Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 2017-05-17 13:23, Michael Casadevall wrote: On 05/17/2017 05:04 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote: If the key is compromised, you can't rely on any date information anymore, you need to revoke it completely and break things. Won't that only be true in certificates without SCTs? Once you have a SCT,

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 05/17/2017 05:04 AM, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > If the key is compromised, you can't rely on any date information > anymore, you need to revoke it completely and break things. > Won't that only be true in certificates without SCTs? Once you have a

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 2017-05-16 14:24, Michael Casadevall wrote: Maybe a bit out there, but an interesting thought none the less. It would definitely go a good way at preventing one root certificate from underpinning a large chunk of the internet. My thought here is if a large "Too Big to Fail" CA's private key

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 16/05/17 19:53, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: What is the advantage of that, given that PKCS#7 involves BER, it introduces C/C2/C3, and you're still supplying the same number of certs? I don't think there is any notable advantage. I asked the question because I thought it

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Rob Stradling wrote: > > Regarding AIA->caIssuers, RFC5280 says: > 'Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing >certificates MUST be able to accept individual DER encoded >certificates and SHOULD be able to

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 16/05/17 16:11, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: On 16/05/17 15:41, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: The important point in this is that there

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 11:12 AM, Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Fewer round trips, if you can include everything in a single response. > So fewer round-trips if same-size, or bigger data set if you're anything newer than 6 years

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Fewer round trips, if you can include everything in a single response. Alex On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 11:11 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On 16/05/17

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 11:00 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 16/05/17 15:41, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > > >> The important point in this is that there should not be a non-linear path >> of trust (which is implied,

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 16/05/17 15:41, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: The important point in this is that there should not be a non-linear path of trust (which is implied, I think, by the reading of "group of cross-certs"). But yes, there would be a linearized path. If you *rely* on AIA, then why not

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:34 AM, Doug Beattie wrote: > Thanks Rob and Ryan for pointing that out. Will the web servers need to > send down a group of cross certs and then let the client use the ones they > need in order to chain up to a root in their local trust

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:27 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > On 16/05/17 14:45, Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> Ryan, >> >> If you look at the wide range of user agents accessing google.com today >> you'd see many legacy applications and older versions of

RE: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

gmail.com>; MozPol <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org>; Cory Benfield <c...@lukasa.co.uk> Subject: Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption While the internet is moderately good at handling a single cross-sign (modulo the challenges

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:24 AM, Alex Gaynor wrote: > Hi Ryan, > > I've lost the thread on how this addresses Cory's original problem > statement, if you could spell that out that'd be very helpful. > Sure, the original problem statement arises from the fact that CAs have

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

While the internet is moderately good at handling a single cross-sign (modulo the challenges we had with 1024-bit root deprecation due to a bug in OpenSSL's path building -- now fixed), as we extend the chains, it seems evident to me that server operators are unlikely to configure their servers to

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 16/05/17 14:45, Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy wrote: Ryan, If you look at the wide range of user agents accessing google.com today you'd see many legacy applications and older versions of browsers and custom browsers built from variants of the commercial browsers. By the time

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 9:45 AM, Doug Beattie wrote: > Ryan, > > If you look at the wide range of user agents accessing google.com today > you'd see many legacy applications and older versions of browsers and > custom browsers built from variants of the commercial

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Hi Ryan, I've lost the thread on how this addresses Cory's original problem statement, if you could spell that out that'd be very helpful. Alex On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:22 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 7:58 AM, Peter Gutmann

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 7:58 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi writes: > > >I can't help but feel you're raising concerns that aren't relevant. > > CAs issue roots with effectively infinite (20 to 40-year) lifetimes because > it's too painful to

RE: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

c...@lukasa.co.uk>; Ryan Sleevi <r...@sleevi.com>; Gervase Markham > <g...@mozilla.org> > Subject: Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser > Consumption > > On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 7:19 AM, Peter Gutmann > <pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz> &

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Michael Casadevall via dev-security-policy writes: >I learned something new today. I'm about to run out the door right now so I >can't read the RFCs but do you know off the top of your head why that was >removed? >From the PKIX RFC? There was never any

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 05/16/2017 08:40 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > On 16/05/17 13:24, Michael Casadevall via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> Just spitballing ideas here, but in Alex's case, part of me would be >> tempted to see if X509 could be extended with a new "CanIssueUntil" >> field. Basically, it would act as

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 16/05/17 13:24, Michael Casadevall via dev-security-policy wrote: Just spitballing ideas here, but in Alex's case, part of me would be tempted to see if X509 could be extended with a new "CanIssueUntil" field. Basically, it would act as an off switch for CA:TRUE after a given date, but

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On 05/16/2017 06:05 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy > writes: > > Unless someone has a means of managing frequent updates of the root > infrastructure (and there isn't one, or at least none that work), this will > never fly.

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Ryan Sleevi writes: >I can't help but feel you're raising concerns that aren't relevant. CAs issue roots with effectively infinite (20 to 40-year) lifetimes because it's too painful to do otherwise. You're proposing instead: require that all CAs must generate (new) roots on

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 7:19 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi writes: > > >Mozilla updates every six to eight weeks. And that works. That's all that > >matters for this discussion. > > Do all the world's CAs know this? Does that matter, if all

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Ryan Sleevi writes: >Mozilla updates every six to eight weeks. And that works. That's all that >matters for this discussion. Do all the world's CAs know this? Peter. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 6:05 AM Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy > writes: > > >An alternative solution to the ossification that Alex muses about is to > >require

Re: [FORGED] Re: Configuring Graduated Trust for Non-Browser Consumption

Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy writes: >An alternative solution to the ossification that Alex muses about is to >require that all CAs must generate (new) roots on some interval (e.g. 3 >years) for inclusion. That is, the 'maximum' a root can be