> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Nick
> Lamb via dev-security-policy
>
> I have a question: These certificates appear to be not only forbidden by the
> BRs
> but also
On Tuesday, 4 April 2017 16:31:10 UTC+1, douglas...@gmail.com wrote:
> How this happened:
Thanks Doug,
I have a question: These certificates appear to be not only forbidden by the
BRs but also technically unlikely to function as desired by the subscriber. Did
any customers report problems
On Tuesday, April 4, 2017 at 10:38:28 AM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
>
> The email has been sent, and the survey is open.
>
Published a security blog about it:
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/04/04/mozilla-releases-version-2-4-ca-certificate-policy/
Cheers,
Kathleen
On Tuesday, 4 April 2017 04:18:41 UTC+1, Jakob Bohm wrote:
> So why does Mozilla want disclosure and not just a blanket X on a form
> stating that all SubCAs are adequately audited, follow BRs etc.?
Not speaking for Mozilla of course, but as a fan of disclosure provisions:
Mandating disclosure
On Monday, 3 April 2017 23:34:44 UTC+1, Peter Kurrasch wrote:
> I must be missing something still? The implication here is that a purchaser
> who is not yet part of the root program is permitted to take possession of
> the root cert private key and possibly the physical space, key personnel,
>
On 27/03/17 22:12, Andrew Ayer wrote:
> [ Corresponding issue on GitHub:
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/67 ]
This has now been added to the policy 2.5 draft with a one-week deadline.
Gerv
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I've started the process of working on policy version 2.5 (does it ever
end? :-). The first thing I did was check in a number of tweaks and
wording changes which were in the April CA Communication, and therefore
had already been discussed, or which seemed uncontroversial. They are
those listed
On 03/04/17 13:11, Gervase Markham wrote:
> Hi Steve and Rick,
Q8) The accountant's letters for the 2015-2016 audits are dated February
28th 2017. The audits were supplied to Mozilla, and published, on the
1st of April 2017. Why the delay?
Gerv
___
Hi Gerv,
Here is the incident report for this reported issue.
Doug
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Gervase
> Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Thursday, March 16,
On Tuesday, April 4, 2017 at 8:19:28 AM UTC-7, Doug Beattie wrote:
> Here is the incident report for this reported issue.
I don't see anything attached or linked?
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Attachment was stripped, here it the content:
GlobalSign BR violation: EV Certificate with dNSName containing a space
On February 26, 2017, we received a report that there were multiple SANs in an
EV SSL Certificate that contained a space within it. Spaces are not permitted
characters, per
On 04/04/17 16:31, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote:
> Attachment was stripped, here it the content:
Thanks Doug.
Unless anyone sees something particularly problematic here, I think we
can call this incident closed.
Gerv
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On Monday, April 3, 2017 at 2:21:14 PM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> All,
>
> I'm getting ready to send the April 2017 CA Communication email.
>
> I updated the wiki page to have the survey introduction text, and a
> (read-only) link to the full survey:
>
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