Just to make your life more paranoid:) Re: Surreptitious Tor Messages?

2005-10-04 Thread gwen hastings

Troll Mode on:
TOR was originally developed as a result of CIA/NRL funding:)

compile your own client and examine sources if you have this particular 
brand of paranoia(I do)

change to an OS which makes this easy ...

BTW running TOR makes you very visible that you are running tor even as 
a client.. its quite a noisy protocol



Troll Mode off:
:)


Tyler Durden wrote:

Can anyone suggest a tool for checking to see if my Tor client is 
performing any surreptitious signaling?


Seems to me there's a couple of possibilities for a TLA or someone 
else to monitor Tor users. Tor clients purchased online or whatever 
could possibly signal a monitoring agency for when and possibly where 
the user is online. This would mean that at bootup, some surreptitious 
packets could be fired off.


The problem here is that a clever TLA might be able to hide its POP 
behind the Tor network, so merely checking on IP addresses on outgoing 
packets wouldn't work.


Can anyone recommend a nice little package that can be used to check 
for unusual packets leaving my machine through the tor client?


-TD






Re: [p2p-hackers] good-bye, Mnet, and good luck. I'm going commercial! plus my last design doc (fwd from zooko@zooko.com)

2005-03-14 Thread gwen hastings
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Hi Steve,

~~long time no si.. BT trackers could easily be put into DNS and
stored for TTL times in fact talk at code con 2005 in the lounges and
corners were discussing the very possibility after the OZYDNS demo by
Dan Kaminsky, since most of the DNS servers practice recursion, it is
practically impossible at the current time to prevent the flow of
information via DNS in and out of internet connected spaces even if
firewalled. Dont you remember my beach talk in anguilla about stashing
a complete banking system software/websites and persistant transaction
into DNS running the E language interpreter  which would be loaded by
the java hooks in mozillas name resolution mechanism, it could simply
be done by operating as a local socks4a/5 proxy same as tor, privoxy
etc so that the special domain names would be recognized PRIOR to
going to DNS.
problem about hiding the trackers is easy in MY opinion, the hard
problem I see is that for people who have loaded the torrent by what
ever means now see the other members of the swarm of users
uploading/downloading the proprietary content ,as in bit torrent
content is directly related to prosecutable evidence.
And having said tha,t the user level source code for  M of N slices
secret sharing algorithms I have seem practice extreme data expansion
in their implementations.(ie secretshar etc). 4kpgp keys expand to
several 65k slices. :(
~~ regards
~~ gwen


Steve Schear wrote:
| At 12:15 AM 3/10/2005, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
|
|>> I worked with Bram and Zooko at Mojo Nation (where both BT and
|> Mnet got
|>> their respective genesis) and was frankly surprised when the
|>> MPAA
|> was so
|>> easily able to target and put out of commission BT's trackers.
|>> The
|>
|> Why? BT is designed with zero privacy in mind.
|
|
| And this was a profound error, IMHO.  One of the epiphanies from my
|  work at MN was that a secrecy-oriented proxy network development
| and successful deployment needed to precede P2P file sharing if
| such networks were to survive determined technical and legal
| challenges. End users often care little about what 'under the hood'
| of their P2P app only that they can get the content conveniently
| and they are not subjected to annoyances like spy or adware.
|
|
|>> exposure of the trackers was a prominent topic of MN planning
|> discussions
|>> and its odd that precautions, like distributing the tracker
|> functions into
|>> clients or hiding them inside a TOR-like proxy network weren't
|>> taken
|>
|> You can post BT links on a P2P network.
|
|
| But trackers must still be widely accessible by the general
| population of BT users and can you offer the content or obtain it
| without likely identification?
|
| Steve
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