Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
As a
At 09:52 PM 1/22/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
now remember in the case we're discussing here, there is only two
candidates. again, what consequence to the outcome of the election
(that is, who of A or B wins) occurs whether a ballot is marked
A (and B is last by default) or is marked AB?
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should
Plurality (back to the pile count controversy)
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters
are allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an
election contest. That may be true in Australia, but is not
true in the US where typically voters are allowed to rank up
, there will be no
such restriction in practice.
James
Behalf Of Kathy Dopp
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:43 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Plurality (back to the pile count controversy)
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters
are allowed to rank all the candidates who
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
OK James. As I said before, I agree with you that you were
giving the total number of profiles *if* voters were allowed
to rank all candidates, which they were not allowed to do in
Minneapolis or elsewhere in the US public elections if I
On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 11:10 AM, James Gilmour
jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote:
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 1:42 PM
My formula provides the more practical number of how many
profiles are allowed to be cast by voters and how many
profiles are needed if one wants to count the
On Jan 22, 2010, at 8:54 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
As I said earlier, if paper ballots are required, the length of the
paper ballot must be unlimited if the number of candidates who can run
for office is unlimited and you want voters to be able to fully rank
(not that most voters would want to.)
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would be treated
differently from a ballot marked AB: at the last
Kathy Dopp Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 4:54 PM
James, you are using a straw man argument with me, setting up
a false premise that I said something I never did,
Kathy, I was not setting up any straw man argument with you or anyone else. I
simply stated what a preference profile is and
At 09:33 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
determined. Under this rule a ballot marked A would
On Jan 21, 2010, at 8:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
and i believe that it is perfectly
practical when the number of *credible* candidates is small. doesn't
matter what the voting system is. IRV, or whatever.
Yes. But how small?
On Jan 22, 2010, at 3:57 AM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 12:25 AM
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you
At 01:55 PM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 5:53 PM
At 03:57 AM 1/22/2010, James Gilmour wrote:
This
second set of rules are those that prescribe the transfer of votes
to the bitter end, i.e. even after the winners have all been
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication process
here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Variation on previous post. Silly
On Jan 21, 2010, at 3:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication
process here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about
voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM,
People, please. This is not a debate class, and even if it were, no, I won
is really useless even if true. Please take this discussion off list, if you
find it important enough not to stop. There's practically no voting system
content left. As for what is left: we all know that the number of piles
i just want to settle the issue about how many piles one needs to be
precinct summable when there are N candidates.
Kathy was pointing to Abd ul as the qualified actor who refuted the
falsifiable assertion that i made that you needed only 9 piles for 3
candidates. She repeated labeled
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the fact is, transmitting the content (to a central counting
location) of *every ballot* is the transfer of a finite amount of
information. that is even *more* general than sorting to piles and
transmitting the tallies for piles.
Yes, of
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number of
candidates is very small, precinct summability
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that number is 9. if you or
Kathy say it's 15, then
On Jan 21, 2010, at 6:30 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then the possible unique preference
profiles are:
A
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then
ballot to legally equivalent votes. The reduced set is this:
A
B
C
AB
AC
BA
BC
CA
CB
Note that this assumes a 2-rank ballot.
no, it can be a 3-rank ballot where the voter declines to rate their
last choice. 3rd choice is left unmarked.
It also assumes that majority vote isn't
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
I put the general formula
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did put forth a table
which appears to be consistent with
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Variation on previous post. Silly time!
At 02:31 PM 1/16/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 16, 2010, at 12:05 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Robert, your slip is showing.
what slip? i don't have nuttin' under me kilt.
30 matches
Mail list logo
