On Jun 21, 2007, at 1:18 PM, Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 05:51:34PM +0100, Joe Orton wrote:
On Sat, Jun 16, 2007 at 09:29:25PM -, Jim Jagielski wrote:
Secondly: I think this approach is unnecessarily complex. I think
it's
sufficient to simply check whether the
Ruediger Pluem wrote:
Ok, partly playing a bit of devils advocate below :-).
On 06/25/2007 04:42 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Author: jfclere
Date: Mon Jun 25 07:42:25 2007
New Revision: 550519
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revrev=550519
Log:
Add sticky_path to solve PR41897.
On Jun 21, 2007, at 12:51 PM, Joe Orton wrote:
Firstly my sincere apologies to Jim for bringing this up after such
considerable work was put in already - I've had a busy month with a
week
out for a holiday :(
Secondly: I think this approach is unnecessarily complex. I think
it's
On Jun 21, 2007, at 6:20 PM, William A. Rowe, Jr. wrote:
Joe Orton wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 06:18:59PM +0100, Colm MacCarthaigh wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 05:51:34PM +0100, Joe Orton wrote:
On Sat, Jun 16, 2007 at 09:29:25PM -, Jim Jagielski wrote:
Secondly: I think this
Jim Jagielski wrote:
So what's the word... should we back out all the pid table stuff
(from both 1.3 and 2.x) and wait for Joe to provide his
pgrp changes (including any required configure magic to detect
function existance) or what?
As you wrote...
If:
1. The required getpgid/getpgrp
My summary: I've still not seen any argument why it presents a security
risk for a malicious child to be able to kill a piped logger or other
non-MPM-spawned process, so:
1) for 2.2.x and 1.3.x apr_proc_wait()/waitpid() can be used instead of
getpgid(pid) == getpgrp() to determine whether the
On 06/26/2007 06:46 PM, jean-frederic clere wrote:
Ruediger Pluem wrote:
Ok, furthermore I think we need to adjust the proxy_status_hook to
actually display the string the user configured and not only the path
for the cookie. The same is true for the balancer manager (display wise).
On 06/26/2007 08:37 PM, Joe Orton wrote:
My summary: I've still not seen any argument why it presents a security
risk for a malicious child to be able to kill a piped logger or other
non-MPM-spawned process, so:
What about signals other than SIGKILL and SIGTERM?
We also send SIGUSR1 in
