Yes I wrote it. How do you guys like it?
G.
On 5/23/05, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It appears to have been written by someone called Giulio Prisco, who
signs his name Giu1i0 Pri5c0, and is active in the Society for
Universal Immortalism. His home page is
Le 23-mai-05, à 06:09, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 04:00:39AM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
Hmm, my lack of a pure maths background may be getting me into trouble
here. What about real numbers? Do you need an infinite axiomatic
system to
handle them? Because it seems
On Sun, 22 May 2005, rmiller wrote:
I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm
focusing on what the behavior system perceives (measures). If all possible
worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior system should
likewise exist in a
On Sun, 22 May 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
Regarding the nature of Tegmark's mathematical objects, I found some
old discussion on the list, a debate between me and Russell Standish,
in which Russell argued that Tegmark's objects should be understood as
formal systems, while I claimed that they
Hi Patrick,
Sorry for having been short, especially on those notions for which some
background of logic is needed.
Unfortunately I have not really the time to explain with all the
nuances needed.
Nevertheless the fact that reals are simpler to axiomatize than natural
numbers should be a
Lee,
What you are describing here is panpsychism. If I insist that it is
impossible to know whether and in what way an entity is conscious without
actually *being* that entity oneself, then to be consistent I have to admit
that anything and everything might be conscious. OK; I admit it;
Forgiveness for any typos. I'm in a hurry here. I was going to reply to Miller's message directly, but I see where I can kill two birds with one stone:- Original Message - From: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: rmiller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Subject: Re: Sociological approach Date: Mon,
Stathis writes
If I insist that it is impossible to know whether and in
what way an entity is conscious without actually *being*
that entity oneself, then to be consistent I have to admit
that anything and everything might be conscious. OK; I
admit it; technically, I'm a panpsychist.
Patrick--
At 05:04 AM 5/23/2005, you wrote:
On Sun, 22 May 2005, rmiller wrote:
I'm approaching this as a sociologist with some physics background so I'm
focusing on what the behavior system perceives (measures). If all
possible worlds exist in a superpositional state, then the behavior
QM is a well-defined theory. Like any theory it could be proved wrong by
future experiments. My point is that R. Miller's suggestions would
definitely constitute a replacement of QM by something different. So would
aet.radal's (?) suggestion of information tunnelling between macroscopic
I'd like to take advantage of having a bona fide physicist on the list to
ask a question about decoherence and its implications for the MWI.
Paddy Leahy wrote:
The crucial point, which is not taught in introductory QM
classes, is the theory of Quantum decoherence, for which see the wikipedia
On Mon, 23 May 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
I'd like to take advantage of having a bona fide physicist on the list to
ask a question about decoherence and its implications for the MWI.
SNIP
If this is true, then how can a physicist not accept the MWI?
Beats me...
Isn't that just a matter of
From: Patrick Leahy
NB: I'm in some terminological difficulty because I personally *define*
different branches of the wave function by the property of being fully
decoherent. Hence reference to micro-branches or micro-histories for
cases where you *can* get interference.
Do you agree we
On Mon, 23 May 2005, scerir wrote:
Do you agree we can have branches (or histories) in space
(in a space) but also branches (or histories) in time?
I guess there is an implicit not only in this question :)
You have an atom, excited (ie by a laser).
This atom can radiate a photon in two
On Mon, 23 May 2005, Bruno Marchal wrote:
SNIP
Concerning the white rabbits, I don't see how Tegmark could even address the
problem given that it is a measure problem with respect to the many
computational histories. I don't even remember if Tegmark is aware of any
measure relating the
Paddy Leahy writes:
Let's suppose with Wei Dai that a measure can be applied to Tegmark's
everything. It certainly can to the set of UTM programs as per Schmidhuber
and related proposals. Obviously it is possible to assign a measure which
solves the White Rabbit problem, such as the UP.
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 09:13:49PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
For most physicists the Copenhagen interpretation (in some half-understood
way) works perfectly well at the lab bench.
Having been such a physicist at some point in my past, I would
disagree that you average physicist even uses
On Mon, May 23, 2005 at 11:17:04PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
And another mathematical query for you or anyone on the list:
I've overlooked until now the fact that mathematical physics restricts
itself to (almost-everywhere) differentiable functions of the continuum.
What is the
I think I can answer to the whole message by saying "no way" isn't always "the way". The EPR paradox was supposed to prove quantum theory was wrong because it supposedly violated relativity. Alain Aspect proved that EPR actually worked as advertised, however it does so without violating
At 07:29 PM 5/23/2005, you wrote:
I think I can answer to the
whole message by saying no way isn't always the
way. The EPR paradox was supposed to prove quantum theory was wrong
because it supposedly violated relativity. Alain Aspect proved that EPR
actually worked as advertised, however it
Paddy Leahy writes:
Oops, mea culpa. I said that wrong. What I meant was, what is the
cardinality of the data needed to specify *one* continuous function of the
continuum. E.g. for constant functions it is blatantly aleph-null.
Similarly for any function expressible as a finite-length
Lee Corbin wrote:
A friend sends me this link:
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/CONSC_INFO_PANPSY.html
which will perhaps be of interest to a number of people here.
But the familiar first sentence just sends me into orbit:
The hard problem of consciousness, according to
David
-Original Message-
From: Patrick Leahy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 6:50 PM
To: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Sociological approach
QM is a well-defined theory. Like any theory it could be proved wrong by
future experiments. My point is that R. Miller's
-Original Message-
From: Patrick Leahy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 8:14 PM
To: Hal Finney
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Decoherence and MWI
On Mon, 23 May 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
I'd like to take advantage of having a bona fide physicist on
-Original Message-
From: rmiller [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2005 5:40 PM
To: Patrick Leahy
Cc: aet.radal ssg; EverythingList; Giu1i0 Pri5c0
Subject: Re: Sociological approach
...
More to the point, if you happen to know why the mere act of
measurement--even at a
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