JanetRAnderson wrote:
I'm still grasping for a counting method which is easily explained to the
public. Let me try this out with you. Using IRV, eliminate all but the two
top candidates, in order from least to most. A look at the real life
current returns in Florida shows, better than
Markus Schulze wrote:
Suppose that this given voter would have approved Nader and disapproved
Gore and Bush if he had no information about the voting behaviour of
the other voters. Then I am saying that this voter votes insincerely
when he approves Nader and Gore and disapproves only Bush
you wrote (2 Dec 2000):
This, along with small party members' tendency to vote for a lesser-
evil in 1st place, and the parties reluctance to run more than 1
candidate, should be mentioned whenever someone talks about IRV's
"track record".
However, I would like to know whether you
Markus's definition of sincere Approval voting says that reversing or
falsifying preferences among candidates other than the incumbant is
sincere. Nonsense.
Besides, it seems real funky to have different sincerity definitions
for different methods.
To my opinion, "sincerity" must be defined
critical the order of transfer becomes in a close election. Would this
be an improvement over the current definition of IRV?
Janet
- Original Message -
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 02, 2000 10:11 AM
Subject: Re: [EM] Major
Dear Craig, dear Martin, dear Mike,
Craig wrote (1 Dec 2000):
Markus wrote (30 Nov 2000):
I suggest the following definition of sincere voting in Approval Voting:
A voter votes "sincerely" when he approves all those candidates
he prefers to the incumbent and disapproves all those
Markus said:
I assume that the voters vote vNM utilities and that the election
method takes from the reported vNM utilities the information it
needs to calculate the winner because I define the criteria in
terms of reported vNM utilities.
Yes, you define the criteria in terms of a form input
Markus wrote (in part):
I suggest the following definition of sincere voting in Approval Voting:
A voter votes "sincerely" when he approves all those candidates
he prefers to the incumbent and disapproves all those candidates
to which he prefers the incumbent.
Ahh. I was halfway into
Mike wrote (in part):
Take another look at my definition of sincere voting. It doesn't
say that sincere voting must be nonstrategic. With a rank method
the only sincere ballot is a sincere ranking of all the candidates.
Why do you have to rank all the candidates in order for it to be a sincere
Dear Markus:
You wrote:
Of course, it is possible that a given voter makes strategical considerations
and gets to the conclusion that voting _sincerely_ is the best _strategy_.
But nevertheless it makes sense to differ between sincere voters and
insincere voters. When a given voter makes
Take another look at my definition of sincere voting. It doesn't
say that sincere voting must be nonstrategic. With a rank method
the only sincere ballot is a sincere ranking of all the candidates.
Why do you have to rank all the candidates in order for it to be a sincere
ballot? In fact,
Dear Markus--
You said:
you say that the well known and widely used concept that
criteria and election methods are defined on the reported
von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the voters is
"inadequate," "vague," "sloppy," "dishonest," "absurd,"
"faulty," "incorrect," "poor," "silly,"
Dear Mike,
you say that the well known and widely used concept that
criteria and election methods are defined on the reported
von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the voters is
"inadequate," "vague," "sloppy," "dishonest," "absurd,"
"faulty," "incorrect," "poor," "silly," "contradictory,"
Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Mike,
you wrote (29 Nov 2000):
I'm sorry! Because Markus had been repeating things, I must have
not thoroughly read one of the paragraphs in his most recent posting.
I thought that I did, but I must have missed that sentence, where
he stated that the
Markus said:
The concept that criteria and election methods are defined
on the reported von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the
voters presumes that every voter casts (not necessarily
sincerely) his von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities and that the
used election method takes from the reported von
Markus said:
I have already said in a different context (23 Sep 2000)
that I use the concept that election methods are defined
on the reported von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the
voters.
Excuse me, but I didn't notice anything about von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities in your definition
Markus said:
you wrote (28 Nov 2000):
Excuse me, but I didn't notice anything about von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities in your definition of "Schulze's
method", for example.
In my definition of the Schulze method, I talk about the
number of voters who strictly prefer candidate X to
Dear Mike,
you wrote (28 Nov 2000):
Markus wrote (28 Nov 2000)
Mike wrote (28 Nov 2000):
Excuse me, but I didn't notice anything about von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities in your definition of "Schulze's
method", for example.
In my definition of the Schulze method, I talk about
Dear Mike,
you wrote (28 Nov 2000):
Ok. So now you're saying that, when Schulze's method is used, voters
report their vN-M utilities. You'd previously given the impression
that the voters report pairwise preferences, via a ranking. Which
is it?
Yes, you'll say that someone could rank the
Dear Mike,
I have already said in a different context (23 Sep 2000)
that I use the concept that election methods are defined
on the reported von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities of the
voters. But in your reply (23 Sep 2000) you wrote that
this concept was "funny," "incomplete," "undefined,"
Dear Mike,
you wrote (21 Nov 2000):
Plurality doesn't have rank balloting. Plurality isn't just a
count rule to be applied to rank-ballots. Plurality, like any
voting system, is a combination of a balloting system and a
count rule.
I don't agree with you that the ballot design is a part of
Markus said:
you wrote (21 Nov 2000):
Plurality doesn't have rank balloting. Plurality isn't just a
count rule to be applied to rank-ballots. Plurality, like any
voting system, is a combination of a balloting system and a
count rule.
I don't agree with you that the ballot design is a
Dear Mike,
you wrote (24 Nov 2000):
Ok, that was what I'd thought, but the other day you posted a
definiton in terms of people preferring one candidate to another,
and the natural interpretation of that is felt preferences,
sincere preferences. But I recognize that BPGMC is in terms of
Bart Ingles wrote:
Markus Schulze wrote:
FPP violates Condorcet and beat path GMC.
Example:
40 voters vote A B C.
35 voters vote B C A.
25 voters vote C B A.
Due to the Condorcet criterion, candidate B must be
elected. Due to beat path GMC,
Markus Schulze wrote:
FPP violates Condorcet and beat path GMC.
Example:
40 voters vote A B C.
35 voters vote B C A.
25 voters vote C B A.
Due to the Condorcet criterion, candidate B must be
elected. Due to beat path GMC, candidate B must be
elected. But
Markus wrote:
Beat path GMC is defined in terms of voted preferences.
Beat path GMC is met e.g. by Schulze(wv)
I reply:
Ok, that was what I'd thought, but the other day you posted a
definiton in terms of people preferring one candidate to another,
and the natural interpretation of that is
Dear Mike,
you wrote (21 Nov 2000):
It seems to me that no method can meet that criterion. Say, for
instance, that the method is BeatpathWinner, defined in terms
of actual voted preferences. Maybe the voter believe that they
have a situation where they need defensives truncation, and so
Markus defined Beatpath GMC as follows:
"X Y" means that an absolute majority of the voters
strictly prefers candidate X to candidate Y.
"There is a majority beat path from X to Y" means that
(1) X Y or
(2) there is a set of candidates C[1],...,C[n] with
X C[1]
I'm proposing a majority winner set method. It could go with a new criteria
(which would be failed by margin systems, and either passed or failed by
winning votes systems depending on the specific wording).
Definition of majority winner set:
The set of candidates who pairwise beat all
Martin wrote:
Isn't there another majority winner set consisting of A B? And another
for B
C?
Or do I misunderstand your 'absolute majority'?
Yes, I think so. Absolute majority means majority of all votes cast (ie
over 50%). B is not included in the majority winner set. However, I should
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