Here's a Condorcet method that I think retains CT's defection resistance
while being closer to cloneproof. It is Smith,DSC (but I think DAC would
also work).
Consider Mike's usual C/D example:
Sincere rankings are
33: AB
32: BA
34: C
In DSC, {AB} is affirmed with a strength of 65. Then A
C/D:
It seems to me that the co-operation/defection (C/D) problem is more difficult
to truly eliminate
than I'd believed. Hugely reducible, but maybe not eliminatable.
The methods that I've been suggesting, to get rid of the C/D problem--I'll
refer to those as
defection-resistant methods.
First off, I heartily agree that the cooperation/defection problem (aka
ABE, aka Chicken Dilemma) is probably the most broadly-applicable,
hard-to-solve problem in voting theory. The reason is simple: if there's a
majority condorcet winner, it's easy to make a system which has a
unique-winner
Hi Mike,
De : Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
À : MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
Cc : election-meth...@electorama.com
Envoyé le : Mardi 28 février 2012 15h29
Objet : Re: [EM] C/D is persistent. Another Approval C/D mitigation. IRV and
sincerity.
(Though I'd still really appreciate
Chris,
from the responses I've been getting it appears that the ballot would not be
accepted. Even the simpler
four slot ballot with two bubbles [(2) (1)] is deemed too complicate by the EM
list members if it is to be
interpreted as a score equal to the sum of the darkened digits. Not that
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 14.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
The explanation may not be not much more
complex. It
is the strategy where
I say MinMax is more complicated and, more
importantly, hard to grasp.
I recommend sincere voting. Teaching multiple
On Jun 15, 2011, at 2:05 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.6.2011, at 14.46, Kevin Venzke wrote:
It's better if explaining the method's
rules is enough (or close) to understand the strategy.
...
No, I am (almost) saying that if you have to explain the strategy
separately then that's bad. I think
-Original Message-
From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On
Behalf Of fsimm...@pcc.edu
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2011 11:35 PM
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] C//A
Some folks have opined
On 13.6.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be
instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
A rating ballot should have a row for each candidate's name followed by four
bubbles:
[candidate name] (8) (4) (2) (1)
The voter's rating of the candidate is the sum of the digits of the darkened bubbles. This allows voters
that can do addition up to 8+4+2+1=15 to
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone Independent Condorcet
method?
That's quite good.
Would a method of the sort While there is no uneliminated CW, eliminate
the Approval loser/s be cloneproof? How about while there is no
uneliminated CW,
You have just given one of the many equivalent formulations of DMC, which
always elects the lowest
approval candidate that beats all of the more approved candidates pairwise.
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Monday, June 13, 2011 7:51 am
Subject: Re: [EM] C
Some folks have opined that the ballot line
[candidate name] (4) (2) (1)
Is too complicated.
How about just
[name] (2) (1)
with the understanding that the score that you assign to the name is the sum of
the digits of the bubbles
that you darken, namely zero (for the empty sum), one, two,
What is wrong with what I wrote here?
I am addressing voters used to Plurality voters who may have never
voted per Condorcet.
I do not talk of bubbles, but this detail depends on design of the
ballot.
I do not talk of such as if Y covers X, then Y beats X - just the
basics of
I understand that you have a rational reason for not wanting something like
()3 ()2 ()1 - because
(x)3 ()2 (x)1 is ambiguous. But I don't agree. I think most people have an
easier time understanding if you tell them that
(x)3 ()2 (x)1 means 3, than understanding that
(x)2 (x)1 means 3.
Just an
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...
Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming
Condorcet-like
at all.
Here's a good example:
Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval.
While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest
On 11.6.2011, at 13.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a
écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some
comments.
I think with C//A it
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a
retired teacher I find iot easier to
rate than to rank, anyway.)
Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or something. A rating
based ballot could be
From: Juho Laatu
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style
ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to
rate than to rank, anyway.)
Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or
something. A
12, 2011 3:09 am
Subject: Re: [EM] C//A
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...
Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming
Condorcet-like
at all.
Here's a good example:
Initialize
fsimm...@pcc.edu Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2011 10:42 PM
I think the following complete description is simpler than
anything possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1).
The voter rates a candidate on a scale from
zero to seven by darkening the
I like it Forest - Very simple and yet it makes a lot of sense. I can
think of no objections to such a method. What does C/A stand for?
Condorcet/Approval?
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] C//A
Message-ID: e38f8415600fc.4df3f...@pcc.edu
Content
Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy
weakness.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
I think the following complete description is simpler than anything
possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles
On 11.6.2011, at 6.09, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Why are we here?
It certainly made sense to come and explore.
. We find ourselves asking the voters to do some truncating.
. Counters may have to adjust counting ballots.
Among the many variant Condorcet methods there are various ways of
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a
écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some
comments.
I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find the winner,
and the
I think voters could be confused over that where one truncates actually
matters to the method. That is, the method isn't resolvable if everybody
votes untruncated and there's a cycle; no single ballot can break the tie
unless it also breaks the cycle. Further, if only some people truncate,
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find
the winner, and
the strategy becomes obvious. No defeat
From: Jameson Quinn
I think voters could be confused over that where one truncates
actually matters to the method. That is, the method isn't
resolvable if everybody
votes untruncated and there's a cycle; no single ballot can
break the tie
unless it also breaks the cycle. Further, if
Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...
Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming
Condorcet-like
at all.
Here's a good example:
Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval.
While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest approval candidate
that
On 12.6.2011, at 2.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find
the winner, and
the
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are
some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I agree with Kevin
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