Correction: >Note that it will always be the best strategy in defeat >support not to tie any candidates or truncate, encouraging you to vote >insincerely every time you do not have a preference between two candidates. This is always the case when those [tied] candidates are last, but not necessarily when they're not. eg A>B=C>D - Splitting B & C may help D to win in some cases, although this doesn't make defeat support any more attractive.
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Blake Cretney
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Tom Ruen
- RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule LAYTON Craig
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Richard Moore
- Re: [EM] Dyadic Approval Martin Harper
- RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule LAYTON Craig
- RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule LAYTON Craig
- RE: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Blake Cretney
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Markus Schulze
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule Blake Cretney
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
- Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule MIKE OSSIPOFF
