Just to make myself clear here, to a voter a "utility" is something like the
electric company, or the municipal water supplier. "Utilities" is a category
of stocks traded on various exchanges.
They have nothing to do with how we vote.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.c
At 04:01 PM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>To be clear, I thought you were claiming that any method (not just a
>Condorcet method) that allows such votes could simply be called a mix
>of Condorcet and Approval. That's why I brought up ER-IRV.
Oh. That is so blatantly false that it did not even oc
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 09:04 AM 8/22/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >I wouldn't choose it either. This comment of mine is a response to you
> >seeming to claim that if a method allows equal-ranking and truncation,
> >this is a sufficient condition for it to be
At 10:42 PM 8/21/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 21:59:49 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>>At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>
>>>That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed?
>WHAT do the vote counters do that maybe can claim equal strength f
At 01:32 AM 8/21/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>Just to make myself clear here, to a voter a "utility" is something like the
>electric company, or the municipal water supplier. "Utilities" is a category
>of stocks traded on various exchanges.
>
>They have nothing to do with how we vote.
Ah, this is r
At 01:23 AM 8/21/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote:
>There is no such thing as "utility" to a voter. That is an abstraction used
>by analysts for which I have seen no definition that is useful to me, a
>voter, despite having pleaded for one on this list for at least three years
>now.
The term is widely us
On Tue, 21 Aug 2007 21:59:49 -0400 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
>>That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed?
>
WHAT do the vote counters do that maybe can claim equal strength for such
rankings, when others are not doin
Chris Benham wrote:
31: A>>B
32: B>>C
37: C>>A
Leaving aside the approval cutoffs, methods that don't elect C here
must fail mono-raise.
With these rankings and also C being the most approved candidate, for
me a method needs
a good excuse for not electing C.
DMC and also "Approval-Weighte
At 10:48 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>That's still pretty strange... What about IRV with equal rankings allowed?
Well, I suggested it long ago as a simple improvement. Voters can
essentially vote it as Approval if they want.
In an Approval election, if all the candidates you approve are no
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote in reply Peter Barath:
>I guess this is an unjust blame because this thing
>affect all voting methods.
No. It *particularly* affects ranked methods, because ranked methods
obscure preference strength. While there may be methods which promote
the expression of absolute
At 04:58 PM 8/20/2007, Peter Barath wrote:
> >Sure. That's been proposed many times. However,
> >it's not a very good method. First of all, it is
> >blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the
> >Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best
> >winner, by far.
>
>I guess this is an unjust blame
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 01:22 PM 8/20/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > > And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is
> > > "Condorcet/Approval."
> >
> >By "And" did you mean "Any"?
>
> Lucky guess!
>
> >I don't think either equal ranking or truncation a
At 12:30 PM 8/20/2007, Chris Benham wrote:
>And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval."
>
>Abd,
>Is "And.." suppose to read 'Any...', or is there some missing
>word? As written, to the extent that it makes
>sense it is false.
Yes. Any.
>>The term "Approval"
Peter Barath wrote:
And what about the method (I don't know the name) in which
the least approved candidate is eliminated until there is
a Condorcet-winner?
That is called "Definite Majority Choice". It has some alternative
algorithms.
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choi
>>1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is
>>not, the Approval winner wins.
>Sure. That's been proposed many times. However,
>it's not a very good method. First of all, it is
>blatantly obvious, if you care to look, that the
>Condorcet winner is sometimes *not* the best
>w
>By the way, electing from the Condorcet top tier using approval
>would be called Smith//Approval or Schwartz//Approval depending on
>which top tier is used. I don't typically consider these methods
>because they are more complicated than Condorcet//Approval and
>can't be adjusted to satisfy FBC.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:44 PM 8/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find
literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise
measure.
And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condor
At 09:44 PM 8/19/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>I would guess that if you searched the EM archives you would find
>literally dozens of proposed methods that combine approval with a pairwise
>measure.
And method which allows equal ranking and truncation is "Condorcet/Approval."
The term "Approval" is
Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> At 01:29 PM 8/16/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
>> We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many
>> other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the
>> voters.
>
> It's an error. The one most ha
At 07:01 PM 8/19/2007, Peter Barath wrote:
>Which means that the concept of "two candidates with the best chances"
>depends not solely on the candidates themselves but theoretically
>possibly on the voting method too!
Yes. Of course. But I don't think that voting
method results in a different est
Hi,
--- Peter Barath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> My favourite (at this moment)
> is a preference ranking with an approval cutoff. For me it's
> interesting enough that it can be used in two ways:
>
> 1. If there is a Condorcet-winner she/he/it wins. If there is
>not, the Approval winner w
>47: Bush >> Gore > Nader
>27: Gore > Nader >> Bush (honest); Gore >> Nader > Bush (strategic)
>26: Nader > Gore >> Buch (honest); Nader >> Gore > Bush (strategic)
>Bush wins the first rount, but loses for Gore in a runoff (IAR).
>With strategic voting, the spoiler effect is possible under simple
Diego Renato wrote:
2007/8/18, Gervase Lam:
> [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your
compromise
> candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken
your votes
> for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the
>
2007/8/18, Gervase Lam:
>
> > [With a reweight of 0 a] concern [is] that if you approve your
> compromise
> > candidate, who ends up being the most approved, you can weaken your
> votes
> > for your favorite candidate and cause him to fail to qualify for the
> > second round.
>
> The ideal way to s
> Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2007 20:23:19 +0200 (CEST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> Subject: [Election-Methods] RE : Improved Approval Runoff
> --- Diego Renato <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a ?crit?:
> > 3) If not, that candidate runs a second round against other candidate -
> > the
> > most approved after a new count
At 01:29 PM 8/16/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
We should resist TACTICAL bullet voting for the same reason that many
other methods than plurality. Increase the overall satisfaction of the voters.
It's an error. The one most harmed by "tactical" bullet-voting is the
voter who votes that way. Some ana
> Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2007 17:00:59 -0300
> From: "Diego Renato"
> Subject: [Election-Methods] Improved Approval Runoff
> 1) On the first round, the voter can vote for as many or as few candidates
> as desired.
> 2) If some candidate has more than 50% of approvals, th
I do not see where I expressed a bias I do not feel:
For many elections most voters would be happy with Plurality.
We NEED to have a method that will both satisfy their needs AND
provide for satisfying voter desires when they are ready for something
more complex.
Could be that Braz
Diego Renato wrote:
All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are
vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality
voting. For instance, suppose that some voter has A as his/her first
preference. S/he can vote like this:
Approval: A: approved; B: reject
Correction:
> 2nd count (1st round):
> 22,5 Bush clone
> 27 Gore <- selected for runoff.
> 26 Nader
>
>
Diego Santos
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
2007/8/16, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax:
> At 04:00 PM 8/15/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
> >All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are
> >vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality
> voting.
>
> "Vulnerable" implies that there is something wrong with this. It is
>
2007/8/15, Dave Ketchum:
>
> On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
> candidate. Why is this something to fight?
> One candidate can overshadow the competition.
> Voters can be loyal to their party.
For occasional exception elections there will be mor
At 04:00 PM 8/15/2007, Diego Renato wrote:
>All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are
>vulnerable to bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting.
"Vulnerable" implies that there is something wrong with this. It is
not correct to claim that this gives "the s
On Thu, 16 Aug 2007 01:04:21 +0100 James Gilmour wrote:
> Dave Ketchum> Sent: 15 August 2007 22:57
>
>>On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
>>candidate.
>
>
> On what basis do you say that? Surely it is, to a very great extent, a
> function of the voting sy
Dave Ketchum> Sent: 15 August 2007 22:57
> On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
> candidate.
On what basis do you say that? Surely it is, to a very great extent, a
function of the voting system. If the voting
system says (directly or indirectly) "pick one wi
On most elections many, if not most, voters' preference will be a single
candidate. Why is this something to fight?
One candidate can overshadow the competition.
Voters can be loyal to their party.
For occasional exception elections there will be more interest in voting
for multiple
All one-round voting systems that allows ballot truncation are vulnerable to
bullet voting, resulting the same results of plurality voting. For instance,
suppose that some voter has A as his/her first preference. S/he can vote
like this:
Approval: A: approved; B: rejected; C: rejected; D: rejected
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