One other point with regard to Daniel Nagy's paper at
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
A good way to organize papers like this is to first present the
desired properties of systems like yours (and optionally show that
other systems fail to meet one or more of these properties);
On 10/28/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Irreversibility of transactions hinges on two features of the proposed
> systetm: the fundamentally irreversible nature of publishing information in
> the public records and the fact that in order to invalidate a secret, one
> needs to know i
On 10/26/05, James A. Donald <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> How does one inflate a key?
Just make it bigger by adding redundancy and padding, before you
encrypt it and store it on your disk. That way the attacker who wants
to steal your keyring sees a 4 GB encrypted file which actually holds
about a
> The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
> the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
> about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
> anything else.
Fine, I want it to be about crypto and anonymity. You can
> From: Kerry Bonin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2005 06:52:57 -0700
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Peer-to-peer development." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] P2P Authentication
> User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Windows/20050716)
> Reply-To: "Peer-to-peer development."
Wasn't there a rumor last year that Skype didn't do any encryption
padding, it just did a straight exponentiation of the plaintext?
Would that be safe, if as the report suggests, the data being
encrypted is 128 random bits (and assuming the encryption exponent is
considerably bigger than 3)? Seems
On 10/25/05, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> More on topic, I recently heard about a scam involving differential
> reversibility between two remote payment systems. The fraudster sends
> you an email asking you to make a Western Union payment to a third
> party, and deposits the requested a
On 10/26/05, Shawn K. Quinn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
> > Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
> > thus are subject to what economists call "network externalities". The
> > best example I can think of is Microsoft
On 10/24/05, John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> More to the point, an irreversible payment system raises big practical
> problems in a world full of very hard-to-secure PCs running the
> relevant software. One exploitable software bug, properly used, can
> steal an enormous amount of money i
> http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
>
> I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
> they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
> rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
> without. If anonymity mechanisms a
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
> court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
> problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
> matter at hand
On 10/23/05, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
> p2pka) is based on section 3.3 and 3.4.2 and is something like this:
>
> A -> B: N_ab
> B -> A: N_ba
> B -> A: Sign{f(N_ab)}_a
> A -> B: Sign{f(N_ba)}_b
> A -> B: Sign{A, K_a
On 10/22/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> R. Hirschfeld wrote:
> > This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
> > factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
> > chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
> > the payer)
On 10/13/05, Brian Minder <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This
> includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions
> accordingly.
Gmail would facilitate automating a new cypherpunks-moderated list.
Gmail's sp
On 10/20/05, R.A. Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
> >Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
>
> Google is your friend, dude.
>
> Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
> consulting the literature.
On 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> > As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
> > couple of approaches discussed.
> >
> > The simplest goes like this. If
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement, "I will
perform service X if Alice supplies me with a mint signature
On 10/18/05, Major Variola (ret.) <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists
> should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class
> journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema.
We put up with this "needs killing" crap from Tim
Let's take a look at Daniel Nagy's list of desirable features for an
ecash system and see how simple, on-line Chaum ecash fares.
> http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems
> based on similar schemes lack some ke
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the
> only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I
> am strongly convinced that b
> Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
>
> http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is
> presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the
> author s opinion, contributed to the fact that d
21 matches
Mail list logo
