Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I could see a kind of proxy front end to STV elections. I'm not sure
I'm convinced it would be a good idea, or even practical to implement,
but suppose that any person or group (including parties) could
register an STV ranking, and a voter could select that ranking
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 6:06 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(Continuous elections could also increase the level of participation in
decision making in the sense that old votes could be valid for a long time
even if the voter wouldn't bother to change the vote often. Well, on the
other hand
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 6:08 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Don't know the details of these mechanisms but tickets seem to me like
add-ons that may have both good and bad effects. They do reduce the problems
of vote splitting due to short votes.
In Ireland, there are no 'how to vote' cards.
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 7:34 PM, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2008 12:22 AM
I think a reasonable compromise is the system where a voter
picks a list and can override it. This could include a
system where any voter can register a list prior
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 10:28 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 17, 2008, at 20:05 , Raph Frank wrote:
Voting the 'party ticket' in this context is just voting for all
candidates that your party puts forward before giving any
rankings to any other candidate.
It makes sense to me
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 10:28 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Are there any statistics from real STV-PR elections on how many votes (sum
of fragments) run out of candidates during the counting process?
The easiest way to see that is to look at how many votes are
remaing to the last count.
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 10:29 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One could also complete short votes (at least by default) to something
longer (e.g. party preferences or just party as a whole) to get rid of this
problem.
That is another option, the Australians seem to be against the concept of
On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 10:29 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There could also be systems where the number of seats per district is rather
small but PR is counted at the top level. This means that you can tweak the
system to get a bit more locality and a bit more political proportionality
at
On 8/18/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 2:00 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
I have to say I just do not understand the obsession with lists.
An assumption, I think, that voters won't have the patience and attention
span to evaluate a long list of candidates, and
On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 12:16 AM, Aaron Armitage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm also stuck with plurality, and I agree entirely that plain-vanilla STV
s a vast improvement
Right. Whatever PR-STV's flaws, they are minor compared
to plurality.
If we wants slates that run as teams and are voted
On 8/19/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Juho wrote, in thread PR favoring racialminorities:
... I was also thinking about trees that offer more detailed
grouping of the candidates.
I just spoke with someone at Texas Tech. We were discussing how
cascade voting might be
I had a similar though previously.
It was based on a legislature rather than individual voters.
I called it 'consumable votes'.
Here is one example, though there was a fair few versions.
http://listas.apesol.org/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2006-March/017903.html
I had though
On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 10:09 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rules for registering candidates may be different in different countries and
may also be method independent in many cases. Parties may often have a
formal role, but I don't know what the typical rules in STV-PR countries
are.
In
On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 10:15 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 12:00 , James Gilmour wrote:
I have to say I just do not understand the obsession with lists.
Lists are indeed rather clumsy and maybe simplifying (trees would be more
expressive though :-).
Yeah, if the
On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 10:18 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 18, 2008, at 20:23 , James Gilmour wrote:
I think a system that requires people to rank 10-20+
candidates is going to run into trouble.
I don't see why there should be such large numbers of candidates in real
public
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 7:23 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The decoy list strategy appears because it's possible to vote for a
different national party and regional party (constituency candidate), which
leads to an overhang that can be exploited to turn top-up into
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:41 PM, James Gilmour
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Surely, this is not a matter of opinion? Surely, the result obtained was
more representative of the expressed wishes of the voters
than if SF had won more seats than the Greens? Irrespective of the policies
of the
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 11:30 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, this is where I see that STV and trees (or lists) can be combined in a
fruitful way. If the number of candidates is large then short votes may lead
to problems in STV. To guarantee proper inheritance of the votes it would be
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 11:33 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The system works quite fine. It is a basic party based open list election
using d'Hondt within each district separately.
So, the ballot has 179 names and you pick one ?
Election-Methods mailing list - see
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 11:33 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I guess practically all methods with multiple candidates have some of this
flavour. Maybe the tendency to work together within a party (=smile more
than the competing candidate) and be more hostile towards the candidates of
other
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 11:33 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Maybe one could force the voting
power of different candidates within some agreed range. That could be done
by cutting only the power of the strongest representatives and forwarding
their excess votes to the nearest group (or as
On 8/22/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, that's true for any single-seat district, FPTP or not.
Right, I was thinking single-seaters.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 8/22/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In Finland where the number of candidates is relatively high some less
obvious candidates may have some trouble getting in to the lists but on the
other hand some well known figures (that have become popular (and respected)
in other areas than
On 8/22/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 22, 2008, at 2:18 , Raph Frank wrote:
Thus, I don't see them as massively different ... the trees just add more
structure and reduce the freedom.
The intention was not to reduce freedom. If a voter wants to bypass the
default inheritance
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One problem of a straightforward every candidate gets p voting money units
at the beginning of each block of time is that, on one hand, the situation
may be serious enough that one needs to pass more than p units' worth. In
that
On 8/22/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I had in mind was something like this: Say there's a single-winner
election where the plurality winner has 35% support. Then those voters
effectively got 0.5 (+1) worth of the vote with only 0.35 mass. The total
voting power of
On 8/22/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The general structure of a delegate cascade is actually a cyclic
graph. But cycles can occur only at the bottom of each casacade,
where they result in pools. Pools are equivalent to roots, so d'Hondt
(etc.) should still work.
Maybe a
On Sat, Aug 23, 2008 at 9:55 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes, in general members of some group in the parliament are expected to vote
the same way most of the time. Different parties have somewhat different
attitude. In some questions the groups explicitly give free hands to their
On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 9:59 AM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 24, 2008, at 3:15 , Raph Frank wrote:
A party ideally, wants candidates who don't get elected (so
they get 'free' votes) or candidates who get more than 1 quota, so the
party gets the excess (more 'free' votes).
Yes
On Sun, Aug 24, 2008 at 10:44 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There are some limits to the transformation: for instance, you can't have
representation below 1/(assembly size), thus the power constraint caveat
of the transformation. Similarly, power is in steps of 1/(assembly
On 8/25/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The divisor method choice differs not just when you're by the threshold,
but also at the discontinuity points of their respective rounding. Also, I
think that if you're going to use a divisor method, there's no point in not
using
On 8/25/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's a problem with this way of thinking, as can be made general to
explicit voting schemes (such as ones based directly on opinion axes), and
that is that it's impossible to ensure perfect representation on all the
axes, so one
On Mon, Aug 25, 2008 at 8:10 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That could work, since additional votes for A increase the weighting,
meaning that a vote for A isn't wasted even if A wins.
Right, you basically lose your share of the votes that went to allow A to win.
Let's
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Well, since we're already talking about logistics-heavy methods
Actually, I don't think your suggestion requires that much additional
logistics. All you would need would be for the candidates to register
their home address with the
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Inputs are ranked ballots. Each voter starts with a weight of one. The
quota is Droop (Hare does much worse).
Can a voter skip ranks and also is there a limited number of ranks?
If you allow rank skipping, then a voter can
On 8/26/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Or one could use STV instead, and have more local seats. If I'm not wrong,
the 50% mark of maximum disenfranchisement would be lowered significantly by
STV, so fewer list seats would be required.
Absolutely. The problem virtually
You should set up an example poll rather than asking people to create their own.
The results could be show as a probability of each candidate winning
based on the votes.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:40 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here we are quite close to confusing the voters. If each small district has
different candidates and each voter can vote at any station, then maybe we
could try the (so much feared) computerized voting, but only so that each
voter
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:42 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 12:53 , Raph Frank wrote:
There could be some practical problems like all candidates of some party
picking districts where that party has largest support. And if that would
seem probable they might then try
On Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 5:46 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To gain even
better trust that this set is the best one one could publish the best found
set and then wait for a week and allow other interested parties to seek for
even better sets. Maybe different parties or candidates try to
On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 4:29 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Aug 31, 2008, at 8:25 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
Ofc, he doesn't define geographic centers of the districts, which
presumably means the centre of gravity of the district.
I'm pretty sure I want the average point of the land
On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 8:28 PM, Markus Schulze
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank wrote (31 Aug 2008):
I think this is the strategy that most parties actually
use for vote management. They never recommend to the
voters not to rank a certain party member.
Actually, it is the main
On 9/1/08, Michael Rouse [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There was a discussion of district-drawing algorithms on the
election-methods list a few years back. I've always thought that taking
centroidal Voronoi cells with equal populations was an elegant way to do it.
Here's an example of standard
I have only had a quick look at your (extensive) references. In
fairness, they are pretty large blocks of text, and it isn't entirely
reasonable to expect people to go through them in their entirety.
On 9/1/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thank you for writing that, Brian Olson, I felt
On 9/1/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Those maps could be pruned so that only the Pareto front remains. That is,
if there's some map that's worse on all metrics with regards to some other
map, then that first map isn't included. As long as there are enough metrics
to give
On 9/1/08, Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Raph Frank,
you wrote (31 Aug 2008):
Btw, is there a simplified explanation of
your PR-STV method somewhere?
From what I can see, it compares possible
outcomes pairwise like CPO-STV (but only
compares outcomes
Ok, I think I have an example which shows the vote management resistance.
Assume the following
2 Seats to be filled and 3 candidates
A1: Popular candidate (party A)
A2: Other candidate (party A)
B: Party B candidate
Honest rankings are
A1's personal supporters
12: A1BA2
26: A1A2B
Party A's
On 9/2/08, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have implemented essentially that, and it pretty quickly gets pretty good
results as measured by the distance per person to land-area-center test. I
added one thing to deal with variations in population density. Each district
center also has
On 9/3/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think you should rank A as high as possible but behind at least 1
candidate who you are reasonably sure will be elected.
I didn't quite get this part of the mail. Usually candidates that are sure
to be elected would go down in the rankings.
1) Every odd year, an 'election' is held but voters vote for parties
2) based 1), seats are distributed using d'Hondt between the parties
3) Also based on 1), districts are modified so that they are
gerrymandered to give each party the correct number of seats
4) The following year, those
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 1:57 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I checked my code and I'm not doing the expensive square root. It's not
quite the second though, it's actually:
((dx*dx + dy*dy) * weight)
The weight gets nudged by multiplying by 1.01 or 0.99. Squaring the weight
or not
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 8:35 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you use a Mercator projected map, you're just hiding the quantization.
All maps have some distortion, and since the map projection uses
trigonometric functions, you can just use the Haversine distance directly.
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 8:46 PM, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
OK, we could solve that in principle (though not too quickly) by using
Google Maps driving time, or the like. But what does driving time have to do
with grouping voters (unless we're drawing a precinct and measuring
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 10:27 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
1) Every odd year, an 'election' is held but voters vote for parties
2) based 1), seats are distributed using d'Hondt between the parties
If you're going to have D'Hondt, or PR in general, why
On Wed, Sep 3, 2008 at 10:51 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In general then, any method that acts like Z had never run (when Z is
eliminated) would be resistant to Woodall free-riding.
Right, you can get that benefit from alot of methods. For example,
you could do hand
On 9/4/08, Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why not self-chosen districts ?
Because then the last half of voters would be able to pick
between district already composed of majoritarians ideologies.
Again the least organized and the smallest group would finish splitted
between
On 9/4/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not necessarily PAV, but a method that's based on Approval and would
otherwise be as good as STV, if such a beast exists. What kind of strategy
can be used in PAV?
If a candidate is certain to win, then there is no point in voting for
On 9/4/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
By what law? Since I'm not American, I'm not familiar with the law, and
thus I can't comment on whether this kind of indirect PR would be covered.
Warren covers it here
http://rangevoting.org/PropRep.html
I re-read what I said, and
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
One simple approach would be to ask the voters directly about the
(physical/mental) distances. The answers could be of e.g.
Village1Village2Village3... There could be more villages on the
questionnaire than there will be districts.
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 11:34 PM, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It is not (or should not be) a question of whether or not there is a
consensus at any particular geographical level of community.
The defining factors for the geographical community should be the level at
which the
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The point was really that the
ordering of all the candidates should be re-evaluated based on the estimated
probabilities and utilities.
Yeah, lower probability candidates should be moved upwards and higher
probability candidates
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting from the
ones with strongest support (e.g. best candidate of the largest party in the
largest
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:52 PM, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
That seems wrong to me, but I don't have anything but subjective
impressions. Certainly for my local city council and school board the
community has no more consensus (and perhaps less) than one finds at the
state
On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Stéphane Rouillon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hello Juho,
using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
The idea is to get equivalent sample that are not opposed by intrinsec
On 9/5/08, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
With all due respect, what I was writing about was not subsidiarity. Nor has
subsidiarity (senu stricto) anything to do with the
proposal for how the EU and its Member States should deal with issues,
despite the abuse of the term
On 9/5/08, Stéphane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public/get_involved/submission/R/ROUILLON-65
You are welcome to comment. At least I hope you have fun reading it if you
find the time.
Your implementation of IRV is non-standard (though I agree with the
On 9/5/08, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If the larger assembly is deciding if power should be DELEGATED, it is
devolution that is in operation, not subsidiarity.
I guess it depends on how you want do define the term. I
don't think subsidiarity is determined by actual
On 9/5/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Not really. The vote transfers happen indirectly through reduced
satisfication scores. If a voter doesn't vote for a party and instead votes
for a group of personal candidates, his satisfication score will be lowered
for the potential
On 9/6/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Good Evening,
re: Do you examine all the candidates carefully and pick one who is
trustworthy and then pay little attention to what he does, or do you pick
someone less carefully and monitor him closely and then kick him out at the
next
On 9/9/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I cannot take any of you seriously. Are you all suspending disbelief
for the sake of the argument? I agree with your ideals, but there's
an element of unreality in proposing to restructure a legislature by
design. Like in Brian's
On 9/9/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I suspect we are seeing the process differently. In my view, candidates
can only stand for election in a single district and the only candidates the
electorate will consider are those seeking election from their district:
I'm Honest Joe, and
On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 9:10 PM, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Whoops!
It was your entire post of Mon Sep 8 03:44:51 PDT 2008
I didn't cite it because I was responding to the entire post, which follows:
Ahh, no problem.
The issue is that I have made various suggestions in recent
On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 10:00 PM, Terry Bouricius
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The experience and excellent work of the Citizen Assembly
established by the provincial parliament in British Columbia a few years
ago is compelling evidence that elections may not be the key to genuinely
representative
On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 11:23 PM, Aaron Armitage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I see a real philosophical problem with this. The whole point of having a
republic is so that the people can make public decisions in common. Any
chamber which is not subject to popular control is therefore
On 9/10/08, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2008 12:50 AM
I was looking at their BC-STV proposal. What is the
difference from normal PR-STV (or is calling it BC-STV just a
'marketing ploy' :) )?
Depends what you mean by normal
On 9/10/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you take the parallel system strategy to its extreme, you'd get a
parallel organization where (as an example), a group elects a double
mayor and support him over the real mayor, essentially building a state
inside the state. I
On 9/10/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If duplicate votes don't count, then there'll be a natural incentive to
pick friends instead of central party figures. All campaigning would do
would be to give whichever candidate's being promoted a lot of votes, which
is no better
On 9/10/08, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In any case, I would rather a friend got it than someone famous who I
didn't know.
The exception might be someone who did well in the previous term in
office. Current legislators would count as 'famous' and in a good
way.
Election-Methods
On Wed, Sep 10, 2008 at 7:38 PM, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Call this the formal defense of the modern state. It claims that
the constitutional structures are not at fault. The faults or
failings in democracy are located outside of state institutions. But
whether we argue that
On Wed, Sep 10, 2008 at 8:53 PM, Aaron Armitage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't think I expressed my point clearly enough: I consider that making
the public the active agents in their own governance is a very major
benefit of popular government. THE benefit, in fact.
However, most of the
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 12:30 AM, Raph Frank [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A two House solution seems to help with that though, you still need to
know what is happening in order to pick the elected house.
Also, it could work like the Irish Seanad and have persuasive power only.
For example
Sorry, pressed reply instead of reply to all
On 9/11/08, Aaron Armitage [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It doesn't follow from the fact we choose representatives for ourselves
that we would lose nothing by being stripped of the means of political
action. We would lose our citizenship, because
On 9/11/08, Juho [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why weakest? What is the weakest of each party's strongest candidates?
It means find the candidate in each party with the highest vote.
These are the party's stongest candidates.
You then assign the seat to the weakest of them (but only if the party
is
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 8:10 PM, Aaron Armitage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What about
one of the
the proposed random ballot rules, where if there is
consensus, a
specific candidate wins. However, if that doesn't
work, the winner is
random.
I'm not sure I understand. If everyone votes
On Thu, Sep 11, 2008 at 11:32 PM, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
Michael Allan wrote:
... The faults or failings in democracy are located outside of
state institutions. ... The fixes and changes are needed
elsewhere.
Right, if the people are organised, they can
On 9/12/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
re: You have created a conflict of interests here. People who don't set
aside their own ambition are favoured.
Can you supply a rationale to support this statement?
A person who wants to be selected would try to convince the other 2 to
On Sat, Sep 13, 2008 at 6:00 PM, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Good Afternoon, Raph
re: A person who wants to be selected would try to convince the
other 2 to support him, even if he thinks one of them would
be better.
This is the conflict of interests.
Of course a
On Sun, Sep 14, 2008 at 8:56 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A random assembly also resists the attack where one corrupts candidates,
simply because it's not clear who the candidates are going to be.
There is also the effect that a person who wants to be a candidate may
need
This is another for film ratings. It gives each moving a score and is
resistant to random raters.
http://www.mathaware.org/mam/08/reputation.pdf
Meant 'movie a score'
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9/15/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Good Morning, Raph
re: (With regard to the suggestion that the process 'Have one
triad judge the other'):
Well, the person can still try to convince the judges, the
point is that he doesn't act as judge of his own fitness.
On 9/15/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Holders of minority views who wish their view to gain ascendancy have an
obligation to persuade the majority of their compatriots that their
(currently minority) view is advantageous for all the people. If they can
not do so, they have no
On 9/16/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Like you said about Napster, even with a small number of people, it
was worth using. But I'm mistaken to claim that Napster was
therefore free of scale dependencies. It's not either/or. A
start-up threshold can be orthogonal to a network
On 9/17/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Good Afternoon, Raph
re: However, under your system, they (minority views) do get
represented in the level 1 triads. What they lose is the
having high level representatives.
Ah. Now we're at the crux of the matter ...
On 9/18/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sorry, then my definition of network effect was wrong. I doubt we
disagreed about anything else.
Np, there is also a possibility that mine was wrong too :).
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect
In economics and business, a
On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 1:24 PM, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
re: (About explaining the worst case, where all except a minority
gets removed), Ahh, I did with the religious minority?
As I said in my response to that explanation, the reasoning is seriously
flawed. It is based on
On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 3:34 AM, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
V(N) is the value per user if N users are using the system.
P(V) is the number of people who would use the system if it had value V
C = cost per user (time, direct cost etc.)
V increases with N and P
On 9/20/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Variant acts may be proposed. Variant acts are acts that differ from
the originally proposed act. When a variant act is proposed, the
participants do not gain another vote to cast. Instead they gain a
choice of which act to cast their
On 9/21/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To compete effectively, however, it must meet two requirements: 1)
sufficient voter turnout in the medium; and 2) faithful carriage of
votes from the medium to the principal polls. First of all, its voter
turnout must be high enough to
On 9/22/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
We're sunk if V(0) depends on short term benefit. We've got nothing
short term to offer. And we're asking a lot (high material C). The
initial users will have to test the code.
I meant personal benefit, not short term, but the issue still
On 9/23/08, Fred Gohlke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Good Morning, Raph
re: The principle is that if you can't advance (best case
scenario), then just make sure nobody else advances (2nd
best scenario).
Fortunately, people who would pursue such a course are rare. The majority
of
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