Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 22:24:53 -0500
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
To: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com, EM Methods
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
At 02:14 AM 1/13/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
IRV/STV is fundamentally unfair because a
On Jan 14, 2010, at 11:03 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 22:24:53 -0500
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
To: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com, EM Methods
election-methods@lists.electorama.com
At 02:14 AM 1/13/2010, robert bristow-johnson
On Jan 13, 2010, at 8:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 5:02 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 7:57 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This seems to me to be a claim that is at best not self-evident
(in the sense that Pareto or anti-dictatorship, say, are).
On Jan 14, 2010, at 9:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
do you mean their 2nd choice is not counted because their first choice loses
in the final round? that goes without saying, but that's the dumb IRV rules.
that is an *arbitrary* threshold imposed upon IRV, that 1st choices count
On Jan 13, 2010, at 3:15 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 09:30 AM 1/13/2010, Terry Bouricius wrote:
It has been argued that IRV tends to reduce negative campaigning,
or makes
campaigns overly bland (depending on your stance), because in
addition to
seeking first choices, candidates
Kathy Dopp wrote (11 Jan 2010):
snip
IRV/STV is fundamentally unfair because a large group of persons whose
first choice loses, never has their 2nd choice counted, unlike some
other voters. It's a highly inequitable method.
snip
Kathy Dopp wrote (13 Jan 2010):
For those who need a system for
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I'm glad to hear you don't support IRV/STV methods.
There are several scenarios where voters' marked 2nd choices are never
counted, even when their first choice loses,
if their 1st choice loses at
Kathy,
You need to learn the terminology for election experts to understand you.
You can't use the term majority-favorite to when you mean
Condorcet-winner. They mean different things, and your statements below
are confusing (and false), simply because you are using terms incorrectly.
For the
Dave Ketchum wrote (9 Jan 2010):
For a quick look at IRV: 35A, 33BC, 32C
A wins for being liked a bit better than B - 3533.
That C is liked better than A is too trivial for IRV to notice - 6535.
Let one BC voter change to C and C would win over A - 6535.
Let a couple BC voters switch to A
On Jan 14, 2010, at 1:12 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
We know that we can't have a system with all the properties that we
might independently desire. Consequently, we compare systems
overall, looking not just at their list of properties met and
unmet, but at the implications for voter
oops. forgot to finish a sentence.
On Jan 14, 2010, at 1:12 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
We know that we can't have a system with all the properties that we
might independently desire. Consequently, we compare systems
overall, looking not just at their list of properties met and
unmet,
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 1:44 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 1:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I'm glad to hear you don't support IRV/STV methods.
not over
At 08:06 PM 1/13/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
For those who need a system for substituting for a top-two runoff
election, I devised two fair methods to suggest to her that do not
have all the flaws of IRV/STV. (They both may've been devised by
others before me. My goal was to create a fair method
Response to Robert's statement...
I guess I still haven't heard a good justification for why the Condorcet
winner, if one exists, should *ever* be rejected as the elected winner.
...
Imagine this scenario. ..
A highly polarized electorate with a three candidate race. Only two candidates
are
On Jan 14, 2010, at 11:00 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
simply, if a Condorcet winner exists, and your election authority elevates to
office someone else, that elected person is rejected by a majority of the
electorate. what other democratic value papers over that flaw? LNH?
At 09:32 PM 1/13/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
This sounds like a variation on Borda count, but with an
incentive to vote on fewer candidates.
Yes perhaps, but normalized to give a value of one in total to all
ballots since Borda was rejected by the MN Supreme court as violating
On Jan 14, 2010, at 4:24 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Response to Robert's statement...
I guess I still haven't heard a good justification for why the
Condorcet winner, if one exists, should *ever* be rejected as the
elected winner.
...
Imagine this scenario. ..
sure, but i have a less
At 12:51 PM 1/14/2010, Chris Benham wrote:
I'm not sure what Kathy means by a majority favorite.
Yeah, she's not necessarily precise, being a voting security expert,
not a voting systems expert.
That phrase is
usually taken to refer to a candidate that is strictly top-ranked by more
than
At 02:38 PM 1/14/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 1:44 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 1:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 12:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
I'm glad to hear you
On Jan 14, 2010, at 7:17 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Again, as I mentioned, the Condorcet Criterion looks good, it's intuitively
satisfying. Unfortunately, it depends on pure rank order, neglecting
preference strength.
Just for the record: for many of us that's an advantage.
20 matches
Mail list logo
