On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 01:00:58AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Hello,
This is off-topic for debian-devel -- we have a -vote list for discussion
of votes, please use it. Followups to -vote.
In,
http://www.mathematik.uni-kl.de/~wwwstoch/voss/comp/vote.html
you claim:
] Generalised
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 12:54:50AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
I fully agree. But then the per-option quorum has this problem, too.
And here it is harder to understand (see my example) and more relevant
(can occur for votes with many voters) than in the case of global
quorum.
This problem is
Hi,
Anthony Towns wrote:
[ Analysis snipped ]
If only nine developers find A acceptable, well, it deserves to lose.
Thank you. I wrote two days ago that
Nick Phillips wrote:
If a winning option would be discarded due to quorum requirements, then
I think the vote should probably be considered
Hello,
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
Monotonicity (http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.html#MC) requires
With the relative order or
Hello,
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
Did you read it carefully?
Three options, A, B and D (the default option). Quorum is 10. Votes are:
9 ABD
4 BDA
A defeauts B, 9:4; B defeats D,
Hi,
Jochen Voss wrote:
My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
avoid it unless you throw the entire vote out and start over.
The fact that few
Hallo,
it is necessary to distinguish between the participation
criterion and the monotonicity criterion.
The participation criterion says that a set of additional
voters who strictly prefer candidate A to candidate B must
not change the winner from candidate A to candidate B. The
Condorcet
Hallo,
here is an extreme violation of the participation criterion.
Situation 1:
A:B=206:94
A:C=160:140
A:D=161:139
A:E=162:138
A:F=96:204
B:C=202:98
B:D=163:137
B:E=164:136
B:F=205:95
C:D=203:97
C:E=93:207
C:F=165:135
D:E=228:72
D:F=166:134
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:49:04AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Hello,
On Thu, May 22, 2003 at 08:45:51PM -0400, Raul Miller wrote:
I'm going to focus only on your claim that this page shows an example
of the violation of monotonicity by Manoj's proposal.
Monotonicity
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 02:45:30PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Ugh, that's an overcomplicated example. Here's a simpler one:
Did you read it carefully?
No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
understand it
Anthony Towns wrote:
Yes, that's why we're in favour of per-option quorums, which don't
introduce flawed incentives for little reason other than matching
tradition.
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
R=15
10
On Fri, 2003-05-23 at 00:45, Anthony Towns wrote:
And, as I've already posted elsewhere, you'll note there's no problem
at all here if number of votes received is twice the quorum, which,
historically, it almost always is.
Not almost. Always. Quorum was calculated wrong in the old elections.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:26:49AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in favour of a
less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
Exactly.
For example: Ballot contains A, B and default option D.
Quorum is 10.
Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Right. Leads to a lot of soul searching -- I no longer know
whether I am helping or hurting my candidate by expressing my true
preference.
I should not be put in this position.
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two
Hallo,
John wrote (23 May 2003):
instead, the per-option quorum will throw out the IDW in
favour of a less-favoured option due to quorum requirements.
R=15
10 ABD
5 BDA
I suggest that one should at first calculate the ranking of
the candidates according to the beat path method and then,
Hello,
On Sat, May 24, 2003 at 12:23:17AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:54:32AM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
Did you read it carefully?
No, I didn't, and since it's so complicated I wouldn't expect to
understand it properly even if I had. I hate complicated examples.
I should not be put in this position.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
False.
With your proposal, the worst case
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 08:46:13PM +0200, Jochen Voss wrote:
In my example local quorum causes the following problem:
dropping an irrelevant option changes which
relevant option wins the election.
Global quorum does not have this problem.
The way you've apparently defined your terms: Yes,
Hello Manoj,
On Wed, May 21, 2003 at 10:31:14AM -0500, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
On Tue, 20 May 2003 22:43:59 +0200, Matthias Urlichs [EMAIL PROTECTED]
said:
John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
- 2. If the ballot has a quorum requirement R any options other
- than the default option which do not
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 09:29:36AM +0200, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
Hi,
Jochen Voss wrote:
My example: The winner among the interesting options changes
because an uninteresting option fails quorum.
That is a property of any Condorcet conflict resolution system. You can't
avoid it
Raul Miller wrote:
I should not be put in this position.
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 10:49:08AM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
worst case scenario: everyone feels the way you do. no one votes.
two week discussion period resumes, or the amendment is withdrawn.
False.
i was limiting
If it were impossible to rank options equally, then the combination of a
global quorum and an an elimination of unacceptable option (options to
which the default is preferred by a majority) would have essentially the
same effect as a per-option quorum.
This is easy to see. Every ballot would
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 05:24:59PM -0400, Buddha Buck wrote:
Imagine a vote along the lines of:
100 ballots of the form:
[1] Red,[ ] Blue,[ ] Default
100 ballots of the form:
[1] Red,[ ] Blue,[1] Default
25 ballots of the form:
[ ] Red,[1] Blue,[ ]
John == John H Robinson, IV [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
John we have two examples of where per-option quorum is flawed:
John Example 1:
John 2 options + default, R=15. 15 voters. 10 vote ABD, 5 vote
John BDA
John result: Condorcet would select option A Proposed would
Sam Hartman wrote:
Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
What we are saying is that we are giving minorities the power in
certain limited cases to overrule the
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
Sam Hartman wrote:
Aj has made what seems to me to be a compelling argument that
1) local quorum is not flawed in this case
2) The Debian community wants B to win votes of this form.
What we are saying is
On Fri, May 23, 2003 at 04:40:49PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
correct me if i am wrong, but, isn't quorum suppoed to _prevent_
minority rule? now you are saying that minority rule is good, and
desired?
What do you mean?
There are forms of minority rule which quorum prevents, and there
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