RE: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

2017-10-17 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
The current plan is to create a new root that is cross-signed by each of the four roots we've identified as critical for customers (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384). If Mozilla whitelisted this sub CA, the same as Google's and Apple's, the entire issue around rapid root inclusi

Re: Audit Reminder Email Summary

2017-10-17 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
On Tuesday, October 17, 2017 at 2:44:11 PM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > A lot of the delay this time is in regards to our new > Audit Case process. > We'll work to get this cleared up this month. To those of you CAs who have correctly followed the instructions for providing your annual upda

Re: Audit Reminder Email Summary

2017-10-17 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
A lot of the delay this time is in regards to our new Audit Case process. We'll work to get this cleared up this month. Forwarded Message Subject: Summary of October 2017 Audit Reminder Emails Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 19:00:06 + (GMT) Mozilla: Overdue Audit Statements Root Ce

Re: Efficient test for weak RSA keys generated in Infineon TPMs / smartcards

2017-10-17 Thread Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy
> On Oct 17, 2017, at 09:49, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > On 16/10/17 23:15, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> Unfortunately, as of right now, their github repository still doesn't >> include the promised C/C++ implementation, > > Hi Jakob. Today I ended up

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

2017-10-17 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 17/10/17 15:50, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > That doesn't seem to line up with the discussion in > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/_EnH2IeuZtw/discussion > to date. Do you have any additional information to share? > > Note that the path you just described is the one that p

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

2017-10-17 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 5:06 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 16/10/17 20:22, Peter Bowen wrote: > > Will the new managed CAs, which will operated by DigiCert under > > CP/CPS/Audit independent from the current Symantec ones, also be

Re: Efficient test for weak RSA keys generated in Infineon TPMs / smartcards

2017-10-17 Thread Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
On 16/10/17 23:15, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: Unfortunately, as of right now, their github repository still doesn't include the promised C/C++ implementation, Hi Jakob. Today I ended up rewriting the ROCA fingerprint checker in C (using OpenSSL BIGNUM calls) to get it working

RE: Efficient test for weak RSA keys generated in Infineon TPMs / smartcards

2017-10-17 Thread Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy
I think this is right. ROCA-detect appears to just be an implementation of the fingerprinting algorithm described in the 2016 paper (https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_svenda.pdf). There are already plenty of clues in the 2016 paper that something might

Re: Efficient test for weak RSA keys generated in Infineon TPMs / smartcards

2017-10-17 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy
On Monday, 16 October 2017 23:15:51 UTC+1, Jakob Bohm wrote: > They have also obfuscated their test by providing bitmasks as decimal > bigints instead of using hexadecimal or any other format that makes the > bitmasks human readable. The essential fingerprinting trick comes down to this (I had to

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

2017-10-17 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 16/10/17 20:22, Peter Bowen wrote: > Will the new managed CAs, which will operated by DigiCert under > CP/CPS/Audit independent from the current Symantec ones, also be > included on the list of subCAs that will continue to function? AIUI we are still working out the exact configuration of the n

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

2017-10-17 Thread Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
On 16/10/17 20:19, Daniel Cater wrote: > Could we have a list of the subCAs that are being considered for exemption > for the distrust? Here's an informal list created by me examining the CCADB. Note that the CCADB links won't work for anyone except Root Store operators. GeoTrust Global CA |