On 06/25/2018 05:27 AM, Kurt Andersen wrote:
> I've now posted draft 15 of the ARC protocol.
Section 4.1.3 ARC-Seal (AS)
Second bullet point:
"Section Section 5.1.1"
- reads oddly in the text version. It's more clear in the
html version, where the second "Section" is part of a link.
On 06/25/2018 05:09 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
> On 6/25/2018 6:03 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote:
>> On 06/25/2018 04:44 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
>>> If the creator of the information does not have a reliable way of
>>> knowing what the receiver of it will do with
On 06/27/2018 09:15 PM, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
> We already tried to walk that line in the spec. In general, any tag that
> does not have a defined interpretation (firstly in the ARC spec, then
> falling back to the DKIM spec) gets ignored with certain exceptions, such
> as the "h" tag in an AS
On 06/25/2018 04:18 PM, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
> Correct - this was a clarification that has been added. If people find it
> objectionable we can take it back out. What would your parser do if it
> found an "h" tag in the header? Just ignore it or override the implicit "h"
> that is defined for
On 06/25/2018 04:44 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
> On 6/25/2018 5:38 AM, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
>> That's the right approach, but the ambiguity of what a validator might
>> do is why we thought it best to be explicit.
>
>
> Yup.
>
> Anything that comes close to 'do whatever you want with this
>
On 06/25/2018 04:10 PM, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
>>+ this (new?) requirement to check on h-tags for
>> AS mean that a common parse routine for the three
>> header types cannot be used. Did I miss the discussion
>> introducing the requirement?
>>
>
> The 'h' tag was never
On 22/01/18 22:47, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
> Title : Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol
- Section 6 gives verifier actions for evaluating the chain state,
but they do not cover the need for the arc.oldest-pass value
required by 5.2.1.
- 5.2.1 mentions a
On 22/01/18 22:47, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
> Filename: draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11.txt
[...]
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-11
Section 5.3 defines the AMS as being identical, with exceptions,
to a DKIM signature header. This might be taken
On 24/04/18 22:45, Kurt Andersen (b) wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 1:10 PM, Jeremy Harris <j...@wizmail.org> wrote:
>
>> On 24/04/18 04:02, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-14
>>
>> Sec
On 24/04/18 04:02, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-14
Section 3.3:
For AMS generation, what is the intention regarding oversigning?
Section 11:
Additional implementation:
Organization: Exim developers
Status of
On 21/03/18 15:18, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 3:00 PM, wrote:
>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-13.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Kurt Andersen and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
I see that Google are still
On 23/10/2018 07:09, Steven M Jones wrote:
> Consider this a reminder that your questions and suggestions are welcome.
>
> New version: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-usage-06
How about another subsection 5.x saying when Originating ADMDs should
take any ARC action? For
On 08/04/2019 12:02, Douglas E. Foster wrote:
> I had only these rudimentary requirements:
> [...] A secure-email method for outbound messages with sensitive
> content
Rudimentary? How secure; what's your threat model?
Those two things often don't go together.
(I should declare an
On 02/08/2019 20:58, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> For guidance here, I would rely on anecdotes of implementation. Has anyone
> implemented something that attaches "iprev" results?
Exim does.
--
Cheers,
Jeremy
___
dmarc mailing list
dmarc@ietf.org
On 11/11/2019 06:30, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>> Authentication-Results: example.com;
>> dkim=pass dns.sec=yes header.i=@example.org header.b=j5aQ3SJv
>>
>
> Are there any MTAs that would take a different action based on this
> information?
For Exim it would be a fairly simple bit of
On 29/07/2020 18:34, Hector Santos wrote:
> Look at my DMARC record for my isdg.net domain:
>
> v=DMARC1; p=reject; atps=y; rua=mailto:dmarc-...@isdg.net;
> ruf=mailto:dmarc-...@isdg.net;
>
> The atps=y [...]
> So anyone out there can see that I authorized bayviewphysicians.com to
> sign for
On 05/07/2020 23:39, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> Any opinion on the whole thing generally?
Certainly worthy of discussion. I wonder if it needs tying
to ARC rather than, or in addition to DKIM?
--
Cheers,
Jeremy
___
dmarc mailing list
On 05/07/2020 22:56, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kucherawy-dkim-transform-01
Substansive:
section 6, on footers:
- Is not a common boundary marker a signature-marker, namely
two dashes, space, end-of-line? The exim-users list, for
example, uses that.
Nit:
On 15/07/2020 10:25, Benny Lyne Amorsen wrote:
> At the other end of the spectrum, domains which never ever
> participate in mailing lists or mail forwarding need some kind of
> "p=reject-yes-really-I-mean-it", to stop recipients from ignoring the
> policy.
The domain owner doesn't know. It's
On 05/05/2021 12:28, Douglas Foster wrote:
Non-delivery reports are officially discouraged
RFC 5321 Section 6.2 says the reverse.
--
Cheers,
Jeremy
___
dmarc mailing list
dmarc@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
On 18/12/2021 03:47, Douglas Foster wrote:
MX checks are a valid tool for assessing SMTP MailFrom addresses, since the
sender is supposed to be ready to accept non-delivery reports and other
automated messages. Of course, this has applicability if (but only if)
the RFC5322.From domain is the
21 matches
Mail list logo