On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If minimax
is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives 95% of the advantage vs.
plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. And besides, if
we try to get
consensus on
On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, I agree [with Juho Laatu].
If minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives 95% of the advantage
vs. plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the
On 28.5.2011, at 23.16, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If
minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives 95% of the advantage vs.
plurality of the
On 28-May-2011, Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote, is there any good reason to use
minimax of
winning votes (clipped at zero) over minimax using margins? it seems to me
that a candidate
pairing where Candidate A just squeaks by Candidate B, but where a lotta people
vote should
have less weight
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com a écrit :
will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked
pairs? if the cycle has only three candidates, it
seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs.
It is the same with three.
On 27.5.2011, at 10.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. We draw up a statement which details the serious problems
with plurality in the US context, and states that there are
solutions.
Juho Laatu Sent: Friday, May 27, 2011 9:43 PM
Good approach. I have one comment on the target statement.
On 29.5.2011, at 1.33, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Margins elects A here:
35 AB
25 B
40 C
Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you
argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of the
ballots?
I guess the common assumption is that the unranked
On 29.5.2011, at 2.09, James Gilmour wrote:
On 27.5.2011, at 10.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. We draw up a statement which details the serious problems
with plurality in the US context, and states that there are
solutions.
Juho Laatu Sent: Friday, May 27, 2011 9:43 PM
Good approach. I
I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.
But I still think that we should go with a method that is does not require the
voters to rank the
candidates.
From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
1. Asset Voting
2. Approval
3. DYN
4. MCA
5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
If by #5 you mean IBIFA, I can't take any credit for that.
I
Dear all,
I apologise for some less fortunate attempts to resolve the problem of the
generalized incomplete ballot.
Now I think I have finally arrived at a good unified treatment the problem,
generalized symmetric ballot completion, which respects the power of the
blank vote to block elections
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