Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
Dr. Minsky,
In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of
will:
The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept
is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our
psychology is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I
click on send.
Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a multi-tasking
operating system which assigns priorities to different tasks (which is
why it sometimes can be
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.
Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I
can still
Le 27-déc.-06, à 01:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true,
right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should
always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever
we fancy.
This is a key
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would
Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
The crux is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that
And yet I persist ... [the hiatus of familial duties and seasonal
excesses now draws to a close [Oh yeah, Happy New Year Folks!]
SP: 'If we are talking about a system designed to destroy the economy of
a country in order to soften it up for invasion, for example, then an
economist can apply
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of
Le 27-déc.-06, à 07:40, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Brent Meeker writes:
My computer is completely dedicated to sending this email when I
click on send. Actually, it probably isn't. You probably have a
multi-tasking operating system which assigns priorities to different
tasks
I agree with you. The only one sin you talk about is akin to the
confusion between the third person (oneself as a thing) and the
unnameable first person. Even in the ideal case of the
self-referentially correct machine, this confusion leads the machine to
inconsistency. That sin is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
The crux is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or
Jef Allbright wrote:
...
The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can
be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an
exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context
at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer
Jef Allbright wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
All meaning is necessarily within context.
OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.
But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of
Mark,
I would still draw a distinction between the illogical and the foolish or unwise. Being illogical is generally foolish, but the converse is not necessarily the case. The example I have given before is of a person who wants to jump off the top of a tall building, either because (a) he
Brent Meeker writes:
OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of hierarchy
of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the world has
higher priority than putting out the garbage. But what
Bruno Marchal writes:
OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of
hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the
world has higher priority than putting out the garbage. But what
Jef Allbright writes:
I said might because there is one case where I am certain
of the truth, which is that I am having the present
experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of
hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving
the world has higher priority than
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
OK, an AI needs at least motivation if it is to do anything, and we
could call motivation a feeling or emotion. Also, some sort of
hierarchy of motivations is needed if it is to decide that saving the
world has higher priority than
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the
truth, which is that I am having the present experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim
OK Stathis, I happily concede your point in relation to our word
'logical', but not in relation to 'reason'. Logic belongs to the
tight-nit language of logico-mathematics but reason is *about* the real
world and we cannot allow the self-deluding bullies and cheats of the
world to steal *our*
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