Re: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-25 Thread Eddy Nigg

On 06/21/2014 07:15 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:

But I would like to start enforcing the 2048 bit as soon as
possible.  Do we have some criteria for at which point we're
willing to break compatibility?



I'm in favor of enforcing it which will help reduce even mistakenly 
issued certificates with smaller keys to be detected quickly and there 
will be no incentive to use such keys for web sites (there are other 
use-cases for non-browsers and those should be still permitted I guess).


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Re: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-23 Thread Gervase Markham
On 21/06/14 17:15, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
 There are still a few new certificates generated with 1024 bits.
 I've been filing bugs about those and there were only a few so
 far this month.  

Thank you for doing this work; it really is appreciated.

Gerv

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Re: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-22 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Sat, Jun 21, 2014 at 05:37:20PM -0700, David E. Ross wrote:
  
  There are still a few new certificates generated with 1024 bits.
  I've been filing bugs about those and there were only a few so far this
  month.  Maybe we can set a date from which we won't be accepting
  certificates with a smaller than 2048 bit key generated after that date?
  
  Should I put an effort into trying to get those certificates that are still
  seen revoked?
 
 Bug reports have been filed for each non-complying root certificate.
 See the following bugs: 1015767, 1015770, 1015771, 1015772, 1015773,
 1026128, and 1026741.

Those are based on who still generated new certificates recently,
and as far as I know I didn't see them generate any new ones since
I filed those bugs.  The question is if I should also do it for
older certificates.


Kurt

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Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-21 Thread Kurt Roeckx
Hi,

The CA/B baseline requirement say that all RSA keys that are used
since since 1 january 2014 should have been at least 2048 bit.
All shorter than 2048 should have either expired or been revoked
by that date.  But it's still not the case.  We're currently
around 0.24% of the certificates that are being seen on the
internet that still are too short.

I've made a graph of the progress of this at which you can see at:
http://www.roeckx.be/certificates/rsa_small_zoom.png

If I do a linear interpolation of the last 3 months it looks like
we might end up with 0% around January 2015, only 1 year after it
was supposed to be the case.  I hope the current trend stays that
way.

But I would like to start enforcing the 2048 bit as soon as
possible.  Do we have some criteria for at which point we're
willing to break compatibility?

There are still a few new certificates generated with 1024 bits.
I've been filing bugs about those and there were only a few so
far this month.  Maybe we can set a date from which we won't be
accepting certificates with a smaller than 2048 bit key generated
after that date?

Should I put an effort into trying to get those certificates that
are still seen revoked?


Kurt

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RE: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-21 Thread Jeremy Rowley
I think getting them revoked would be the first step.  If you make the data
available about which CAs still have 1024 bit certs or lower, we could email
the CAs and find out what is going on.

Jeremy

-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Kurt Roeckx
Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2014 10:15 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

Hi,

The CA/B baseline requirement say that all RSA keys that are used since
since 1 january 2014 should have been at least 2048 bit.
All shorter than 2048 should have either expired or been revoked by that
date.  But it's still not the case.  We're currently around 0.24% of the
certificates that are being seen on the internet that still are too short.

I've made a graph of the progress of this at which you can see at:
http://www.roeckx.be/certificates/rsa_small_zoom.png

If I do a linear interpolation of the last 3 months it looks like we might
end up with 0% around January 2015, only 1 year after it was supposed to be
the case.  I hope the current trend stays that way.

But I would like to start enforcing the 2048 bit as soon as possible.  Do we
have some criteria for at which point we're willing to break compatibility?

There are still a few new certificates generated with 1024 bits.
I've been filing bugs about those and there were only a few so far this
month.  Maybe we can set a date from which we won't be accepting
certificates with a smaller than 2048 bit key generated after that date?

Should I put an effort into trying to get those certificates that are still
seen revoked?


Kurt

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Re: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates

2014-06-21 Thread David E. Ross
On 6/21/2014 11:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
 I think getting them revoked would be the first step.  If you make the data
 available about which CAs still have 1024 bit certs or lower, we could email
 the CAs and find out what is going on.
 
 Jeremy
 
 -Original Message-
 From: dev-security-policy
 [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
 .org] On Behalf Of Kurt Roeckx
 Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2014 10:15 AM
 To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
 Subject: Only accepting 2048 bit or better certificates
 
 Hi,
 
 The CA/B baseline requirement say that all RSA keys that are used since
 since 1 january 2014 should have been at least 2048 bit.
 All shorter than 2048 should have either expired or been revoked by that
 date.  But it's still not the case.  We're currently around 0.24% of the
 certificates that are being seen on the internet that still are too short.
 
 I've made a graph of the progress of this at which you can see at:
 http://www.roeckx.be/certificates/rsa_small_zoom.png
 
 If I do a linear interpolation of the last 3 months it looks like we might
 end up with 0% around January 2015, only 1 year after it was supposed to be
 the case.  I hope the current trend stays that way.
 
 But I would like to start enforcing the 2048 bit as soon as possible.  Do we
 have some criteria for at which point we're willing to break compatibility?
 
 There are still a few new certificates generated with 1024 bits.
 I've been filing bugs about those and there were only a few so far this
 month.  Maybe we can set a date from which we won't be accepting
 certificates with a smaller than 2048 bit key generated after that date?
 
 Should I put an effort into trying to get those certificates that are still
 seen revoked?

Bug reports have been filed for each non-complying root certificate.
See the following bugs: 1015767, 1015770, 1015771, 1015772, 1015773,
1026128, and 1026741.

-- 

David E. Ross
http://www.rossde.com/

On occasion, I filter and ignore all newsgroup messages
posted through GoogleGroups via Google's G2/1.0 user agent
because of spam, flames, and trolling from that source.
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