II bomber pilot told defense reporters over breakfast that "we never had an engagement" with the Yugoslav military. "They never came to war with us," Stevens said. "We just bombed the hell out of them until they signed an agreement. "We had 780 million people (in the NATO alliance) attacking 20 million people, and they finally came to their knees after (NAT0 forces) bombed for four months. What's the precedent out of that? There's no precedent out of that. I don't see it having any relationship to the ability of the Army on the ground in a war. "We never fought anybody there" in the Balkans over Kosovo, "not even their planes," he said. "This was just a bombing campaign until we bombed them into submission. And I guess if you can find another country that was located like Serbia was -- where it was completely surrounded by people friendly to us -- where we had free access to it all the time, I guess we could bomb anyone into submission if you wanted to take on that task. "But defeating 20 million people the way we defeated them," Stevens continued, "I don't think that's something we should go around holding our head high in the air (about) and saying we're superior" because "we ended the war by the air. The war never started. "I think it's an anomaly," Stevens said of the air war against Milosevic. "I don't think it's a lesson at all." Stevens' remarks came against a backdrop of postwar audits by Air Force generals who have emphasized in recent closed-door meetings, that their bombing campaign, while highly professional, was no cause for gloating, participants told LEGI-SLATE News Service. The bombing wore out air crews and aircraft and used up the inventory of smart weapons that will cost billions to replenish, the generals said. The strain of the Kosovo bombing campaign has compelled Air Force leaders to focus on what they call "reconstitution" -- curing the downsized service of ills inflicted by such sudden and intense deployments as those to the Balkans. One ill is the stress imposed on Air Force families whose unhappiness often prompts airmen to quit the service. The Air Force is now critically short of pilots and is looking for additional ways to stem the exodus. Stevens recalled that airmen based in Aviano, Italy, expressed much less enthusiasm to him about bombing Yugoslavia than attacking the Iraqi military during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. In giving his views on a wide range of other military matters, Stevens made these points: * The Army. It should be enlarged beyond its projected active-duty strength of 480,000 and a "portion" of it should be trained in peacekeeping since that mission predominates these days, he said. Stevens said the Army trains its volunteers "to be warriors, and we end up putting them at intersections at Haiti, the Balkans, Kuwait and now Kosovo. Let's train some people to be peacekeepers in the sense of being able to carry light arms and be able to defend themselves and be on the streets of Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti and wherever the hell they want to put peacekeepers." Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the newly sworn-in Army Chief of Staff, said at his first news conference on June 23 that 480,000 "may not be enough" people to carry out the Army's missions. He said he would withhold final judgment until a manpower study in completed. Other Army leaders have warned that enlarging the Army would put an extra burden on recruiters who already have trouble signing up enough volunteers to fill the ranks. * China. "I really don't look at China as a threat to the United States" in the sense of it stealing our most vital secrets through spying, Stevens said. "I served in China in World War II. I've been back there many times. I think the bulk of Chinese people look at us as friends. We've got to wait out another generational change" in China's top leadership to achieve better harmony," he said. "There's a substrata coming together of younger people in the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan. And if you want to look at the industrial base, a great portion of the industrial base for Taiwan is on the mainland. This means to me that if we stop worrying about these guys who are rattling cages and look at the bulk of the population and where it's going, we can have a great bond of friendship
