On Tue, Oct 8, 2019 at 10:04 AM Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Unless I found a root that Ryan isn’t referring to, Mozilla Policy 2.1 (
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:CertificatePolicyV2.1) would have been in
> force when the root was first
On 08/10/2019 13:41, Corey Bonnell wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2019 at 10:52:36 AM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
I'm curious how folks feel about the following practice:
Imagine a CA, "Foo", that creates a new Root Certificate ("Root 1"). They
create this Root Certificate after the effective date
On Monday, October 7, 2019 at 10:52:36 AM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> I'm curious how folks feel about the following practice:
>
> Imagine a CA, "Foo", that creates a new Root Certificate ("Root 1"). They
> create this Root Certificate after the effective date of the Baseline
> Requirements, but
On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 12:20 PM Jeremy Rowley
wrote:
> For example, suppose a root was created before a rule went into place and
> the root needs to be renewed for some reason. If the root was compliant
> before creation and modifying the profile would break something with the
> root, then
-policy On
Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
Sent: Monday, October 7, 2019 10:21 AM
To: r...@sleevi.com
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy
Subject: RE: CAs cross-signing roots whose subjects don't comply with the BRs
Yeah - I like the visibility here since I know I often forget to post
don't scan, it's like a terrible version of Christmas.)
-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy On
Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Sent: Monday, October 7, 2019 10:07 AM
To: Jeremy Rowley
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy
Subject: Re: CAs cross-signing roots whose
On 07/10/2019 17:35, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 11:26 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>> On 07/10/2019 16:52, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>>> I'm curious how folks feel about the following practice:
>>>
>>> Imagine a CA, "Foo",
On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 11:54 AM Jeremy Rowley
wrote:
> Are both roots trusted in the Mozilla root store? If so, could you say
> that Mozilla has approved of the root not-withstanding the non-compliance?
> If root 2 did go through the public review process and had the public look
> at the
: Monday, October 7, 2019 9:35 AM
To: Jakob Bohm
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-policy
Subject: Re: CAs cross-signing roots whose subjects don't comply with the BRs
On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 11:26 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 07/10/2
On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 11:26 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 07/10/2019 16:52, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> > I'm curious how folks feel about the following practice:
> >
> > Imagine a CA, "Foo", that creates a new Root Certificate ("Root 1").
On 07/10/2019 16:52, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
I'm curious how folks feel about the following practice:
Imagine a CA, "Foo", that creates a new Root Certificate ("Root 1"). They
create this Root Certificate after the effective date of the Baseline
Requirements, but prior to Root Programs consistently
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