Dave Ketchum wrote:
I do not understand 'no resolution':
By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete
Condorcet election.
By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a
complete election.
Any such election may produce a CW.
Those
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 04:12:21 -0400 Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I do not understand 'no resolution':
By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete
Condorcet election.
By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a
complete
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including
paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some).
True, but paper ballots must be tampered with one at a time and it
takes many many more
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 11:45:16 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including
paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some).
True, but paper ballots must be
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More complete defenses are possible with electronics.
Totally FALSE statement.
In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an
electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting
system that
Dave Ketchum wrote:
In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in
tailoring test cases to favor a desired result.
Maybe try an open simulator. Make the electorate engine pluggable
so experimenters can try different voting behaviours. That should
protect against
