On 24/03/2017 05:54, Walter Goulet wrote:
On Thursday, March 23, 2017 at 8:13:38 PM UTC-5, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
Hi all,
This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of the
normal discussions that I typically see in the group. H
On Thursday, March 23, 2017 at 8:13:38 PM UTC-5, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of
> > the normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think
> > that my
On 23/03/2017 22:59, Walter Goulet wrote:
Hi all,
This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of the
normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think that my
question may be relevant in helping to understand what a 'policy' for an
internal, no
On Tuesday, March 21, 2017 at 11:34:30 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 21/03/17 10:16, Gervase Markham wrote:
> > On 17/03/17 11:30, Gervase Markham wrote:
> >> The URL for the draft of the next CA Communication is here:
> >> https://mozilla-mozillacaprogram.cs54.force.com/Communications/CACo
Hi all,
This is not directly related to Mozilla policy, CA issues or really any of the
normal discussions that I typically see in the group. However, I think that my
question may be relevant in helping to understand what a 'policy' for an
internal, non-publicly trusted PKI might look like.
Whi
On Tuesday, March 21, 2017 at 7:17:26 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote:
> On 17/03/17 11:30, Gervase Markham wrote:
> > The URL for the draft of the next CA Communication is here:
> > https://mozilla-mozillacaprogram.cs54.force.com/Communications/CACommunicationSurveySample?CACommunicationId=a050S00
On Tuesday, March 21, 2017 at 5:51:29 AM UTC-7, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On 2017-03-21 12:51, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> > On 21/03/2017 10:09, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> >> Action 6 says:
I've updated action #6, but it still might not be clear.
Here's the new draft:
ACTION 6: QUALIFIED AUDIT STATEMENTS
When an
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 12:54 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
>
> The above message (and one by Symantec) were posted to the
> mozilla.dev.security.policy newsgroup prior to becoming aware of
> Google's decision to move the discussion to its own private mailing
> list and procedures.
(Posting in an official capacity)
Jakob,
As the initial message said:
"You can participate in this discussion at
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/eUAKwjihhBs
"
I've removed the cross-post, to ensure that threads do not fork due to
members being subscribed to one l
On 23/03/2017 20:27, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
On 23/03/2017 17:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
(Posting in a Google Capacity)
I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have st
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 23/03/2017 17:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
>> (Posting in a Google Capacity)
>>
>> I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an
>> Intent to Deprecate a
On 23/03/2017 17:09, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
(Posting in a Google Capacity)
I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an
Intent to Deprecate and Remove, consistent with our Blink process, related to
certain certificates issued by Symantec Corporation.
This is a propose
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 12:54 PM, tarah.symantec--- via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> What will be the process for critical infrastructure such as medical
> devices and payment systems when they're affected by this?
To avoid fragmentation of discussion, would it be possible to reply to the
blink
On Thursday, March 23, 2017 at 12:09:23 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> (Posting in a Google Capacity)
>
> I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an
> Intent to Deprecate and Remove, consistent with our Blink process, related to
> certain certificates issued by Sym
On 2017-03-23 16:39, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 8:37 AM, Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
I would be interested in knowing why Google felt it necessary to purchase
an existing root instead of, for example, pursuing a "new ro
(Posting in a Google Capacity)
I just wanted to notify the members of this Forum that we have started an
Intent to Deprecate and Remove, consistent with our Blink process, related to
certain certificates issued by Symantec Corporation.
This is a proposed plan, not a final commitment, and we wel
On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 8:37 AM, Peter Kurrasch via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I would be interested in knowing why Google felt it necessary to purchase
> an existing root instead of, for example, pursuing a "new root" path along
> the lines of what Let'
So this is the third of my 3 sets of criticisms regarding the acquisition of
the GlobalSign roots by Google Trust Services. I apologize for the significant
delay between the first 2 sets and this one. Hopefully people in the forum
still feel this discussion relevant going forward even though th
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