robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should
Kathy
I think my post made clear that I was referring only to preference profiles.
I was not dealing with the situation where some
artificial, and highly undesirable, restriction had been placed on the numbers
of rankings the voters could mark.
I think my comments about the counting procedure
OK James. As I said before, I agree with you that you were giving the
total number of profiles *if* voters were allowed to rank all
candidates, which they were not allowed to do in Minneapolis or
elsewhere in the US public elections if I am right.
Further, I think that Robert is correct, that one
Kathy,
Arrow never uses the word spoiler in his theorem (original nor revised
version). You may be thinking about his independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) criterion. While this could be expanded to have some
bearing on the concept of spoilers, it is not the same thing. Firstly,
Arrow
On Jan 22, 2010, at 5:32 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 12:55 AM, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
Arrow never used, never mind defined, the word spoiler.
That is true. Back in Arrow's day,
Back in Arrow's day? Like, um, today?
the word spoiler was not used,
I meant back in the days when Arrow came up with his theorem
concerning rank choice votes failing at least one of his fairness
criteria. (IRV fails more of Arrow's fairness criteria than plurality
and fails more of Arrow's criteria than all other alternative methods
I've heard recommended.)
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
OK James. As I said before, I agree with you that you were
giving the total number of profiles *if* voters were allowed
to rank all candidates, which they were not allowed to do in
Minneapolis or elsewhere in the US public elections if I
On Jan 22, 2010, at 7:57 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I meant back in the days when Arrow came up with his theorem
concerning rank choice votes failing at least one of his fairness
criteria. (IRV fails more of Arrow's fairness criteria than plurality
and fails more of Arrow's criteria than all other
On Jan 22, 2010, at 7:19 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Arrow never uses the word spoiler in his theorem (original nor revised
version). You may be thinking about his independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) criterion. While this could be expanded to have some
bearing on the concept of
On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 11:10 AM, James Gilmour
jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
My formula provides the more practical number of how many
profiles are allowed to be cast by voters and how many
profiles are needed if one wants to count the
On Jan 22, 2010, at 8:54 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
As I said earlier, if paper ballots are required, the length of the
paper ballot must be unlimited if the number of candidates who can run
for office is unlimited and you want voters to be able to fully rank
(not that most voters would want to.)
At 12:03 AM 1/22/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Terry, just do not imagine that people do not see the trick you use
of redefining words that have had a common meaning for decades.
The biggest is majority, which has been redefined to mean something
very different, which is then justified on a bogus
On Jan 22, 2010, at 5:32 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
This reminds me of one of the plethora of other deliberately
misleading claims of Fairytale Vote, they constantly cite Arrow's
theorem as if that is a logical reason to support IRV when IRV fails
more of Arrow's Fairness criteria than even
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would be treated
differently from a ballot marked AB: at the last
At 07:48 PM 1/21/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:34 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
At 04:41 PM 1/21/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:32 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Terry, You cleverly conveniently change all the definitions whenver it
At 08:58 PM 1/21/2010, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Kathy,
I will refrain from the majority discussion, as that is off topic.
It is very much on-topic. The spoiler effect is a problem because it
can shift results from a true majority result to one actually opposed
by a majority of voters. And this
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 4:54 PM
James, you are using a straw man argument with me, setting up
a false premise that I said something I never did,
Kathy, I was not setting up any straw man argument with you or anyone else. I
simply stated what a preference profile is and
At 09:33 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did
Jonathan,
Yes and no...You are correct that Arrow never uses the term
monotonicity, but the concept is embodied in his second condition,
called positive association.
Terry
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
To: kathy.d...@gmail.com
Cc:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would
On Jan 22, 2010, at 10:30 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Jonathan,
Yes and no...You are correct that Arrow never uses the term
monotonicity, but the concept is embodied in his second condition,
called positive association.
Yes--I'm talking about terminology merely (that, and that
On Jan 21, 2010, at 8:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
and i believe that it is perfectly
practical when the number of *credible* candidates is small. doesn't
matter what the voting system is. IRV, or whatever.
Yes. But how small?
On Jan 22, 2010, at 3:57 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
At 01:55 PM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
From: Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
To: Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
Cc: kathy.d...@gmail.com, election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] I need an example of Condorcet method being
subjected
Message-ID: acf2480e-5c32-4678-8e29-500f743f5...@pobox.com
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