Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure if it
would withstand strategy (there's that hard to
estimate the amount of strategy that will happen
again),
--- On Sun, 14/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure
if it
would withstand
Kristofer,
You wrote (Sun.Nov.23):
Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist. Borda-elimination
(Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax is quite simple, and everybody
who's dealt with sports knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll
partially grant this, though, since the good
--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and
that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure if it
would withstand strategy (there's that hard to
estimate the amount of strategy that will happen
again), and the Minmax
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then you should advocate Minmax for being Minmax, not for
being Condorcet compliant. If you do the latter, then people
may argue that the system is inconsistent because it
doesn't follow up the implication
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There are different kind of criteria.
If one decides the winner based on one single
vote a method that would elect the least
preferred candidate would be bad. Things get
however more complex with group opinions that
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Minmax may elect the Condorcet loser only when there
is no Condorcet winner. And only in situations where
all other candidates are worse than the Condorcet
loser from the minmax philosophy/utility point of
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Tue, 25/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'll try to answer very shortly to most of the points.
I can comment more if there are some interesting ones.
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Note that the minmax philosophy is to study paths of
length one. Minmax philosophy says that voter interest
to replace the elected candidate with another is more
relevant than their interest to replace the candidates
Hallo,
Juho Laatu wrote (28 Nov 2008):
I didn't quite get this. When evaluating
candidate X minmax just checks if voters
would be interested in changing X to some
other candidate (in one step), while
methods like Schulze and Ranked Pairs may
base their evaluation on chains of victories
.
Juho
--- On Fri, 28/11/08, Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Friday, 28 November, 2008, 2:41 AM
Hallo,
Juho Laatu wrote (28 Nov 2008):
I didn't quite get this. When
Chris Benham wrote:
Kristopher,
All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial. Smith,IRV has in
common with IRV but not the other well-known Condorcet methods
that a Mutual Dominant Third winner can't be buried. But like all other
Condorcet methods it is not absolutely invulnerable to Burial
--- On Tue, 25/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'll try to answer very shortly to most of the points.
I can comment more if there are some interesting ones.
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: [EMAIL
--- On Tue, 25/11/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I agree that resistance to Burying is atractive and IRV's big selling
point versus Condorcet methods.
Yes, this may be the strongest selling argument of IRV
against Condorcet. But I think this doesn't yet mean
that Condorcet
Greg wrote:
I have written up my reasons for preferring IRV over Condorcet methods
in an essay, the current draft of which is available here:
http://www.gregdennis.com/voting/irv_vs_condorcet.html
I welcome any comments you have.
I'll try to do so, then. Note that I support Condorcet.
--- On Sun, 23/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Regarding number two, simple Condorcet methods exist.
Borda-elimination (Nanson or Raynaud) is Condorcet. Minmax
is quite simple, and everybody who's dealt with sports
knows Copeland (with Minmax tiebreaks). I'll partially
or whether to
compromise.
Juho
--- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Saturday, 22 November, 2008, 3:06 AM
Thanks, Chris. I'll correct the errors
. Then nominating
also C (the more extreme of the two potential candidates) was maybe a mistake.
Juho
--- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods
PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Saturday, 22 November, 2008, 10:04 AM
Yes, this is as intuitive as it comes in terms of
IRV
strategy, but I
still find it ultimately counter-intuitive
For some light on the question as to whether or not IRV's failures of the
Condorcet Criterion are apt to be rare:
http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
FWS
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
result overall . . . but that's a
tricky topic for another time.
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2008 11:51:01 -0800 (PST)
From: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet
Greg,
I generally liked your essay. I rate IRV as the best of the single-winner
methods that
meet
Greg,
I generally liked your essay. I rate IRV as the best of the single-winner
methods that
meet Later-no-Harm, and a good method (and a vast improvement on FPP).
But I think you made a couple of technical errors.
However, because bullet voting can help and never backfire against one's top
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