Adam Lydick wrote:
The faq (see attached) claims that anyone can write a nexus and that
users control which nexus(s) run.
I certainly didn't see anything that suggests that anyone can force you
to run arbitrary code, regardless of who has signed it.
Force, maybe not. No one can force me to
Ian Grigg wrote:
(Similar to GSM's. That is hard to attack,
there is AFAIR no 'trival' attack, [...]
Just wait a little while.
By the way, one can already buy fake base stations that
mount man-in-the-middle attacks on GSM as a way to eavesdrop
on GSM calls. It's off the shelf, but it costs
Sampo Syreeni wrote:
Rather it's the fact that the Big
Brother doesn't have the necessary total funds, and so doesn't listen into
a considerable proportion of calls as a whole.
Yet.
As far as we know.
:-)
I agree it's an economic issue, and law enforcement doesn't seem to
listen in on a
Declan McCullagh wrote:
Also epic.org (not a cypherpunk-friendly organization,
but it does try to limit law enforcement surveillance) [...]
Is the cypherpunks movement truly so radicalized that it is
not willing to count even EPIC among its friends?
Tyler Durden wrote:
Sorry, I'm new, but does this refer to the notion of splitting up a document
holographically, and placing the various pieces of numerous servers
throughout the 'Net?
No. It is referring to conventional encryption of your local hard disk.
Tyler Durden wrote:
Sorry, I'm new, but does this refer to the notion of splitting up a document
holographically, and placing the various pieces of numerous servers
throughout the 'Net?
No. It is referring to conventional encryption of your local hard disk.
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Lucky Green wrote:
In the interest of clarity, it probably should be mentioned that any
claims Microsoft may make stating that Microsoft will not encrypt their
software or software components when used with Palladium of course only
applies to Microsoft [...]
First, it
Nomen Nescio wrote:
Carl Ellison suggested an alternate way that TCPA could work to allow
for revoking virtualized TPMs without the privacy problems associated
with the present systems, and the technical problems of the elaborate
cryptographic methods.
[...]
Instead of burning only one key into
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
His description of how the Document Revocation List could work is
interesting as well. Basically you would have to connect to a server
every time you wanted to read a document, in order to download a key
to unlock it. Then if someone decided that the document needed
to
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
[Ob Cypherpunks: Seriously, folks. How clueful can someone be who
clearly doesn't know how to use more than one remailer hop, as proven
by the fact that he's always coming out of the *same* remailer all
the time?
I hope I don't need to point out that always using the same
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
In fact, you are perfectly correct that Microsoft architectures would
make it easy at any time to implement DRL's or SNRL's. They could do
that tomorrow! They don't need TCPA. So why blame TCPA for this feature?
The relevance should be obvious. Without TCPA/Palladium,
R. A. Hettinga wrote:
[Ob Cypherpunks: Seriously, folks. How clueful can someone be who
clearly doesn't know how to use more than one remailer hop, as proven
by the fact that he's always coming out of the *same* remailer all
the time?
I hope I don't need to point out that always using the same
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
In fact, you are perfectly correct that Microsoft architectures would
make it easy at any time to implement DRL's or SNRL's. They could do
that tomorrow! They don't need TCPA. So why blame TCPA for this feature?
The relevance should be obvious. Without TCPA/Palladium,
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
His description of how the Document Revocation List could work is
interesting as well. Basically you would have to connect to a server
every time you wanted to read a document, in order to download a key
to unlock it. Then if someone decided that the document needed
to
James A. Donald wrote:
According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
Your point is taken. That said, even if you could turn off TCPA
Palladium and run some
James A. Donald wrote:
According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium
hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.
Your point is taken. That said, even if you could turn off TCPA
Palladium and run some
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
David Wagner wrote:
The Hollings bill was interesting not for its success or failure, but
for what it reveals the content companies' agenda.
The CBDTPA, available in text form at
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/hollings.s2048.032102.html,
does not explicitly call
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
David Wagner wrote:
The Hollings bill was interesting not for its success or failure, but
for what it reveals the content companies' agenda.
The CBDTPA, available in text form at
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/hollings.s2048.032102.html,
does not explicitly call
David Wagner wrote:
Anonymous wrote:
Legislation of DRM is not in the cards, [...]
Care to support this claim? (the Hollings bill and the DMCA requirement
for Macrovision in every VCR come to mind as evidence to the contrary)
To reiterate and lay out the points explicitly
Anonymous wrote:
Legislation of DRM is not in the cards, [...]
Care to support this claim? (the Hollings bill and the DMCA requirement
for Macrovision in every VCR come to mind as evidence to the contrary)
Anonymous wrote:
Legislation of DRM is not in the cards, [...]
Care to support this claim? (the Hollings bill and the DMCA requirement
for Macrovision in every VCR come to mind as evidence to the contrary)
Anonymous wrote:
Piracy - unauthorized copying of copyrighted material - is wrong.
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html
When an artist releases a song or some other creative product to the
world, they typically put some conditions on it.
Don't overlook the fact that when the
Mike Rosing wrote:
As long as MS Office isn't mandated by law, who cares?
It's not clear that enabling anti-competitive behavior is good
for society. After all, there's a reason we have anti-trust law.
Ross Anderson's point -- and it seems to me it's one worth considering
-- is that, if there
Scott Guthery wrote:
Perhaps somebody can describe
a non-DRM privacy management system.
Uhh, anonymous remailers? I never disclose my identity, hence there is
no need for parties I don't trust to manage it.
Come on, folks. This ought to be cypherpunks 101. DRM might be one
way to achieve
Anonymous wrote:
The amazing thing about this discussion is that there are two pieces
of conventional wisdom which people in the cypherpunk/EFF/freedom
communities adhere to, and they are completely contradictory.
I can't agree. Strong protection of copyright is probably possible if
the
Scott Guthery wrote:
Perhaps somebody can describe
a non-DRM privacy management system.
Uhh, anonymous remailers? I never disclose my identity, hence there is
no need for parties I don't trust to manage it.
Come on, folks. This ought to be cypherpunks 101. DRM might be one
way to achieve
Anonymous wrote:
Why, then, did you go ahead with publication?
I believe publishing is important for the advancement of the field.
If noone publishes, how will we learn from our mistakes? How will
people learn of the risks? Fortunately, we are in a privileged position.
The university has been
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