RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

Craig wrote: It is worth noting, too, that defeat support is more likely to punish a voter for truncating a vote. It doesn't punish the voter for truncating. It merely doesn't reward him by letting him thereby steal the election from a sincere CW. But I assure you that, no matter what the

Re: [EM] Spoilers

For example, if (flight of fantasy time) Nader had had unanimous first choice support, but the international capitalist conspiracy suppressed this information I wouldn't say "conspiracy". If you owned a corporate empire whose profits would be adversely affected by a Nader presidency, or

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - where do winners diverge?

What if Unranked-IRV is equivalent to Approval (for single seat elections)?! My intuition offers a sweet reply, although I may be wrong. It can't really be! But where is a counter-example? I would think if it is false, a counter example would exist for 3 candidates. Didn't I post an example

Re: [EM] Approval supporters needed

I replied that I'd be glad to write something. I also said there may be others on this list that might like the job, so I offer it now. Any takers? I'm going to write, and all the Approval advocates on EM should write. In fact why not the Condorcetists too, about Condorcet? Some people

Re: [EM] Unranked ballot election challenge

Tom wrote: *** FBC= "Favorite Betrayal Criterion - By voting another candidate over his favorite, a voter should never get a result that he considers preferable to every result he could get without doing so." I'm not sure what "voting over one's favorite" means with unranked ballots. Let me

[EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - insincere voting strategy in UIRV

Here's a simple case of interest between these methods. This case makes UIRV's top bias obvious. Let A and B be two strong parties, and C is a "weaker" centrist. A and B supporters are scared and some compromise to C, while C's core supporters all bullet vote in the middle. Approval Ballots:

[EM] No, you are not a Spoiler:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 03/29/01 No, you are not a Spoiler: by Donald Davison Greetings, If you have ever voted for a third party candidate, do not allow anyone to accuse you of being a spoiler. While there is a problem, you are not that problem.

RE: I used an old computer it deleted program

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part -- Sure, one solution would be to have all the ballots e-mailed directly to me rather than posted. But, for one thing, there's probably a (mis)perception that such a procedure would be fraud-prone. Actually, since I'd be expected to post the ballots, and whom they're

RE: Condorcet cyclic drop rule

Mr. Ossipoff wrote- If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority of the voters prefer the sincere CW to Jones, and if they vote sincerely, then Jones won't win. Guaranteed. --- D- Three very big *ifs*. With divided majorities, there will be *some* strategy/ insincere game

Re: [EM] RE: Unranked ballot election challenge

Demorep, I agree that when there is no majority candidate, then majority preference can not be clearly judged. Plurality, Approval, IRV, Condorcet all can fail to find a majority winner if voters don't support enough candidates on their ballots. I tend to agree that exhausted ballots should be

RE: Majority? Expressivity? Strategy?

Mr. Weinstein wrote in part- The holy grail and battle cry of 'majority' are not only Demorep's etc. D- Yes indeed compared to the minority rule murder/slave regimes of the nazis and communists in the 1900's (and their evil monarchial/ oligarchial predecessors for the last 6,000 plus

RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

I wrote: It is worth noting, too, that defeat support is more likely to punish a voter for truncating a vote. Mike replied: It doesn't punish the voter for truncating. It merely doesn't reward him by letting him thereby steal the election from a sincere CW. Okay, I think this is the correct

RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

Correction: Note that it will always be the best strategy in defeat support not to tie any candidates or truncate, encouraging you to vote insincerely every time you do not have a preference between two candidates. This is always the case when those [tied] candidates are last, but not

[EM] IRV's majority rule claim

Consider the following case: 6EABCD 1ACBDE 2BACDE 2CABDE 6DABCE In IRV, after 3 rounds, you end up with 6ED 1DE 2DE 2DE 6DE so D beats E in the 4th round, 11 to 6. The IRV proponents like to call this a majority victory for D. But what do the majority

[EM] Delay in finding computer's editor instructions

The manual for my computer includes instructions for the computer's program editor. I found them once, in the manual. I'll find them again. The manual is several inches thick. What I've determined so far is that the program editor isn't listed in any of the indexes or tables of contents that

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: Every voting system punishes truncation, except for Plurality, which has no truncation, because you're only allowed to vote for 1. But even with Plurality you can regret not helping a needed compromise. Does every system punish truncation? I think it would depend on how

Re: [EM] Unranked ballot election challenge

Tom Ruen wrote: Thanks for catching the 546/526 - the first should have been 526 and otherwise the tallies seem correct. Except for the mistake in the IRV first-round calculation, where 7886 appears in both the A and C summations: IRV gives a different result: Round 1:

RE: [EM] Demorep Approval

Responding as usual to Mr. Ossipoff--- Approval has the elementary defect of permitting a *real* first choice majority winner to lose (if *real* rankings were being used) --- Sincere 51 A (100) B (99) 3 B (100) 46 C (100) 100 B wins (54) using simple Approval even though A has a *real*

[EM] RE: Unranked ballot election challenge

Mr. Ruen wrote- Well, so here we have a case to consider. B has more core supporters than A, and A has more compromise supporters from C. Splitting votes compared to full votes makes a difference. Which result more accurately represents voter preference? -- D- Clarification. *IF* there is a

[EM] Majority? Expressivity? Strategy?

MAJORITY? Demorep sometimes deftly clarifies EM-issues. On the issue of 'majority', he has just written (3/29/01): Approval has the elementary defect of permitting a *real* first choice majority winner to lose (if *real* rankings were being used). Demorep gives a 100-voter example, namely