Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate
the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset
voting, I might call it commodity voting: your vote is a
commodity that you transfer according to your
Dear folks,
there is another assumption in Arrow's theorem which people almost
always forget: Determinism. Methods which use some amount of chance can
easily meet all his other criteria, the most trivial example of this
being again Random Ballot (i.e. pick a ballot uniformly at random and
copy
At 12:22 PM 11/8/2009, Terry Bouricius wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral paper by
James Green-Armytage (Strategic voting and Strategic Nomination:
Comparing seven election methods). He
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Notice that the requirement of Arrow that social preferences be
insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences was
preposterous. Arrow apparently insisted on this because he believed
that it was impossible to come up with any objective measure of
On Nov 16, 2009, at 10:53 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Notice that the requirement of Arrow that social preferences be insensitive
to variations in the intensity of preferences was preposterous. Arrow
apparently insisted on this because he believed that it was
On Nov 16, 2009, at 11:53 AM, Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Would this suggest it could be possible to overcome Arrow's theorem using
range ballots?
I do not want to say Arrow's theorem is false. All I ask is:
Are prefential ballots one of the hypothesis used in Arrow's theorem proof?
Because
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal
(vs cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
Arrow's Theorem seems like a red herring in the context of the
On Nov 16, 2009, at 2:15 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs
cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it
preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
Arrow's Theorem
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't have his proof in front of me (I'm on the road), but I'm pretty sure
that it assumes ordinal ranking.
It seems fairly obvious that the theorem also holds for ratings, because
ratings can be projected onto rankings without affecting any of Arrow's
criteria.
The theorem states (from wiki) that there is no method which has the
following properties:
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then adding Z to the slate
won't change the group's preference of X over Y.
* There is no
Strictly speaking I don't think Range is an election method according
to Arrow, because you can't determine the winner from the orderings.
It would be hard to make statements about the effect of introducing
candidate Z when you don't have an assumption about what the outcome is
based on.
You can
On Nov 16, 2009, at 4:58 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
The theorem states (from wiki) that there is no method which has the
following properties:
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then the group prefers X over Y.
* If every voter prefers X over Y, then adding Z to the slate
won't change the
On Nov 9, 2009, at 11:48 PM, Matthew Welland wrote:
Approval
Does not meet the desire of some to be able to differentiate
between I like, I like a lot etc. (note: this seems like
perfectionism to me. Large numbers of voters and opinions all over
the bell curve should make individual
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one or two sentences.
Well, here's a very simple Condorcet system which can easily be
explained in two
Dear Robert,
you wrote:
Round Robin tournament, Ranked Ballot: The contestant who wins in a
single match is the candidate who is preferred over the other in more
ballots. The candidate who is elected to office is the contestant who
loses to no one in the round robin tournament.
that's
This method is also quite hand countable (unlike many other Condorcet
methods). That was certainly an important feature in those days :-).
It has some randomness in the results (when no Condorcet winner exists).
Here's another one. Elect the candidate that wins all others in
pairwise
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one or two sentences.
Well, here's a very simple
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Matthew Welland wrote:
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet
ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one
Thanks all for the discussion and pointers. I still can't concretely
conclude anything yet but here are some rambling and random thoughts based
on what was said and my prior experiences.
Plurality
Leads to two lowest common denominator parties which are not accountable to
the voters. This
Matthew,
I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
Tideman's recent book Collective Decisions and Voting has an analysis of
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
voting method that has ever been proposed and concludes that Range
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius
ter...@burlingtontelecom.net wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral paper by
James Green-Armytage (Strategic voting and Strategic Nomination:
Terry and Matthew,
Terry Bouricius wrote:
I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
Tideman's recent book Collective Decisions and Voting has an analysis of
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
voting method that has ever been
On Nov 8, 2009, at 8:43 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis
of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral
paper by
James
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