Juho wrote:
Many of the criteria would be nice to have. One must however remember
that often they have two sides. Winning something in some area may mean
losing something in another area (e.g. the LNH property of IRV has been
discussed widely on this list recently) especially when trying to
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles? I would still like an example of a
spoiler in Condorcet no matter how unlikely if possible. Thank you.
Juho wrote:
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very
On Jan 23, 2010, at 1:55 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an
On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:29 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i think that the answer is no, if a Condorcet winner exists and
that all bets are off if a CW does not exist, except, perhaps for
these strategy-resistant methods such as Markus Schulze's
method. i
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles? I would still like an example of a
spoiler in Condorcet no matter how unlikely if possible. Thank you.
Kathy
On Thu, Jan 21,
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general) may very
well be so small in typical real elections (large, public, with independent
voter decision making, with changing
well, since no one else responded...
On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:21 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles?
Wikipedia. maybe start with
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, we have a CW... add a candidate, if that candidate does not become
the winner, nor cause a cycle, then the Condorcet Winner we had before
continues to be the CW with the added candidate. (boy, i guess we're
rephrasing the same thing multiple times!)
Yup.
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very abstract concept of spoiler might be: denote f(X) the minimal
number of
On Jan 21, 2010, at 5:33 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general)
may very well be so small in typical real elections (large, public,
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very abstract concept
If the Condorcet method is susceptible to the phenomena of a
nonwinning candidate whose presence in the election changes who would
otherwise win the election, all else being equal.
Could someone please provide me with an example of the spoiler effect
occuring with the Condorcet method of
On Jan 20, 2010, at 7:10 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Is the Condorcet method susceptible to the phenomena of a
nonwinning candidate whose presence in the election changes who would
otherwise win the election, all else being equal?
i changed the sentence form into a question. i hope that was
Thanks Robert,
My question was strictly about Condorcet and I know already how to
generate IRV and spoiler cases, as I said.
Are you claiming that Condorcet methods are never subjected to a case
of a nonwinning candidate changing who would otherwise win?
This seems logical, given the method and
On Jan 20, 2010, at 7:54 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Robert,
My question was strictly about Condorcet and I know already how to
generate IRV and spoiler cases, as I said.
Are you claiming that Condorcet methods are never subjected to a case
of a nonwinning candidate changing who would
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i think that the answer is no, if a Condorcet winner exists and that
all bets are off if a CW does not exist, except, perhaps for these
strategy-resistant methods such as Markus Schulze's method. i sorta
understand it, but since he hangs here, i think Markus
On Jan 21, 2010, at 2:29 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i think that the answer is no, if a Condorcet winner exists and
that all bets are off if a CW does not exist, except, perhaps for
these strategy-resistant methods such as Markus Schulze's
method. i
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