Here's the scenario you used to first show your tree method of determining
delegation order.
16 A1A2B
12 A2A1B
24 BA1=A2
48 C
What if some candidate outside the A1 A2 faction had an A2A1 preference? I
mean either:
Scenario S
16 A1A2B
12 A2A1B
24 BA2A1
48 C
Or:
Scenario T
16 A1A2B
12 A2A1B
24
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 6:06 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Of course, with too many factions, the optimal strategy computation would
be intractable.
With twenty candidates, there are about a million different possible subsets
to consider. Seems like it could be tractable.
I'm not exactly
I hope everyone is interested in a new online survey site intended to prove how
much better IRV-enabled surveys are than traditional one choice or approval
surveys.http://TryIRV.us is the current url, and we are still correcting it and
adding features. It is based on Demochoice code.
The
Jameson,
I'm really liking the SODA method that is evolving. I have a couple of
cosmetic suggestions:
First, in the description of SODA, I dislike using the term delegate for
step 3, candidate-to-candidate transfers. I would only use the word
delegate for step 2, the bullet voters' votes
Andy, I like both of your suggestions. Why don't you try putting them on the
page
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approvalyourself?
I don't want this system or that page to be mine, I just want
them to be good.
2011/7/7 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
2011/7/7 Andy Jennings electi...@jenningsstory.com
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 6:06 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Of course, with too many factions, the optimal strategy computation would
be intractable.
With twenty candidates, there are about a million different possible
subsets to consider.
On my web page where I describe my Proportional Range Voting System
(http://www.tobypereira.co.uk/voting.html), I have suggested that it should be
possible for a computer to sort out the result in a reasonable amount of time.
Of course, this may not actually be the case considering the number
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you probably
know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up and put things
in perspective.
Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and they
have been discussing these matters for years. As you
Assume you have some way to score the goodness of a slate of
representatives. You want to find the best possible such slate, but you
don't have the computational resources to score all possible slates. The
options are:
1. Add candidates one at a time. Advantages: deterministic and simple.
On Jul 7, 2011, at 3:54 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you
probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it
up and put things in perspective.
Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians,
and
Russ's message about simplicity is well-taken. But the most successful
voting reform is IRV - which is far from being the simplest reform. Why has
IRV been successful?
I want to leave this as an open question for others before I try to answer
it myself. The one answer which wouldn't be useful
On 7/7/11 3:54 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
Let me just elaborate on my concerns about complexity. Most of you
probably know most of this already, but let me just try to summ it up
and put things in perspective.
Some of the participants on this list are advanced mathematicians, and
they have been
I'm not sure I exactly followed that. Jameson's option 2 is to look at the
nominated slates and see which is best. You could also still use one of the
other methods to find a possible winner and then compare it with the best
nominated slate (if they are different). Is that anything like what
On 7.7.2011, at 22.54, Russ Paielli wrote:
Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that
thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major
parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it?
If we assume that one of the main
The intended difference was that in option 2 one can use any optimization
algorithm, and after some time we will see who has found the best slate, while
in the proposed new variant of the option we would have a known algorithm, that
would be run with known previously agreed parameters. And
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was
that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky risky from the two leading
parties' point of view as methods that are more compromise candidate oriented
(instead of being first preference oriented). I think that is
Ouch!
. As Kristofer just wrote, Condorcet is a much better method than
IRV for what you are promising - Interesting that Condorcet offers
(more than) the same voter ranking capabilities as IRV, but does much
better counting.
. CIVS offers, available now, what you seem to be trying.
It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians) care a
lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't know what it's
called.
--Bob Richard
On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was that
- Original Message -
From: Andy Jennings
Of course, with too many factions, the optimal strategy
computation would
be intractable.
With twenty candidates, there are about a million different
possible subsets
to consider. Seems like it could be tractable.
Building the
i was looking for Kristofer's posts to EM and came across this, i may
have missed it:
On Jun 22, 2011, at 5:30 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jun 21, 2011, at 7:56 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
Eric Maskin, a Nobel laureate, is currently very
2011/7/7 fsimm...@pcc.edu
- Original Message -
From: Andy Jennings
Of course, with too many factions, the optimal strategy
computation would
be intractable.
With twenty candidates, there are about a million different
possible subsets
to consider. Seems like it
A correction below at ***
- Original Message -
From:
Date: Thursday, July 7, 2011 5:16 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] SODA
To: Jameson Quinn ,
Cc: Andy Jennings , election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
2011/7/7 Andy Jennings
On Wed,
The Hasse diagram for a partially ordered set is a tree.
No, it's not. Or at least, not if I understand your terms correctly. If
there are three candidates [ABC], and all vote types exist, then is [A] a
leaf on the [AB] branch or on the [AC] branch?
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:26 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ouch!
i missed it.
. As Kristofer just wrote, Condorcet is a much better method
than IRV for what you are promising - Interesting that Condorcet
offers (more than) the same voter ranking capabilities as IRV, but
does much better
Downright curious how we skip over what is presented between our
eyes!!!
I recommended paying more attention to Condorcet Internet Voting
Service. Less than a dozen lines after reading my reference to CIVS
below, Robert wished for exactly that!
0n Jul 7, 2011, at 9:50 PM, robert
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
It turns that real live voters (including real live politicians)
care a lot about the later-no-harm criterion, even if they don't
know what it's called.
They need to learn that Condorcet offers less painful response than
what IRV is
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all
countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the
possibility that one day ordinary people might rule the country. I'm sure
many
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