On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up
using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
Votes would be
2011/7/4 Russ Paielli russ.paie...@gmail.com
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar
to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I
consider a major defect.
Political parties can be a good thing because people normally take
shortcuts when deciding whom to vote for - by selecting the political
party that agrees with their own ideology. Especially under the party
list system, parties can be beneficial because smaller political
parties that
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:13 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
Please don't lump IRV and STV. Yes, they use the same underlying mechanisms,
but the effects are totally different. STV can, in practice, completely
eliminate the partisan spoiler problem; IRV cannot. And, as I've
Kathy Dopp Sent: Tuesday, July 05, 2011 2:30 AM
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 7:19 PM, James Gilmour
Kathy, your comments illustrate the fundamental problems with all
party list voting systems: 1. you must have registered political
parties;
As someone else noted in this thread
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer. I ignored the all* in all others.
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the majority
criterion for a single-winner method as you did against the
51: Left Center Right
45: Right Center Left
4: Center Right Left.
The majority criterion forces Left to win in a single-winner election.
However, Left is hated by 49% of the voters.
Just to point out the obvious here: Center would lose even with up to 49% of
the vote in this
2011/7/5 Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:20 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
If you want to minimize unhappiness of the voters by electing candidates
hated by few, you can make the same kind of argument against the
majority
criterion for
Russ, you said that SODA was too complicated. In my prior message, I
responded by saying that it was actually pretty simple. But thanks for your
feedback; I realize that the SODA page was not conveying that simplicity
well. I've changed the procedure there from 8 individual steps to 4 steps -
Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval decisions
sequentially instead of
simultaneously.
The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to first place in
the sequence by an increase
in support, she may become a losing candidate:
Assume sincere preferences
2011/7/5 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jameson suggested that the SODA candidates make their approval decisions
sequentially instead of
simultaneously.
The problem with this is that if a winning candidate moves to first place
in the sequence by an increase
in support, she may become a losing candidate:
I thought that A was required to make her approvals consistent with her
ordering, i.e. to approve
everybody ranked above her cutoff. Doesn't that mean she is required to
approve herself?
Maybe I'm thinking of an older version of SODA.
I hope you are right that there is nothing to fix.
2011/7/5, fsimm...@pcc.edu fsimm...@pcc.edu:
I thought that A was required to make her approvals consistent with her
ordering, i.e. to approve
everybody ranked above her cutoff. Doesn't that mean she is required to
approve herself?
Maybe I'm thinking of an older version of SODA.
I hope
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