Colin Hales wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
In brain material and brain material alone you get anomaly: things are
NOT
what they seem. 'Seem' is a construct of qualia. In a science of qualia,
what are they 'seeming' to be? Not qualia. That is circular. Parsimony
demands we assume 'something' and
According to Stathis Papaioannou:
Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test
new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence,
including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be
included in any risk/benefit
According to Rich Winkel:
Medicine is not like astronomy.
In that ignorance can be toxic.
Rich
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Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
The underlying structure unifies the whole
system. Of course you'll get some impact via the causality of the
structurevia the deep structure right down into the very fabric of
space.
In a very real way the existence of
Le 15-août-06, à 20:52, complexitystudies a écrit :
The deductions made via UDA are impressing,
but I would like to seriously question the Platonic
Assumptions underlying all this reasoning.
No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We have just
different theories.
Note
Le 15-août-06, à 21:09, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the
zero-person point of view will appear also to be unnameable. Names
emerges through the third person pint of view.
I'm beginning to see that, unnameability
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
What does access to information mean ? In a dynamic
universe, it means causality. In a Barbour-style universe
it means some nows coincidentally contain patterns representing other
nows
just as , in a world consisting of every possible picture, there will
Ante diem XVII-um calendas Septembris as Aug. 15 (not XVI as 32-16)
John M wrote:
Bruno:
What is - 6 - ?
Perfect number, you say.
If I do NOT count - or quantize, does it have ANY meaning at all?
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
To be clear
Hi David,
Le 16-août-06, à 02:51, David Nyman a écrit :
Good to see this. First off some grandmotherly-ish questions:
1) The computationalist hypothesis (comp),
This is the hypothesis that I am a digital machine in the
quasi-operational sense that I can survive through an artificial
Le 16-août-06, à 03:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
If we realise that things cannot be as they seem then this is new
evidence
and things now seem different to what they originally did! I did not
intend
that things are as they seem be understood in a narrow sense, such as
what our
Rich Winkel wrote:
According to Stathis Papaioannou:
Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test
new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence,
including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be
included in any
Le 16-août-06, à 03:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I agree. Mathematics and logic are ways of constraining our
propositions so
we don't assert contradictions; contradictions of our own rules. But
that
doesn't mean they are strong enough to keep us from asserting
absurdities.
I think
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
No, I said I didn't understand what you meant - and now I don't think you
do
either. You have apparently come to the recent realization that science
just
creates models and you never know whether they are really real (and most
likely
they
Le 16-août-06, à 15:28, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also I have not yet seen physical theory which does not assume
numbers.
Physical theories assume the validity of mathematical statements.
That doesn't mean the existence of numbers. Everyone agrees that
numbers can't be
Very wise words, Bruno.
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 8:45 AM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 15-août-06, à 20:52, complexitystudies a écrit :
The deductions made
I find Gunther's argumentation commendable, a 'wider' view and a free
spirit getting away from the age-old reductionist education-stuff of
subsequent many generations of scientists - maybe even to realize that
early thinkers, (ingenious though), had to rely on a meager empirical
cognitive
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi David,
Le 16-août-06, à 02:51, David Nyman a écrit :
Good to see this. First off some grandmotherly-ish questions:
1) The computationalist hypothesis (comp),
This is the hypothesis that I am a digital machine in the
quasi-operational sense that I can
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular
difficulties.
I think here I may have experienced a 'blinding flash' in terms of your
project. If, as I've said, I begin from self-reference - 'indexical
David', then I have asserted my 'necessary'
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-août-06, à 15:28, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also I have not yet seen physical theory which does not assume
numbers.
Physical theories assume the validity of mathematical statements.
That doesn't mean the existence of numbers. Everyone agrees that
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Very wise words, Bruno.
John
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 8:45 AM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 15-août-06, à 20:52,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-août-06, à 02:25, Brent Meeker a écrit :
...
There I think I disagree. If there were no intelligent creatures like
ourselves, the infinite set of integers would not exist (I don't
think
they exist like my coffee does anyway). There would be xx but no
number 2
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But 2 is just another notation for xx.
Why is x 'just another notation for 2? or
why is xx not (just) a notation of 3?
(because Peano said so?)
John M
Le 16-août-06, à 02:25, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le
Hi Bruno,
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
collide, no big bang, no physical
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not
exist.
It obviously
complexitystudies wrote:
Hi Bruno,
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
A bold assumption, if I may say so.
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
Hello to the List :-)
The deductions made via UDA are impressing,
but I would like to seriously question the Platonic
Assumptions underlying all this reasoning.
Arguments like the perfectness of 6 seem sensible at
first sight, but only because we look at this with human
eyes.
1)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Hello to the List :-)
The deductions made via UDA are impressing,
but I would like to seriously question the Platonic
Assumptions underlying all this reasoning.
Arguments like the perfectness of 6 seem sensible at
first sight, but only because we look at this
Rich Winkel writes:
According to Stathis Papaioannou:
Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test
new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence,
including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be
included
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