Re: SECOM Trust EV root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Frank Hecker
Ian G wrote re CPSs not available in English: Which leads to the first easy fix: insist that all non-english CAs translate all their docs. Then I can read the CPS! I personally am unsatisfied at that, I see flaws. 1. Frank has made the case for regional and local CAs. The web is wide,

DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Frank Hecker
I've decided to make S-TRUST the next CA to enter the public discussion period. (I need to do a little more work for KISA, T-Systems, and Microsec, the other CAs near the top of the list.) S-TRUST is operated by Deutscher Sparkassenverlag (DSV), which has applied to add four new root CA

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Frank Hecker
Eddy Nigg wrote re S-TRUST issuing new root certificates annually: This is unfortunate and seems to me problematic. I'd suggest that they create a root from which they'd issue those as intermediate. I'm almost certain that other vendors will not include them for the same reason (so it's not an

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 12/17/2008 12:04 AM, Frank Hecker: Please feel free to mention this issue in the bug. However I suspect that S-TRUST is constrained in its practices by the relevant German laws and/or EU directives. I'm not aware of such an EU directive (and we would have known by now from other inclusion

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 12/17/2008 01:26 AM, Frank Hecker: That's a good idea, I'll do that. I'd like to get a definitive answer on this question, since I know I've seen this practice with other CAs, including I think at least one not in Germany. Frank, I asked about it at the bug already earlier. Once I get the

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Frank Hecker
Ian G wrote re creating new root certificates annually for CAs issuing qualified certificates: It is most likely in the regulations that are created by the regulating agency; that is the way these things work. I think that is the telecommunications regulator. Likely, these things are not

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Ian G
On 16/12/08 23:04, Frank Hecker wrote: Eddy Nigg wrote re S-TRUST issuing new root certificates annually: Please feel free to mention this issue in the bug. However I suspect that S-TRUST is constrained in its practices by the relevant German laws and/or EU directives. Unfortunately I

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Frank Hecker wrote: I've decided to make S-TRUST the next CA to enter the public discussion period. (I need to do a little more work for KISA, T-Systems, and Microsec, the other CAs near the top of the list.) S-TRUST is operated by Deutscher Sparkassenverlag (DSV), which has applied to add

Re: DSV/S-TRUST root inclusion request

2008-12-16 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 12/17/2008 03:42 AM, Nelson B Bolyard: Do the new certs for S-TRUST have the same key, or do they have different keys? If they have different keys, do they also have different subject names? Do they have different Subject Key ID (SKID) extension values? Do the certs they issue have Authority