Juho wrote:
I can see three different local/personal representation concepts here. (just
to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)?
I think a?better way of?breaking down those options would be based on the how
the seats are allocated.?
The whole regional/national/district
Forest,
The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates
are ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's
favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the
voter's specified public ranking.
Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm in this?.
The harm is that voter's
2008/7/17 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Juho wrote:
I can see three different local/personal representation concepts here.
(just to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)
I think a better way of breaking down those options would be based on the
how the seats are allocated.
The whole
Juho wrote...
I link this to the problems in Fiji
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Voting_system_of_Fiji. In some circumstances the voters don't
seem to
check where their votes will go.
If you read the article carefully, you will see that the complaints were not
from the voters whose
Dear folks,
some time ago we discussed shortly whether it was possible to design a
strategy-free ratings-based method, that is, a method where voters give
ratings and never have any incentive to misrepresent their true ratings.
If I remember right, the methods that were discussed then were only
On Jul 17, 2008, at 18:38 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I can see three different local/personal representation concepts
here. (just to clarify my thoughts, and maybe help some others too)
I think a better way of breaking down those options would be based
on the how the seats are allocated.
I think already the basic open list provides a quite strong link
between candidates and voters. Voters will decide which candidates
will be elected, not the party (this is an important detail).
(Extensions are needed to provide proportionality between different
subgroups of the party.)
On Jul 17, 2008, at 20:10 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Chris:
Truncation should be allowed, so no-one has to fill out rankings
if they
don't want to.
Total agreement there.
My suggestion is to try to adapt an idea from information theory:
when
designing a system for conveying information
On Jul 17, 2008, at 21:13 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Juho wrote...
I link this to the problems in Fiji
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system_of_Fiji.
In some circumstances the voters don't
seem to
check where their votes will go.
If you read the article carefully, you will see that the
Juho wrote:
I think already the basic open list provides a quite strong link between
candidates and voters. Voters will decide which candidates will be
elected, not the party (this is an important detail). (Extensions are
needed to provide proportionality between different subgroups of the
For those just joining in we're talking about designing lotteries that make
compromise C a sure winner in the following scenario: P: ACB
Q: BCA
Where P and Q are approximately 50%., and C is considered about 3/5 of the way
between the lower and upper value in each faction from an expectation
** Definition of method FMAC-RB
** (Favourite or Most Approved Compromise Random Ballot)
** --
--
** Phase I: Perform a standard approval election to find the
** compromise ranking for Phase II. The question on the ballot reads
**
On Jul 18, 2008, at 1:34 , James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 9:18 PM
I think already the basic open list provides a quite strong link
between candidates and voters.
Yes, it is certainly much stronger than with closed-list. But see
next proviso.
Voters will
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