On 10/28/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Irreversibility of transactions hinges on two features of the proposed
systetm: the fundamentally irreversible nature of publishing information in
the public records and the fact that in order to invalidate a secret, one
needs to know it;
One other point with regard to Daniel Nagy's paper at
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
A good way to organize papers like this is to first present the
desired properties of systems like yours (and optionally show that
other systems fail to meet one or more of these properties);
On Fri, Oct 28, 2005 at 02:18:43PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
In particular I have concerns about the finality and irreversibility
of payments, given that the issuer keeps track of each token as it
progresses through the system. Whenever one token is exchanged for a
new one, the issuer records
On 10/25/05, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More on topic, I recently heard about a scam involving differential
reversibility between two remote payment systems. The fraudster sends
you an email asking you to make a Western Union payment to a third
party, and deposits the requested amount
If you have
to be that confident in your computer security to use the payment
system, it's not going to have many clients.
Maybe the trusted computing platform (palladium) may have something to
offer after all, namely enabling naive users to use services that
require confidence in their own
John Kelsey wrote:
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
see why we don't already have this problem with online banking and
similar financial services. Couldn't a virus today steal people's
passwords and command their banks to
--
Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Yes, but unfortunately it is not clear at all that
courts would find the opposite, either. If a lawsuit
names the currency issuer as a defendant, which it
almost certainly would, a judge might order the
issuer's finances frozen or impose other measures
One intresting security measure protecting valuable digital assets (WM
protects private keys this way) is inflating them before encryption.
While it does not protect agains trojan applications, it does a surprisingly
good job at reducing attacks following the key logging + file theft pattern.
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
matter at hand.
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 5:58 PM
To: John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
..
Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
see why we don't already have
On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 02:58:32PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
see why we don't already have this problem with online banking and
similar financial services. Couldn't a virus today steal people's
passwords and command their
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, someone who can't afford a vowel, Alex, ;-)
expressed his anal glands thusly in my general direction:
You're such an asshole.
My, my. Tetchy, this morning, oh vowelless one...
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
This is what you characterized as a unitary
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
R. Hirschfeld wrote:
This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
the payer) in order
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found
At 11:14 AM 10/24/2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found that this feature attracted Ponzi schemes
and fraudsters of all stripes, and eventually it was forced to reverse
transactions and freeze accounts. It's not
At 10:23 PM +0200 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
The referred 1988
paper proposes an off-line system
Please. You can just as easily do an on-line system, and still have blind
signatures, including m=m=2 shared secret signature hiding to prevent
double spending.
In fact, the *only* viable way to
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 07:34:34PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
Google is your friend, dude.
Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
consulting the
At 2:36 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
With all due respect, this was unnecessarily rude, unfair and unwarranted.
This is the *cypherpunks* list, guy... :-)
Silvio Micali is a very prolific author and he published more than one paper
on more than one exchange protocol
And I just got
At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
Google is your friend, dude.
Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
consulting the literature. It's out there.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A.
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 05:19:49PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
BTW, you can exchange cash for goods, or other chaumian bearer certificates
-- or receipts, for that matter, with a simple exchange protocol. Micali
did one for email ten years ago, for instance.
Could you give us a reference to
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement, I will
perform service X if Alice supplies me with a mint signature
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 11:31:39 -0700
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no
means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash
transactions _irreversibility_.
Certainly Chaum ecash has this property. Because
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement, I
On 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
On 10/20/05, R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
Google is your friend, dude.
Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
consulting the literature. It's out
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the
only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I
am strongly convinced that banks
cyphrpunk wrote:
If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be
the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly
in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy.
Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do
is
I will provide a detailed answer a bit later, but the short answer is that
anonymity and untraceability are not major selling points, as experience
shows. After all, ATMs could easily record and match to the user the serial
numbers of each banknote they hand out, yet, there seems to be no
Let's take a look at Daniel Nagy's list of desirable features for an
ecash system and see how simple, on-line Chaum ecash fares.
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems
based on similar schemes lack some key
Thank you for the detailed critique!
I think, we're not talking about the same Chaumian cash. The referred 1988
paper proposes an off-line system, where double spending compromises
anonymity and results in transaction reversal. I agree with you that it was
a mistake on my part to deny its
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
system without excessive complications. Only the fifth point, the
ability for outsiders to monitor the amount of cash in circulation, is
not satisfied. But even then, the ecash mint software, and procedures
and controls followed by the issuer, could be
Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is
presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the
author s opinion, contributed to the fact that despite
On Tue, Oct 18, 2005 at 11:27:53PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding
and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standard
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