If you object to plurality as I used it below, then WHAT label would
you use for this major (often used) election method?
I did go to Robert's 10th which is not into our level of detail on
this topic (I see neither approval nor Condorcet mentioned).
I went to Wikipedia, which I see as
2010/2/10 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a...@lomaxdesign.com
At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for effective
votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be trusted. Since corruption
is often a very cheap investment for the
At 01:08 PM 2/10/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Condorcet does an N*N matrix showing for EACH pair of candidates which
is better liked - used in counting and usable by others to help plan
their future. Often there is a CW which wins for winning in all of
its pairs; else a cycle in which each would
Consider the following votes:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections involving
A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Huh? I count 66 voters who prefer either B or C over A.
Change it up:
49 A
26 BC
25 CB
Now the CW is B. In the C vs. B
Abd wrote:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise
elections involving A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Assuming that by the above votes you mean
34:AB=C
33:BCA
33:CBA,
A is not the Condorcet winner and is in fact the Condorcet loser, losing
both A:B and
At 01:45 PM 2/11/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
34 A
33 BC
33 CB.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections
involving A, A wins
AB, 34:33
AC, 34:33.
Oops. Of course, A is the Condorcet loser. I added the second
preferences as an afterthought. I meant
34 A
33 B
We all get careless and stumble, sooner or later!
But I choke on two details here:
You misuse the label plurality - having only the ability to vote for
1 even though, for many races most intelligent voters will find there
is only one candidate deserving approval.
Even Approval has more
At 05:33 AM 2/10/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Who says organization, says oligarchy. One has to be careful not
to have the organization become undemocratic, because the default
tendency is for it to turn so, since it is (initially) more effective that way.
I've elsewhere detailed how an attempt to corrupt a proxy in a DP system
could easily lead to a mouthful of hair for the would-be corrupter. They pay
the money, they get the open support of the proxy, the proxy ends up looking
very good to the constituents, who, on this issue, vote directly,
At 02:16 PM 2/10/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What if the bribe is payable only after the vote, and only for
effective votes? (And don't say that the bribegiver can't be
trusted. Since corruption is often a very cheap investment for the
bribegiver, they would not be particularly motivated to
At 12:20 PM 2/8/2010, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Given that much better methods exist, have been tried and worked,
and are much easier to canvass, WTF?
If I were to guess: in part a desire to produce a stepping stone to
STV, and in part organizational inertia.
On Feb 6, 2010, at 12:27 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For all practical purposes, except when there are only a few candidates, the
first format (1) would be much more compact than the second - which is the
point you're making. The data is probably quite compressible as well.
Well, yes.
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, February 05, 2010 4:50 PM
CUT
Practically speaking, I'd assume, the precincts would be provided
with a spreadsheet showing the possible combinations, and they would
report the combinations using the spreadsheet, transmitting it. So
some cells would be
At 01:12 PM 2/5/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, February 05, 2010 4:50 PM
CUT
Practically speaking, I'd assume, the precincts would be provided
with a spreadsheet showing the possible combinations, and they would
report the combinations using the spreadsheet,
On Feb 4, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
The general formula for the number of possible rankings (for strict
ordering, without allowing equal rankings) for N candidates when
partial rankings are allowed and voters may rank up to R candidates
(N=R if voters are allowed to rank all
On Feb 4, 2010, at 8:29 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 8:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
On Feb 4, 2010, at 7:51 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
The general formula for the number of possible rankings (for strict
ordering, without allowing equal rankings)
Kathy Dopp wrote:
People on this list seem to still be sending around their incorrect or
incomplete formulas for the number of possible rank orders for rank
order ballots. This number BTW does *not* correspond to the number of
piles needed to count IRV which is a lesser number but does
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Feb 2, 2010, at 2:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Warren tells me that
C-1
SUM{ C!/n! }
n=1
has a closed form, but didn't tell me what it is. does someone have
the closed form for it? i fiddled with it a little, and i can
certainly see
On Feb 2, 2010, at 2:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Warren tells me that
C-1
SUM{ C!/n! }
n=1
has a closed form, but didn't tell me what it is. does someone
have the closed form for it? i fiddled with it a little, and i can
certainly see an asymptotic limit of
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