On Fri, Oct 28, 2005 at 02:18:43PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> In particular I have concerns about the finality and irreversibility
> of payments, given that the issuer keeps track of each token as it
> progresses through the system. Whenever one token is exchanged for a
> new one, the issuer record
One other point with regard to Daniel Nagy's paper at
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
A good way to organize papers like this is to first present the
desired properties of systems like yours (and optionally show that
other systems fail to meet one or more of these properties);
On 10/28/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Irreversibility of transactions hinges on two features of the proposed
> systetm: the fundamentally irreversible nature of publishing information in
> the public records and the fact that in order to invalidate a secret, one
> needs to know i
On 10/25/05, Travis H. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> More on topic, I recently heard about a scam involving differential
> reversibility between two remote payment systems. The fraudster sends
> you an email asking you to make a Western Union payment to a third
> party, and deposits the requested a
--
Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Yes, but unfortunately it is not clear at all that
> courts would find the opposite, either. If a lawsuit
> names the currency issuer as a defendant, which it
> almost certainly would, a judge might order the
> issuer's finances frozen or impose other meas
John Kelsey wrote:
From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
see why we don't already have this problem with online banking and
similar financial services. Couldn't a virus today steal people's
passwords and command their banks to tr
> If you have
> to be that confident in your computer security to use the payment
> system, it's not going to have many clients.
Maybe the trusted computing platform (palladium) may have something to
offer after all, namely enabling naive users to use services that
require confidence in their own
On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 02:58:32PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
> see why we don't already have this problem with online banking and
> similar financial services. Couldn't a virus today steal people's
> passwords and command their
>From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Oct 24, 2005 5:58 PM
>To: John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
>Payment Systems
..
>Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. S
On 10/24/05, John Kelsey <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> More to the point, an irreversible payment system raises big practical
> problems in a world full of very hard-to-secure PCs running the
> relevant software. One exploitable software bug, properly used, can
> steal an enormous amount of money i
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
> court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
> problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
> matter at hand
One intresting security measure protecting valuable digital assets (WM
protects private keys this way) is "inflating" them before encryption.
While it does not protect agains trojan applications, it does a surprisingly
good job at reducing attacks following the key logging + file theft pattern.
T
At 11:14 AM 10/24/2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found that this feature attracted Ponzi schemes
and fraudsters of all stripes, and eventually it was forced to reverse
transactions and freeze accounts. It's not cle
From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
On 10/22/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
>ben
On 10/22/05, Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> R. Hirschfeld wrote:
> > This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
> > factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
> > chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
> > the payer)
R. Hirschfeld wrote:
Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 11:31:39 -0700
From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no
means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash
transactions _irreversibility_.
Certainly Chaum ecash has this prope
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, someone who can't afford a vowel, Alex, ;-)
expressed his anal glands thusly in my general direction:
>You're such an asshole.
My, my. Tetchy, this morning, oh vowelless one...
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
>This is what you characterized as a "unitary
On 10/20/05, R.A. Hettinga <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
> >Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
>
> Google is your friend, dude.
>
> Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
> consulting the literature.
On 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> > As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
> > couple of approaches discussed.
> >
> > The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies A
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
> couple of approaches discussed.
>
> The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
> with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement,
> Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 11:31:39 -0700
> From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > 2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no
> > means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash
> > transactions _irreversibility_.
>
> Certainly Chaum ecash has this property.
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 05:19:49PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> BTW, you can exchange cash for goods, or other chaumian bearer certificates
> -- or receipts, for that matter, with a simple exchange protocol. Micali
> did one for email ten years ago, for instance.
Could you give us a reference to
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement, "I will
perform service X if Alice supplies me with a mint signature
At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
>Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
Google is your friend, dude.
Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
consulting the literature. It's out there.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hetting
At 2:36 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
>With all due respect, this was unnecessarily rude, unfair and unwarranted.
This is the *cypherpunks* list, guy... :-)
>Silvio Micali is a very prolific author and he published more than one paper
>on more than one exchange protocol
And I just got
At 10:23 PM +0200 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
>The referred 1988
>paper proposes an off-line system
Please. You can just as easily do an on-line system, and still have blind
signatures, including m=m=2 shared secret signature hiding to prevent
double spending.
In fact, the *only* viable way t
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 07:34:34PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
> At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
> >Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
>
> Google is your friend, dude.
>
> Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
> consulting the
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
system without excessive complications. Only the fifth point, the
ability for outsiders to monitor the amount of cash in circulation, is
not satisfied. But even then, the ecash mint software, and procedures
and controls followed by the issuer, could be des
Thank you for the detailed critique!
I think, we're not talking about the same Chaumian cash. The referred 1988
paper proposes an off-line system, where double spending compromises
anonymity and results in transaction reversal. I agree with you that it was
a mistake on my part to deny its peer-to-
Let's take a look at Daniel Nagy's list of desirable features for an
ecash system and see how simple, on-line Chaum ecash fares.
> http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems
> based on similar schemes lack some ke
I will provide a detailed answer a bit later, but the short answer is that
anonymity and untraceability are not major selling points, as experience
shows. After all, ATMs could easily record and match to the user the serial
numbers of each banknote they hand out, yet, there seems to be no preferenc
cyphrpunk wrote:
If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be
the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly
in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy.
Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do
is
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the
> only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I
> am strongly convinced that b
On Tue, Oct 18, 2005 at 11:27:53PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
> > Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
> >
> > http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding
> and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standar
> Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
>
> http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
>
> Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is
> presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the
> author s opinion, contributed to the fact that d
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