robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 12, 2010, at 3:57 PM, Juho wrote:
Sincere cycles are probably not very common in real elections. There
have already been many ranked ballot based elections with reasonably
sincere ballots, but at least I'm not aware of any top level cycles in
them.
i
Here are the results on an actual election:
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
Perata (or maybe someone in his camp) accuses the other candidates of gaming
the system by promoting each other as 2nd choices.
Some challengers tried to do that to IRV-leader Kriss
On Nov 13, 2010, at 12:55 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This reads as a valuable demonstration of the value of Condorcet.
it would be even more informative if, in the semi-final round between
Perata, Quan, and Kaplan, we knew how the 2nd-choice votes of Perata
and Quan voters broke down.
On Nov 13, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Sand W wrote:
Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
I believe that the DemoChoice numbers you cite are from the first
results file, released on November 5. The data below was released on
November 10 and includes nearly all of the ballots (although the audit
hasn't started yet). You are correct that my totals for Quan and Perata
should match the
On Nov 13, 2010, at 1:37 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
I believe that the DemoChoice numbers you cite are from the first
results file, released on November 5. The data below was released on
November 10 and includes nearly all of the ballots (although the
audit hasn't started yet). You are
Regarding my example
31: AB
32: BC
37: CA
Forest:
I've come around to the belief that most Condorcet cycles in
ordinary elections
are artificial, so chances are that this cycle was created from
the burial of B
by the C faction. Giving C the win only rewards this manipulation.
Chris:
I
Bob Richard wrote:
On 11/13/2010 8:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Sand W wrote:
Here are the results on an actual election:
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayortype=table
Perata (or maybe someone in his
- Original Message -
From: C.Benham
Date: Saturday, November 13, 2010 11:20 am
Subject: My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC
To: em
Cc: Forest W Simmons
Regarding my example
31: AB
32: BC
37: CA
Forest:
I've come around to the belief that most
Message: 1
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 2010 22:17:49 +0200
From: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: Election Methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots
Message-ID: 8c9f038f-e57b-4589-a102-41b7a91bf...@yahoo.co.uk
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii;
Actually, differs from plurality is not a sure indication of failure
for ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet.
For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate.
For ranking, voter can vote for more than one, perhaps ranking most
desired over more gettable.
Condorcet will use all
On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com wrote:
Actually, differs from plurality is not a sure indication of failure for
ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet.
For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate.
David, Not sure why you are restating the obvious.
On Nov 13, 2010, at 10:07 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
wrote:
Actually, differs from plurality is not a sure indication of
failure for
ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet.
For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate.
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