On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Bruce via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> I'm trying to understand this posting. I think the CAs have an obligation
> to disclose all Intermediate certificates to the CCADB. I don't think that
> the CAs have an obligation to
On Friday, June 16, 2017 at 1:05:37 AM UTC-4, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> Hello, I was crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf files and found some
> intermediate certificates that don't appear in crt.sh.
>
> I forwarded them to Rob, I don't know if this is useful to anyone else, but
> they're
On 23/06/17 14:49, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy wrote:
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 6:17 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
wrote:
On 23/06/17 14:10, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
On 23/06/2017 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
On 22/06/17 10:51, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 19/06/17 20:41, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
Is this useful? if not, what key usage is interesting?
https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/ServerOrAny.zip
Thanks for this,
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 6:17 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 23/06/17 14:10, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>
>> On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
>>>
>>> Reasons:
>>>- Some are only trusted by the old Adobe CDS
On 23/06/17 14:10, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
Reasons:
- Some are only trusted by the old Adobe CDS program.
- Some are only trusted for Microsoft Kernel Mode Code Signing.
- Some are very old roots that are no longer trusted.
On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote:
Reasons:
- Some are only trusted by the old Adobe CDS program.
- Some are only trusted for Microsoft Kernel Mode Code Signing.
- Some are very old roots that are no longer trusted.
I wonder if Google's daedalus would like to see some of those.
On 22/06/17 10:51, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote:
On 19/06/17 20:41, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
Is this useful? if not, what key usage is interesting?
https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/ServerOrAny.zip
Thanks for this, Tavis. I pointed my certscraper
I definitely consider increased visibility into the vast iceberg that is
the public PKI to be a good thing!
What set of intermediates are you using? If it's reasonably complete, I
doubt we'll do any better than you, though maybe someone here has a
particularly clever technique for processing
I think you're right, it was probably me submitting my corpus - I hope
that's a good thing! :-)
I only submitted the ones I could verify, would you be interested in the
others? Many are clearly not interesting, but others seem like they may be
interesting if I had an intermediate I haven't seen.
One of my hobbies is keeping track of publicly trusted (by any of the major
root programs) CAs, for which there are no logged certificates. There's
over 1000 of these. In the last day, presumably as a result of these
efforts, 50-100 CAs were removed from the list.
Cheers,
Alex
On Thu, Jun 22,
On 19/06/17 20:41, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
Thanks Alex, I took a look, it looks like the check pings crt.sh - is doing
that for a large number of certificates acceptable Rob?
Hi Tavis. Yes, Alex's tool uses https://crt.sh/gen-add-chain to find a
suitable cert chain and
FYI, I'm submitting these right now, it seems to be working, here's an
example
https://crt.sh/?q=1eb6ec6e6c45663f3bb1b2f140961bbf3352fc8741ef835146d3a8a2616ee28f
Tavis.
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:56 PM, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> I noticed there's an apparently valid
On Monday, 19 June 2017 20:57:28 UTC+1, Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> I noticed there's an apparently valid facebook.com certificate in there
> (61b1526f9d75775c3d533382f36527c9.pem). This is surprising to me, that
> seems like it would be in CT already - so maybe I don't know what I'm doing.
>
> Let
I noticed there's an apparently valid facebook.com certificate in there
(61b1526f9d75775c3d533382f36527c9.pem). This is surprising to me, that
seems like it would be in CT already - so maybe I don't know what I'm doing.
Let me know if I've misunderstood something.
Tavis.
On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at
Thanks Alex, I took a look, it looks like the check pings crt.sh - is doing
that for a large number of certificates acceptable Rob?
I made a smaller set, the certificates that have 'SSL server: Yes' or 'Any
Purpose : Yes', there were only a few thousand that verified, so I just
checked those and
If you're interested in playing around with submitting them yourself, or
checking if they're already submitted, I've got some random tools for
working with CT: https://github.com/alex/ct-tools
Specifically ct-tools check will get what you
want. It's all serial, so for
On Fri, 16 Jun 2017 10:29:45 -0700
Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 2:00 AM, Rob Stradling
> wrote:
>
> > On 16/06/17 06:05, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
> >
> >> Hello, I was
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 2:00 AM, Rob Stradling
wrote:
> On 16/06/17 06:05, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
>
>> Hello, I was crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf files and found some
>> intermediate certificates that don't appear in crt.sh.
>>
>> I
> On Jun 16, 2017, at 05:00, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> On 16/06/17 06:05, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
>> Hello, I was crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf files and found some
>> intermediate certificates that
On 16/06/17 06:05, Tavis Ormandy via dev-security-policy wrote:
Hello, I was crawling the pkcs7 blobs in public pdf files and found some
intermediate certificates that don't appear in crt.sh.
I forwarded them to Rob, I don't know if this is useful to anyone else, but
they're available here.
21 matches
Mail list logo