2010/2/10 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for effective
votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be trusted. Since corruption
is often a very cheap investment for the
I feel obliged to pass this excellent paper along to the list. It describes not
only portal, hydraulic and feline voting systems, but points out the definitive
advantage of electronic voting systems.
On Voting Systems
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
At 01:08 PM 2/10/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Condorcet does an N*N matrix showing for EACH pair of candidates which
is better liked - used in counting and usable by others to help plan
their future. Often there is a CW which wins for winning in all of
its pairs; else a cycle in which each would
Consider the following votes:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections involving
A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Huh? I count 66 voters who prefer either B or C over A.
Change it up:
49 A
26 BC
25 CB
Now the CW is B. In the C vs. B
Abd wrote:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise
elections involving A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Assuming that by the above votes you mean
34:AB=C
33:BCA
33:CBA,
A is not the Condorcet winner and is in fact the Condorcet loser, losing
both A:B and
At 01:45 PM 2/11/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections
involving A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Oops. Of course, A is the Condorcet loser. I added the second
preferences as an afterthought. I meant
34 A
33 B
We all get careless and stumble, sooner or later!
But I choke on two details here:
You misuse the label plurality - having only the ability to vote for
1 even though, for many races most intelligent voters will find there
is only one candidate deserving approval.
Even Approval has more
