Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
Noise, but possibly worth a response. In writing about a Condorcet race the standard format seems to be AXY. For voting the ballot format seems to be to be able to assign rank numbers to as many of the candidates as the voter chooses. In reporting election results the n*n matrix has findable values for each pair of candidates. Robert calls the format he has seen for the matrix silly, and suggests another format. The reporting is a human readable copy of what is being computed - with the computing almost certainly done by computer if many candidates. Therefore a reporting format such as Robert's would be usable if humans could agree - or even have selectable choices of formats if enough desire. Dave Ketchum On Sep 7, 2011, at 1:12 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or their elected representatives) to try out different ballot formats than ranked choice but... ... The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. ... why, oh why, are all of you election method experts stuck on that silly n x n matrix geometry (where the main diagonal has no information you have to associate one number on the lower left with another number on the upper right, and it isn't obvious which number goes with which candidate) instead of grouping the pairwise totals *in* *pairs*??? like A 56 B 44 A 88 B 65 C 12 C 35 A 90 B 82 C 55 D 10 D 18 D 45 THAT format is where you have useful information about the relationships between candidates at a glance. if we're gonna tell people about Condorcet, why are we putting it in a stupid rectangular array where it is difficult to tell who beat who? it only makes it harder to sell this to skeptics. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
Ok, where do I sign up? On 2011-09-05 23:13, Dave Ketchum wrote: I finally got around to a bit. I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo? Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts Contents When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line, something, such as indentation, should show start of each item. I see Enthusiasts here - Should also go with Experts below. Introduction It is time to change our voting system. We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. Proper question is whether there MAY be more than two candidates: . There will never be more than two - so election method does not matter. . When there are more, voters can wish to vote against the worst by voting for more than one - impossible with plurality. . We cannot be bothered with this need - how bad this is depends on value of the election. Part of selling against plurality: . Wherever current experience is that runoffs are rarely needed and there is very little voting for other than the two main candidates, deciders may feel that there is no need for preparing for what has never happened to them. . Even with that normality, there can be times when voting for others happens in significant numbers. We need to alert deciders that this can happen in any district and this is what needs preparing for even if they are used to things staying simpler. Better ballots With better information from the voters, we can find better winners. Approval gives nothing but ability to vote for more than one. All the others provide for voters indicating which of the candidates they vote for are also their most preferred. Also, while Condorcet ranking unconditionally says that higher ranks are better than lower, there is nothing requiring or permitting saying how much higher. The other methods, depending on statements as to how much higher a ranked candidate may be, require that the voter indicate magnitude in the vote. Fairer counting methods Condorcet: . It is an approach to a tie that CAN result in those leading candidates needing some extra analysis to decide on a winner. . The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner (when there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet winner, and they are, in alphabetical order: I claim that, if there is one, the CW should be found and, at our distance, we do not need to check on how the method goes about that. Even if there is no CW, the n*n matrix used to look for the CW is the obvious source for deciding on a winner - which points toward using n*n for this analysis. I have not chased down the innards of using IRV here, but wonder if, as used here, it is immune to the problems that afflicted IRV in Burlington. Anyway, I ask that IRV discussion stay out of the Condorcet discussion - seems like there were, earlier, better words about IRV than I see here. Also, seems like SODA should be kept away from Condorcet. In Using the fairer methods in organizations Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform. One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the nomination process of a political party. It is true that our supported methods make this process less important, because, unlike plurality, they do not break down when more than one candidate from a party is running. Still, we expect that many parties would still want to have a formal nomination (“primary election”) process so as to focus their efforts on one or two candidates per office. We believe that any party using a superior voting system internally will see immediate benefits. A primary process with increased turnout, with fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic result will result in a stronger nominee who is better-prepared to win in the general election. This presumably is true in some states. In New York parties do not do elections. Primaries, done by government for the parties, handle both primary elections AND electing party officers. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or their elected representatives) to try out different ballot formats than ranked choice but... ... The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. ... why, oh why, are all of you election method experts stuck on that silly n x n matrix geometry (where the main diagonal has no information you have to associate one number on the lower left with another number on the upper right, and it isn't obvious which number goes with which candidate) instead of grouping the pairwise totals *in* *pairs*??? like A 56 B 44 A 88 B 65 C 12 C 35 A 90 B 82 C 55 D 10 D 18 D 45 THAT format is where you have useful information about the relationships between candidates at a glance. if we're gonna tell people about Condorcet, why are we putting it in a stupid rectangular array where it is difficult to tell who beat who? it only makes it harder to sell this to skeptics. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts: final stretch
I finally got around to a bit. I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo? Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts Contents When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line, something, such as indentation, should show start of each item. I see Enthusiasts here - Should also go with Experts below. Introduction It is time to change our voting system. We, the undersigned election-method experts and enthusiasts from around the world, unanimously denounce the use of plurality voting in elections in which there are more than two candidates. In this declaration we offer several ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will reliably produce much fairer results. Proper question is whether there MAY be more than two candidates: . There will never be more than two - so election method does not matter. . When there are more, voters can wish to vote against the worst by voting for more than one - impossible with plurality. . We cannot be bothered with this need - how bad this is depends on value of the election. Part of selling against plurality: . Wherever current experience is that runoffs are rarely needed and there is very little voting for other than the two main candidates, deciders may feel that there is no need for preparing for what has never happened to them. . Even with that normality, there can be times when voting for others happens in significant numbers. We need to alert deciders that this can happen in any district and this is what needs preparing for even if they are used to things staying simpler. Better ballots With better information from the voters, we can find better winners. Approval gives nothing but ability to vote for more than one. All the others provide for voters indicating which of the candidates they vote for are also their most preferred. Also, while Condorcet ranking unconditionally says that higher ranks are better than lower, there is nothing requiring or permitting saying how much higher. The other methods, depending on statements as to how much higher a ranked candidate may be, require that the voter indicate magnitude in the vote. Fairer counting methods Condorcet: . It is an approach to a tie that CAN result in those leading candidates needing some extra analysis to decide on a winner. . The n*n matrix used in Condorcet has information useful to those wanting to learn more about relationship of candidates. There are three Condorcet methods that identify the Condorcet winner (when there is one) without explicitly looking for the Condorcet winner, and they are, in alphabetical order: I claim that, if there is one, the CW should be found and, at our distance, we do not need to check on how the method goes about that. Even if there is no CW, the n*n matrix used to look for the CW is the obvious source for deciding on a winner - which points toward using n*n for this analysis. I have not chased down the innards of using IRV here, but wonder if, as used here, it is immune to the problems that afflicted IRV in Burlington. Anyway, I ask that IRV discussion stay out of the Condorcet discussion - seems like there were, earlier, better words about IRV than I see here. Also, seems like SODA should be kept away from Condorcet. In Using the fairer methods in organizations Private organizations are a great place to start voting reform. One particularly relevant example of a “private” election is the nomination process of a political party. It is true that our supported methods make this process less important, because, unlike plurality, they do not break down when more than one candidate from a party is running. Still, we expect that many parties would still want to have a formal nomination (“primary election”) process so as to focus their efforts on one or two candidates per office. We believe that any party using a superior voting system internally will see immediate benefits. A primary process with increased turnout, with fewer negative attacks, and with a more-democratic result will result in a stronger nominee who is better-prepared to win in the general election. This presumably is true in some states. In New York parties do not do elections. Primaries, done by government for the parties, handle both primary elections AND electing party officers. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Dave Ketchum wrote: I look at this and shake my head. I am not used to parties having the kind of control implied here - let alone evil control. But the evil control could exist in other states. Then I look at what has been written in our declaration. I see nothing for: . Who can be a voter - most any adult. . Who can be a candidate - most any voter. . What about primary elections? Nothing said inconsistent with voters joining a party, seeing to candidates for primaries and voting in primaries. Why do we have primaries? With FPTP, multiple candidates from a party in the main election could be a disaster. If parties had the power some imply, they could attend to this by preventing multiple party candidates from being in the main election. I imagine that, were the election method cloneproof, the parties would still try to nominate a single candidate so as to concentrate all its promotion power on that single candidate. Whether the party would succeed in doing so depends on the amount of power it has. To my knowledge, the US does not have an explicit party-based system, and therefore, the parties can't use formal power to keep anyone from running outside of the party itself. In closed-list PR countries, the parties *do* have formal power, because the election method is oriented primarily around parties and not around candidates. However, even if the parties do not have formal power, parties have informal advantages, namely organization and money. A contest favors those who are prepared - and since representative democracy consists of such contests (every election), those who can coordinate more effort (be it monetary or organizatorial) towards being heard will, well, be heard better and so gain more votes, all other things equal. The alternate approaches, like Gohlke's Practical Democracy - or for that matter, sortition or (to a lesser extent) delegable proxy - makes marketing less important because the system picks from a random subset that is unlikely to coincide with party membership (Practical Democracy, sortition), or the continuous bidirectional nature of the system means that one can appeal to a small group and still influence politics, and that groups have an incentive to remain small (delegable proxy). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
The control of political parties is indirect, not direct -- just as it is for the influence of money in politics. The link between money and politics is well known. Who really controls political parties is less-well known. For details I suggest looking at my book titled Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections, portions of which can be read at Google Books: http://books.google.com/books?id=UOf86S4Lc-YCprintsec=frontcover#v=onepage Page 19 (Chapter 1) is a good place to start for understanding the indirect links between money and election results, and how political parties use their control of their party's money. In any case, of course this indirect control is not directly addressed in our Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts, which naturally focuses on election methods. Richard Fobes On 9/3/2011 6:55 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: I look at this and shake my head. I am not used to parties having the kind of control implied here - let alone evil control. But the evil control could exist in other states. Then I look at what has been written in our declaration. I see nothing for: . Who can be a voter - most any adult. . Who can be a candidate - most any voter. . What about primary elections? Nothing said inconsistent with voters joining a party, seeing to candidates for primaries and voting in primaries. Why do we have primaries? With FPTP, multiple candidates from a party in the main election could be a disaster. If parties had the power some imply, they could attend to this by preventing multiple party candidates from being in the main election. We talk of proportional-representation, that could involve party control - but I do not remember the Declaration getting into that yet. Via http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi I looked up NY election law (ELN). It gets deeply involved in voters nominating candidates by petition - voters who do not spend all their time at this complex task - but nothing glaring about party control. Dave Ketchum On Sep 3, 2011, at 1:38 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: To: Fred Gohlke I agree that our Declaration only reduces, and does not completely eliminate, control of politics by political parties and political-party leaders. Yet, as you have pointed out in other messages, we need to take one step at a time. After we have disseminated this Declaration we can move on to attempting to find some kind of consensus for proportional-representation methods, and then write and disseminate a separate Declaration on that topic, and that PR-based Declaration (if followed) will further reduce control by political-party leaders (and their followers). Then, presumably years from now, we can move on to developing, and reaching consensus about, voting methods that fully bypass party politics. As you have correctly pointed out, we need to take one step at a time. Richard Fobes On 9/2/2011 1:25 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Mr. Fobes re: I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle ... The declaration presumes the right of political parties to select the candidates for public office, thereby preventing meaningful participation by the public. Over two hundred years experience with party politics (should) have taught us that political parties transcend the will of the people. Parties are important for the principals: the party leaders, contributors, candidates and elected officials, but the significance diminishes rapidly as the distance from the center of power grows. Most people are on the periphery, remote from the center of power. As outsiders, they have little incentive to participate in the political process. The flaws in party politics are disastrous and we ought not blind ourselves to the political causes of the devastation we're enduring, right now. If the only purpose of the declaration is to break the hold of plurality it may be effective, but it offers no roadmap for those countries seeking an electoral method that gives their people meaningful participation in the political process. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Good Afternoon, Richard I absolutely agree - we must crawl before we can walk. However, since we are not babies, perhaps our position is more analogous to wriggling out of a cesspool. To do that, it's best to have an idea of where we want to go so we don't flounder around in it longer than necessary. In thinking about how to respond to your note, I kept coming back to a thought that seemed important, so I looked it up: Keep thine eye upon the prize; be sure that thy eyes be continually upon the profit thou art like to get. The reason why men are so apt to faint in their race for heaven, it lieth chiefly in either of these two things: 1. They do not seriously consider the worth of the prize; or else if they do, they are afraid it is too good for them; ... 2. And do not let the thoughts of the rareness of the place make thee say in thy heart, This is too good for me; ... John Bunyan, 1698 I was surprised to learn this thought's religious overtones (I would have guessed John Bunyan was Paul Bunyan's dad), so I must beg the indulgence of those whose minds close at the first hint of religiosity. The quality of an idea should be independent of its source. I must have thought this one worthy, for I kept it in the back of my mind long after I lost my awe of religion. I think it's important for people proposing Electoral Methods to know (and agree upon) the prize they seek - and not lose sight of it. I fear I've failed to make that point. I have no problem with the 'Declaration'. I simply fear the purpose of reforming electoral methods is lost in the verbiage engulfing the reforms. However much I'd like to see movement toward more democratic electoral systems, I recognize that progress must be slow and incremental. Even Bunyan didn't expect to reach his prize during his lifetime. The purpose of the August 24th suggestion of listing fundamental principles was intended, not to define the 'Declaration', but to ensure that participants in the discussion had the same goal. I'd like to know that each step recommended on the Electoral Methods site is a move toward greater democracy, but I'm not sure others agree. There seems to be greater interest in solidifying the role of political parties in the electoral infrastructure than in improving public participation in the political process. Wouldn't it be a good idea to acknowledge that we don't need more of the poison that's making us so sick? Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Good Morning, Dave I think you're right. I'm wandering between the purpose of the 'Declaration' and the purpose of considering Electoral Methods. Perhaps Toby Pereira has the right idea. Fred Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
To: Fred Gohlke I agree that our Declaration only reduces, and does not completely eliminate, control of politics by political parties and political-party leaders. Yet, as you have pointed out in other messages, we need to take one step at a time. After we have disseminated this Declaration we can move on to attempting to find some kind of consensus for proportional-representation methods, and then write and disseminate a separate Declaration on that topic, and that PR-based Declaration (if followed) will further reduce control by political-party leaders (and their followers). Then, presumably years from now, we can move on to developing, and reaching consensus about, voting methods that fully bypass party politics. As you have correctly pointed out, we need to take one step at a time. Richard Fobes On 9/2/2011 1:25 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Mr. Fobes re: I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle ... The declaration presumes the right of political parties to select the candidates for public office, thereby preventing meaningful participation by the public. Over two hundred years experience with party politics (should) have taught us that political parties transcend the will of the people. Parties are important for the principals: the party leaders, contributors, candidates and elected officials, but the significance diminishes rapidly as the distance from the center of power grows. Most people are on the periphery, remote from the center of power. As outsiders, they have little incentive to participate in the political process. The flaws in party politics are disastrous and we ought not blind ourselves to the political causes of the devastation we're enduring, right now. If the only purpose of the declaration is to break the hold of plurality it may be effective, but it offers no roadmap for those countries seeking an electoral method that gives their people meaningful participation in the political process. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
I look at this and shake my head. I am not used to parties having the kind of control implied here - let alone evil control. But the evil control could exist in other states. Then I look at what has been written in our declaration. I see nothing for: . Who can be a voter - most any adult. . Who can be a candidate - most any voter. . What about primary elections? Nothing said inconsistent with voters joining a party, seeing to candidates for primaries and voting in primaries. Why do we have primaries? With FPTP, multiple candidates from a party in the main election could be a disaster. If parties had the power some imply, they could attend to this by preventing multiple party candidates from being in the main election. We talk of proportional-representation, that could involve party control - but I do not remember the Declaration getting into that yet. Via http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi I looked up NY election law (ELN). It gets deeply involved in voters nominating candidates by petition - voters who do not spend all their time at this complex task - but nothing glaring about party control. Dave Ketchum On Sep 3, 2011, at 1:38 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: To: Fred Gohlke I agree that our Declaration only reduces, and does not completely eliminate, control of politics by political parties and political- party leaders. Yet, as you have pointed out in other messages, we need to take one step at a time. After we have disseminated this Declaration we can move on to attempting to find some kind of consensus for proportional- representation methods, and then write and disseminate a separate Declaration on that topic, and that PR-based Declaration (if followed) will further reduce control by political-party leaders (and their followers). Then, presumably years from now, we can move on to developing, and reaching consensus about, voting methods that fully bypass party politics. As you have correctly pointed out, we need to take one step at a time. Richard Fobes On 9/2/2011 1:25 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Mr. Fobes re: I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle ... The declaration presumes the right of political parties to select the candidates for public office, thereby preventing meaningful participation by the public. Over two hundred years experience with party politics (should) have taught us that political parties transcend the will of the people. Parties are important for the principals: the party leaders, contributors, candidates and elected officials, but the significance diminishes rapidly as the distance from the center of power grows. Most people are on the periphery, remote from the center of power. As outsiders, they have little incentive to participate in the political process. The flaws in party politics are disastrous and we ought not blind ourselves to the political causes of the devastation we're enduring, right now. If the only purpose of the declaration is to break the hold of plurality it may be effective, but it offers no roadmap for those countries seeking an electoral method that gives their people meaningful participation in the political process. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Good Afternoon, Mr. Fobes re: I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle ... The declaration presumes the right of political parties to select the candidates for public office, thereby preventing meaningful participation by the public. Over two hundred years experience with party politics (should) have taught us that political parties transcend the will of the people. Parties are important for the principals: the party leaders, contributors, candidates and elected officials, but the significance diminishes rapidly as the distance from the center of power grows. Most people are on the periphery, remote from the center of power. As outsiders, they have little incentive to participate in the political process. The flaws in party politics are disastrous and we ought not blind ourselves to the political causes of the devastation we're enduring, right now. If the only purpose of the declaration is to break the hold of plurality it may be effective, but it offers no roadmap for those countries seeking an electoral method that gives their people meaningful participation in the political process. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Seems to me Fred is wandering on this one. Our declaration gets big enough without tackling: . Who gets to be a candidate. . Who gets to be a voter. I know New York law gets plenty of complexity while tackling these two - much of it in trying to be fair and reasonable while getting it all done in a reasonable number of days. party nomination relates to primary,, independent nomination relates to independence ignoring party, and designating petition relates to primary - are all used in our law on this. Dave Ketchum On Sep 2, 2011, at 4:25 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Afternoon, Mr. Fobes re: I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle ... The declaration presumes the right of political parties to select the candidates for public office, thereby preventing meaningful participation by the public. Over two hundred years experience with party politics (should) have taught us that political parties transcend the will of the people. Parties are important for the principals: the party leaders, contributors, candidates and elected officials, but the significance diminishes rapidly as the distance from the center of power grows. Most people are on the periphery, remote from the center of power. As outsiders, they have little incentive to participate in the political process. The flaws in party politics are disastrous and we ought not blind ourselves to the political causes of the devastation we're enduring, right now. If the only purpose of the declaration is to break the hold of plurality it may be effective, but it offers no roadmap for those countries seeking an electoral method that gives their people meaningful participation in the political process. Fred Gohlke Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Sorry, I don't have time for a proper response to this right now. I think the draft that I wrote was not pared down enough yet and I wanted to work on it some more before it was posted here. And I think that Richard's version is not quite accurate, though probably just a few words' adjustment will make it work. I also think it's important to say that these are the claims of each method's supporters. You should not have to endorse all of this in order to sign the statement. JQ 2011/8/31 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election methods supported in our Declaration. Below are the versions each of us have written. What does everyone else prefer? We know that the final result will be different from what either of us have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better wordings or as requests for what to change. If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us offering any high-level perspective. - version from Jameson Quinn: - Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are: * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing. Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends up being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed choice of which other system to move on to. * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that such a candidate should win. * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot type because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of this system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality of a candidate, rather than their quality relative to other options, it may help avoid a situation where a polarized electorate elects an unqualified compromise candidate just because both sides prefer such a nonentity to seeing the other side win. * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any predetermined fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not known if these simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might use strategy in different amounts under different voting systems or in different factions. - version from Richard Fobes: - Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four supported methods, most of us agree that: * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of counting. * Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred over every other candidate. * Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of strategic voting. * Score voting may provide the mathematically defined best overall (optimum) results if voters vote sincerely instead of strategically. - end - Thanks! (We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final, version ready to review in full.) Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
On 9/1/2011 8:58 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote: ... It's too easy to fall into the trap of becoming so absorbed with the minutiae of methods that the purpose of the process is obscured. One guard against this eventuality is to include in Fobes 'Declaration' the principle that electoral methods are designed to afford the electorate meaningful participation in the electoral process. Last week I suggested identification of principles as a prelude to creating the declaration, in the hope the members would include such a principle. Do you think it worth considering that there are attempts to establish democratic regimes going on at several places in the world? Would it not be proper to discuss the flaws we've experienced in the party-based model openly and in considerable depth so those struggling with embryonic systems can avoid them? Fred Gohlke If the Declaration does not yet convey what you call the principle that electoral methods are designed to afford the electorate meaningful participation in the electoral process, then please suggest words that convey what's missing. I think that the listed benefits (of election-method reform) cover most of your participation principle, but if we're missing anything, please suggest specific words that will plug into the document to clarify anything important that is not yet covered. This declaration is not intended to be Fobes 'Declaration'. I'm contributing my tech-writing and marketing-writing skills to improve its readability and to help inspire the reader to action, but everyone here should be telling me and Jameson Quinn what they want included. (Not that there's room for much more, but if there's something overlooked and very important, we can squeeze it in, and if necessary find something less important to remove.) And yes, the fact that many places around the world are struggling to create and sustain democracy is a good reason to get this declaration signed and shared. But the world has already waited long enough for us to formulate agreed-on wording about abstract principles, and that opportunity is gone. Now we need to express support for specific election-method reforms -- and not split our vote in opposition to plurality voting. Thanks, Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Thanks to both of you for worthy effort. On Sep 1, 2011, at 12:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote: OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election methods supported in our Declaration. Below are the versions each of us have written. What does everyone else prefer? We know that the final result will be different from what either of us have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better wordings or as requests for what to change. If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us offering any high-level perspective. --- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum --- Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning, assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason (in deciding on a value, consider what would be meaningful in the election method to be used). Then consider the four systems of voting that might be in place: * Approval - vote for all that you have marked, perhaps excluding the least-liked, for you are giving equal backing to all that you vote for. * Condorcet system - rank all that you have marked, according to their positions on the ruler, noting that this makes high-ranked preferred over any lesser. * Majority Judgment - rate those you would rank for Condorcet. Also rate the least-liked to help vote counters see how you scale strength. * Range - same as MJ. - version from Jameson Quinn: - Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are: * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing. Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends up being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed choice of which other system to move on to. * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that such a candidate should win. two-way means? * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot type because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of this system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality of a candidate, rather than their quality relative to other options, it may help avoid a situation where a polarized electorate elects an unqualified compromise candidate just because both sides prefer such a nonentity to seeing the other side win. * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any predetermined fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not known if these simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might use strategy in different amounts under different voting systems or in different factions. - version from Richard Fobes: - Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four supported methods, most of us agree that: * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of counting. * Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred over every other candidate. When there is no single winner, the vote counting must decide among those best approaching winning. * Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of strategic voting. * Score voting may provide the mathematically defined best overall (optimum) results if voters vote sincerely instead of strategically. - end - Thanks! (We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final, version ready to review in full.) Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Thank you, Dave Ketchum, for your excellent feedback. Here is the revision of this section based on trying to implement your requested changes. Your comment about the open primary issue helped me realize this isn't likely to be an issue after we get people to stop using plurality voting. It was offered here in Oregon as a ballot referendum, and it was surprising how few people realized it was not a good idea. (It was yet another [flawed] attempt to compensate for the unfairness of plurality voting.) -- Multiple rounds of voting -- Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting, and the second round, which functions as the runoff election, is often limited to only two main candidates. These traditions have evolved because they help to overcome the weaknesses of plurality voting. When any of our supported election methods are used, just one round of voting may be sufficient. In this case all the candidates, which may be up to as many as ten or possibly twenty, can compete in the same single-round election. If a runoff election is also used, it does not need to be limited to just two main candidates. In fact, offering three or more candidates in a runoff election increases the fairness of the results. Why? It allows for two candidates that appeal to the majority of voters and at least one candidate that appeals to the “opposition” voters. Primary elections, in which political parties choose just one candidate each to progress to the main election, might not be needed for less-competitive elections. However, in highly competitive elections such as for national parliament seats and presidencies, primary elections are still needed for several reasons. They allow voters to focus attention on more candidates initially, which accommodates more choices. Then during the main election voters can focus on the most popular candidates, without distractions from less-popular candidates. Primary elections also serve to foster political dialogue and the resolution of intra-party differences, so the cost of primary elections needs to be balanced against their benefits when considering whether they are still needed. When choosing which candidates deserve to progress to a runoff election, we do not offer specific recommendations for interpreting results – beyond obviously including the most popular candidate. There are various possibilities for how to choose the second, third, and additional candidates, and the best approach would depend on which of our supported methods is used (in the earlier round), and other details. This complexity overlaps with the complexity of choosing a best method to increase proportional representation. Regardless of whether our supported election methods are used with or without runoff elections, the results will be much fairer than can be achieved using plurality voting with multiple voting rounds. -- end -- Richard Fobes On 8/31/2011 9:04 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: On Aug 31, 2011, at 11:11 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: Thank you Dave Ketchum and Peter Zbornik for your excellent responses to my first draft of the multiple rounds of voting section! I have tried to incorporate your requested improvements, while attempting to keep it short. Here is what I've got now for this section: -- Multiple rounds of voting -- Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of plurality voting. When any of our supported election methods are used, just one round of voting may be sufficient. Although our supported election methods could eliminate the need for primary elections (in which political parties choose just one candidate each to progress to the main election), we support the continued use of primary elections because they foster political dialogue and the resolution of intra-party differences. I claim we should promote careful thought as to whether primaries are worth the expense since some methods, such as Condorcet, have no problem with clones or near-clones participating. With an activity changing from essential to useful, there should be consideration as to other possible ways to attend to its usage. In situations that are highly controversial, we support the use of two voting rounds so that voters can focus attention on the most popular candidates during the second round, without distractions from less-popular candidates. When multiple voting rounds are used, every round should use one of our supported election methods. In these cases it is not necessary to limit the runoff election (the second round) to only two candidates, because that limit is only needed to accommodate plurality voting. Runoffs are essential in FPTP, for FPTP can fail to have any candidate get a majority. Runoffs should not be needed for this more than very infrequently with our better methods (and they are EXPENSIVE - thus hard to justify). . A
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
To Dave Ketchum: Your comments below seem to be the advantages of the different ballot types rather than the advantages of the different counting methods. Perhaps we should add a bulleted list of the advantages of each ballot type. I had overlooked that idea. Now I think it's a good idea -- if we can keep it very short and not overlap the advantages of the counting methods. I am trying to keep my biases out of the document (fairness is very important to me!), but so that you know what my bias is, I'll say that I agree that eventually score ballots will be a better choice than ranked ballots, but so far I haven't seen a counting method that handles them in a way that motivates voters to vote sincerely rather than strategically. Majority Judgement appears to be better than range voting, but as far as I can tell it doesn't punish (for lack of a better word) strategic voting attempts. Yet I genuinely want the document to say something positive about score-ballot-based counting methods, so I'm having to rely on feedback from you and others to know what needs to be said -- in a way that non-expert readers will understand. Again, thanks! Richard Fobes On 9/1/2011 3:03 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: Thanks to both of you for worthy effort. On Sep 1, 2011, at 12:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote: OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election methods supported in our Declaration. Below are the versions each of us have written. What does everyone else prefer? We know that the final result will be different from what either of us have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better wordings or as requests for what to change. If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us offering any high-level perspective. --- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum --- Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning, assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason (in deciding on a value, consider what would be meaningful in the election method to be used). Then consider the four systems of voting that might be in place: * Approval - vote for all that you have marked, perhaps excluding the least-liked, for you are giving equal backing to all that you vote for. * Condorcet system - rank all that you have marked, according to their positions on the ruler, noting that this makes high-ranked preferred over any lesser. * Majority Judgment - rate those you would rank for Condorcet. Also rate the least-liked to help vote counters see how you scale strength. * Range - same as MJ. - version from Jameson Quinn: - Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are: * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing. Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends up being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed choice of which other system to move on to. * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that such a candidate should win. two-way means? * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot type because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of this system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality of a candidate, rather than their quality relative to other options, it may help avoid a situation where a polarized electorate elects an unqualified compromise candidate just because both sides prefer such a nonentity to seeing the other side win. * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any predetermined fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not known if these simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might use strategy in different amounts under different voting systems or in different factions. - version from Richard Fobes: - Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four supported methods, most of us agree that: * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of counting. *
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Hi Richard, maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing methods, say Schulze winner vs Approval or Bucklin winner or any other endorsed method. This would allow for election-methods competitions, and could address potential weaknesses of each method. When one of the method would generate a bad winner, then the other method could still give a good winner. For instance, if the Schulze method would generate a winner noone has heard of before (the dark horse), then in the second round, when he meets the Bucklin or Approval winner, he or she might lose the second round, after new details of his/her political past come to public knowledge due to the increased attention given. The election methods should be different for this approach to work. The obvious downside of this approach is increased complexity and thus less public support. With this method IRV might be used as one of the methods, or the old method could be used against the new method. A second proposal: since most single winner methods have their multiple-winner counterpart, the first round could proprtionally elect two (or more) candidates, between which the second round would take place. This solution would use one method for both rounds, thus decrease complexity compared to the first proposal; the solution would not require political party candidates; it would provide a solution for the French presidential elections. The downside of this system is that some of the multiple winner versions of the single-winner methods are not used anywhere and exist only on paper and/or in vote-counting software. Example: 1st round: Schulze-STV elects two candidates for the runoff. 2nd round: Schulze-Condorcet is used. Personally I think the issue of one vs two rounds of elections is a neglected issue. For instance, if the Brittish liberals would have chosen a run-off elections as the alternative to FPTP instead of IRV (AV), then I think they would have found support in the referendum. A second issue, which I think the statement does not address, is the minimal number of seats in each constituency, or in other words, the number of regional constituencies in the election to one body, like the parliament. If we have a 200 seat parliament and each constituency has only two seats, elected proportionally, then we have a proportional election system, with a quota of 33%. This is not a system I can endorse. I would rather endorse low (max., say 5%) and would prefer no quotas, i.e. the quota equals the votes needed for one seat with only one constituency - around 0.5% for a 200 seat election. Using a party list system, there might be constituencies which do not hinder proportional representation, provided that there is a National constituency of sufficient size, which makes sure that each party is proportionally represented in the elected body (Swedish election system). The national constituency would level-out any disproportional representation of the parties, which might arise from the division of the electorate into constituencies. Maybe a similar system could be (or most probably has already been) constructed for open lists. The voter would cast a vote in his/her constituency and at the same time a vote in the national constituency. Question is then how to achieve a proportional representation for open lists balancing the regional constituencies and the national one. I think it is possible and should not be too difficult but don't know how to do it. Maybe these questions have already been discussed. Best regards Peter Zbornik On 8/30/11, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org wrote: Here is what I've just written for the new section titled Multiple rounds of voting: --- begin In highly competitive elections, multiple rounds of voting are needed to eliminate the weakest candidates so that attention can be focused on electing one of the most popular candidates. Our supported election methods work as described for two rounds of voting if the first round of voting elects a single winner from each political party, and the second round chooses from among those winners. However, different counting methods are needed if the same voters vote in both rounds. There are election methods that handle such cases, and they use the better ballots we support. However, we have not yet analyzed this category of counting methods sufficiently to express support for any specific methods. We do strongly agree that single-mark ballots must not be used in any round of voting. More specifically, just as the candidate with the most first-choice votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is not necessarily the least popular, the candidate with the second-most first-choice votes is not necessarily second-most popular, and the candidate with the second-fewest votes is not necessarily the second-least popular. Also we agree that open primary elections are not
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Hi Richard, I am sending a small P.S. to clarify one of the ideas in my email below. I think that the most viable transfer from an old one-round single-winner election system to a new system. Goes through a two round system, where the winner of the election in the old system meets the winner in the new system. This is the track for changes of voting system, which I think will have the biggest chance to get political support. A FPTP system would thus be reformed so that, the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Approval/Score/Bucklin winner in the second round, if the two winners would be different. I think the reform of a two round system could take two different paths: 1) a three round system where a second run-off is held between the runoff winner in the second round and the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner from the first round, if the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner would be different from the two run-off candidates. 2) a two-round system, where the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner if they are different, otherwise we would have a normal run-off. In theory one might imagine a two-round election second round with three candidates, but then the second-round election system would not be a run-off election, which would maket the system politically more difficult to pass. Best regards Peter Zbornik On 8/31/11, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Richard, maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing methods, say Schulze winner vs Approval or Bucklin winner or any other endorsed method. This would allow for election-methods competitions, and could address potential weaknesses of each method. When one of the method would generate a bad winner, then the other method could still give a good winner. For instance, if the Schulze method would generate a winner noone has heard of before (the dark horse), then in the second round, when he meets the Bucklin or Approval winner, he or she might lose the second round, after new details of his/her political past come to public knowledge due to the increased attention given. The election methods should be different for this approach to work. The obvious downside of this approach is increased complexity and thus less public support. With this method IRV might be used as one of the methods, or the old method could be used against the new method. A second proposal: since most single winner methods have their multiple-winner counterpart, the first round could proprtionally elect two (or more) candidates, between which the second round would take place. This solution would use one method for both rounds, thus decrease complexity compared to the first proposal; the solution would not require political party candidates; it would provide a solution for the French presidential elections. The downside of this system is that some of the multiple winner versions of the single-winner methods are not used anywhere and exist only on paper and/or in vote-counting software. Example: 1st round: Schulze-STV elects two candidates for the runoff. 2nd round: Schulze-Condorcet is used. Personally I think the issue of one vs two rounds of elections is a neglected issue. For instance, if the Brittish liberals would have chosen a run-off elections as the alternative to FPTP instead of IRV (AV), then I think they would have found support in the referendum. A second issue, which I think the statement does not address, is the minimal number of seats in each constituency, or in other words, the number of regional constituencies in the election to one body, like the parliament. If we have a 200 seat parliament and each constituency has only two seats, elected proportionally, then we have a proportional election system, with a quota of 33%. This is not a system I can endorse. I would rather endorse low (max., say 5%) and would prefer no quotas, i.e. the quota equals the votes needed for one seat with only one constituency - around 0.5% for a 200 seat election. Using a party list system, there might be constituencies which do not hinder proportional representation, provided that there is a National constituency of sufficient size, which makes sure that each party is proportionally represented in the elected body (Swedish election system). The national constituency would level-out any disproportional representation of the parties, which might arise from the division of the electorate into constituencies. Maybe a similar system could be (or most probably has already been) constructed for open lists. The voter would cast a vote in his/her constituency and at the same time a vote in the national constituency. Question is then how to achieve a proportional representation for open lists balancing the regional constituencies and the national one. I think it is possible and should not be too difficult but don't know how to do it. Maybe these questions have already
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Hi Richard, I am sending a P.S. to my P.S. below. I hope the message got through despite the bad English in the first part of my email below. If not, please let me know, and I will try to explain further. I wrote below: I think the reform of a two round system could take two different paths: 1) a three round system where a second run-off is held between the runoff winner in the second round and the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner from the first round, if the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner would be different from the two run-off candidates. I would like elaborate this proposal a little. Call the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner K. Assume K is different from the two second round runoff candidates R1 and R2. The third round could make use of the same ballot paper as the second round, by making the voter first vote between R1 and R2 (the normal runoff in the second round). Then the voter would make two more choices: Between R1 and K (i.e the question would be: if R1 would win the runoff with R2 would you prefer R1 or K as president (or chairman/leader etc.)?) Between R2 and K (i.e the question would be: if R2 would win the runoff with R1 would you prefer R2 or K as president (or chairman/leader etc.)?) If R1 would win the second round runoff, then the votes R1 vs K would be counted as the third round votes. If R2 would win the second round runoff, then the votes R2 vs K would be counted as the third round votes. The same informtion could be encoded in a ranked ballot with R1, R2 and K, but this could maybe fool some voters to think that the same method was used in the third round as the method for selecting K in the first round - this is just a minor detail. The first round ballot could be either a ranked ballot, or a ballot with a FPTP (bullet vote) ballot part on one side and a ranked ballot part on the second side (a double-vote ballot). The double-vote ballot would enable the voter to bullet vote for a different candidate than he would give his first preference to on the ranked ballot part of the ballot, which might be optimal if different voting tactics are used for both elections, or if the voter cannot make up his mind between two of the candidates and would like to see them both in the combined second/third round. The first-round ballot could also be used in the two round election to reform the FPTP system. I would endorse this three-round system as a good way to reform runoff elections, like the French presidential elections, which is likely to get needed political support. The runoff winner meets the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner and the voter only has to vote twice, so it is difficult to see why a voter would not like this expansion of the current system. A footnote: a similar construct is found on the ballot for constitutional referendums in Switzerland, I think. There is a proposal of constitutional change to be voted on, and a compromise proposal from the Swiss government or Parliament too (I don't remember which). First the voter votes between change the constitution Yes/No If the voter votes Yes then he has to select between the proposed change and the proposal from the government/parliament. Then, if change the constitution gets a majority, then a second round is held between the two different proposals. Best regards Peter Zborník On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 10:43 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Richard, I am sending a small P.S. to clarify one of the ideas in my email below. I think that the most viable transfer from an old one-round single-winner election system to a new system. Goes through a two round system, where the winner of the election in the old system meets the winner in the new system. This is the track for changes of voting system, which I think will have the biggest chance to get political support. A FPTP system would thus be reformed so that, the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Approval/Score/Bucklin winner in the second round, if the two winners would be different. I think the reform of a two round system could take two different paths: 1) a three round system where a second run-off is held between the runoff winner in the second round and the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner from the first round, if the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner would be different from the two run-off candidates. 2) a two-round system, where the FPTP winner would meet the Condorcet/Bucklin/Approval/Score winner if they are different, otherwise we would have a normal run-off. In theory one might imagine a two-round election second round with three candidates, but then the second-round election system would not be a run-off election, which would maket the system politically more difficult to pass. Best regards Peter Zbornik On 8/31/11, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Richard, maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing methods, say Schulze winner
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Richard, maybe a second round could take place between the winners of competing methods, say Schulze winner vs Approval or Bucklin winner or any other endorsed method. This would allow for election-methods competitions, and could address potential weaknesses of each method. When one of the method would generate a bad winner, then the other method could still give a good winner. For instance, if the Schulze method would generate a winner noone has heard of before (the dark horse), then in the second round, when he meets the Bucklin or Approval winner, he or she might lose the second round, after new details of his/her political past come to public knowledge due to the increased attention given. The election methods should be different for this approach to work. The obvious downside of this approach is increased complexity and thus less public support. With this method IRV might be used as one of the methods, or the old method could be used against the new method. I'd like to add to this that plain old top-two runoff can have the honest CW win in a game-theory equilibrium if everybody communicates with everybody else, and there are only a few candidates. This is interesting, because Plurality has no such equilibrium. Perhaps an advanced runoff method could have such candidates in honest X-sets will win under complete information (X being Smith, Landau, whatnot) equilibria. It does seem that runoff methods can improve upon resistance to strategy, at least, because the last round is honest among the two candidates that remain. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Thank you Dave Ketchum and Peter Zbornik for your excellent responses to my first draft of the multiple rounds of voting section! I have tried to incorporate your requested improvements, while attempting to keep it short. Here is what I've got now for this section: -- Multiple rounds of voting -- Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of plurality voting. When any of our supported election methods are used, just one round of voting may be sufficient. Although our supported election methods could eliminate the need for primary elections (in which political parties choose just one candidate each to progress to the main election), we support the continued use of primary elections because they foster political dialogue and the resolution of intra-party differences. In situations that are highly controversial, we support the use of two voting rounds so that voters can focus attention on the most popular candidates during the second round, without distractions from less-popular candidates. When multiple voting rounds are used, every round should use one of our supported election methods. In these cases it is not necessary to limit the runoff election (the second round) to only two candidates, because that limit is only needed to accommodate plurality voting. Also we agree that open primary elections are not fair. In this approach, the supposedly most-popular candidates, regardless of political-party affiliation, progress to the runoff (main) election. This approach fails to consider that a near-majority of voters can end up with only getting to choose between the two candidates who are preferred by the majority. Expressed another way, the designation of most popular is ambiguous in the context of choosing which candidates deserve to progress to the main election. When choosing which candidates deserve to progress to a runoff election, we do not offer specific recommendations for interpreting results -- beyond obviously including the most popular candidate. There are various possibilities for how to choose the second, third, and additional candidates, and the best approach would depend on which of our supported methods is used (in the earlier round), and other details. This complexity overlaps with the complexity of choosing a best method to increase proportional representation. Therefore, in this declaration, we are not expressing support for any specific way to choose which other candidates (besides the most popular), and how many candidates, deserve to progress to the runoff election. Fortunately, in the runoff round, any of our supported methods can produce fair results with three, four, or more candidates -- in contrast to plurality voting which can handle only two. -- end -- Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
On Aug 31, 2011, at 11:11 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: Thank you Dave Ketchum and Peter Zbornik for your excellent responses to my first draft of the multiple rounds of voting section! I have tried to incorporate your requested improvements, while attempting to keep it short. Here is what I've got now for this section: -- Multiple rounds of voting -- Current elections commonly use multiple rounds of voting in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of plurality voting. When any of our supported election methods are used, just one round of voting may be sufficient. Although our supported election methods could eliminate the need for primary elections (in which political parties choose just one candidate each to progress to the main election), we support the continued use of primary elections because they foster political dialogue and the resolution of intra-party differences. I claim we should promote careful thought as to whether primaries are worth the expense since some methods, such as Condorcet, have no problem with clones or near-clones participating. With an activity changing from essential to useful, there should be consideration as to other possible ways to attend to its usage. In situations that are highly controversial, we support the use of two voting rounds so that voters can focus attention on the most popular candidates during the second round, without distractions from less-popular candidates. When multiple voting rounds are used, every round should use one of our supported election methods. In these cases it is not necessary to limit the runoff election (the second round) to only two candidates, because that limit is only needed to accommodate plurality voting. Runoffs are essential in FPTP, for FPTP can fail to have any candidate get a majority. Runoffs should not be needed for this more than very infrequently with our better methods (and they are EXPENSIVE - thus hard to justify). . A thought: If runoffs are not expected, voters had best prepare well for the main election. If expected, why should the lazy among the voters bother to prepare well before the main election? We WANT voters to do well with minimum of effort, so rounds should be minimized except where they may truly justify their expense. Also we agree that open primary elections are not fair. In this approach, the supposedly most-popular candidates, regardless of political-party affiliation, progress to the runoff (main) election. This approach fails to consider that a near-majority of voters can end up with only getting to choose between the two candidates who are preferred by the majority. Expressed another way, the designation of most popular is ambiguous in the context of choosing which candidates deserve to progress to the main election. Why must we touch this topic (open vs closed) primaries? Seems like it is separate from our emphasis on voting methods. When choosing which candidates deserve to progress to a runoff election, we do not offer specific recommendations for interpreting results -- beyond obviously including the most popular candidate. There are various possibilities for how to choose the second, third, and additional candidates, and the best approach would depend on which of our supported methods is used (in the earlier round), and other details. This complexity overlaps with the complexity of choosing a best method to increase proportional representation. Therefore, in this declaration, we are not expressing support for any specific way to choose which other candidates (besides the most popular), and how many candidates, deserve to progress to the runoff election. Fortunately, in the runoff round, any of our supported methods can produce fair results with three, four, or more candidates -- in contrast to plurality voting which can handle only two. Huh? There can be a near tie amongst three and some could wish for all such to get included even in the FPTP world. -- end -- Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Why did you replace MJ with MCA? I understand that MCA's Bucklin-like logic is somewhat easier to explain to those who don't know what a median is; and certainly the methods are similar enough; but I deliberately chose to speak of MJ as the representative Bucklin method, because it has the clearest definition and the strongest support in the academic and popular literature. I still think MJ is the right choice for this statement, though I could be convinced otherwise if some serious MCA supporters came out of the woodwork. JQ 2011/8/30 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org On 8/29/2011 6:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I have made some further changes to the statement https://docs.google.com/**document/d/**1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3** Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_UShttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US ... And I've made yet more changes -- to implement the requests made earlier. https://docs.google.com/**document/d/**1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3** Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_UShttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US I have not yet written the section about rounds of voting, which is an addition that was requested. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
On 8/30/2011 7:17 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Why did you replace MJ with MCA? ... I was not aware that I made such a change. If I did, I apologize. I was blending the version I had written (before you made your changes) with your latest edits, and I may have made such a mistake. In any case, I am not very familiar with MJ and MCA methods, so I have been counting on you to deal with those descriptions. My edits are for the purpose of cleaning up the wording. In other words, please change it back to what you and other MJ/MCA advocates think it should be. Speaking of wording edits, as I said in a Google Docs comment, it would be best to avoid the word median in the description, and find a way to use the word half instead (such as half the voters , and the other half ...). I do agree that the name Bucklin is best avoided because of its historical past of having been used and rejected. Richard Fobes On 8/30/2011 7:17 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Why did you replace MJ with MCA? I understand that MCA's Bucklin-like logic is somewhat easier to explain to those who don't know what a median is; and certainly the methods are similar enough; but I deliberately chose to speak of MJ as the representative Bucklin method, because it has the clearest definition and the strongest support in the academic and popular literature. I still think MJ is the right choice for this statement, though I could be convinced otherwise if some serious MCA supporters came out of the woodwork. JQ 2011/8/30 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org mailto:electionmeth...@votefair.org On 8/29/2011 6:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: I have made some further changes to the statement https://docs.google.com/__document/d/__1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3__Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US ... And I've made yet more changes -- to implement the requests made earlier. https://docs.google.com/__document/d/__1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3__Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oyJLxI9dciXBbowM5mougnbGHzkL3Ue1QkD8nnMwWLg/edit?hl=en_US I have not yet written the section about rounds of voting, which is an addition that was requested. Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Too late this night for fancy words, but hopefully I can express some useful thoughts. On Aug 30, 2011, at 4:52 PM, Richard Fobes wrote: Here is what I've just written for the new section titled Multiple rounds of voting: --- begin In highly competitive elections, multiple rounds of voting are needed to eliminate the weakest candidates so that attention can be focused on electing one of the most popular candidates. Our supported election methods work as described for two rounds of voting if the first round of voting elects a single winner from each political party, and the second round chooses from among those winners. FPTP has a serious problem because it cannot let a voter vote for more than one candidate - and voters can want to vote for more than one - and to say which are liked better than others. Methods we are promoting, such as Score and Condorcet, give the voter needed power. With such methods rounds become less needed since voters can better express their desires in the main election. Likewise, when there are to be rounds, more of the weakest can be discarded before the round since we know better which of the weakest might believably win. The last sentence above is about primaries. FPTP desperately needed such to avoid multiple candidates from a party competing in an election. Once voters understand they can vote for more, and indicate their preference via rating or ranking, primaries will lose much of their backing - thus, possibly getting discarded with FPTP. Note that parties could have a single candidate and not have need for a primary, even in FPTP days. However, different counting methods are needed if the same voters vote in both rounds. There are election methods that handle such cases, and they use the better ballots we support. However, we have not yet analyzed this category of counting methods sufficiently to express support for any specific methods. Assuming primaries still exist, I see no need for that round being unlike the main election, even noting that some voters would be voting in both. We do strongly agree that single-mark ballots must not be used in any round of voting. More specifically, just as the candidate with the most first-choice votes is not necessarily the most popular, and the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is not necessarily the least popular, the candidate with the second-most first-choice votes is not necessarily second-most popular, and the candidate with the second-fewest votes is not necessarily the second-least popular. Whatever makes single-mark evil needs explaining. As a Condorcet backer I have to choke. As an example assume that everyone considers V acceptable, and A, B, and C are each first choice for 1/3 of the voters, If they all rank V as second choice then, for each of the three groups, V will get twice as many Vx as x gets of xV. for being liked better than V. Also we agree that open primary elections are not fair. In this approach, the candidates who are identified as most popular, regardless of political-party affiliation, progress to the next round. This approach fails to consider that the majority of voters who support the most-popular candidate are likely to be the same majority of voters who support the second-most popular candidate -- unless the counting method specifically compensates for this redundant influence. The remaining voters, who may almost be a majority, can end up with only getting to choose between the two candidates who are preferred by the majority. Expressed another way, the words most popular are ambiguous in the context of choosing which candidates deserve to progress to another round of voting. If I cannot kill having primaries I would vote against open. --- end I'm sure I'm missing some important additional considerations, but they aren't coming to me at the moment, so I'll tap into your brains to help refine this section. Of course we aren't offering a fair way to handle French presidential (?) first-round elections (in terms of which two candidates should move on to the final runoff election), but we have nothing specific we would agree on, right? Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
