2010/3/2 Jack Mallah :
> I guess by 'physical supervenience' you mean supervenience on physical
> activity only. That is not what computationalism assumes. Computationalism
> assumes supervenience on both physical activity and physical laws (aka
> counterfactuals). There is no secret about th
I finally figured out what was happening to my emails: the spam filter got
overly agressive and it was sending some of the list posts to the spam folder,
but letting others into the inbox. The post I'm replying to now was one that
was hidden that way.
--- On Sun, 2/14/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as
you say, my position boils down to "consciousness is fundamental and
uncaused."
What does that explain? I cannot even derive from that if
On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote:
On Mon, Mar 1, 2010 at 4:07 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:
At most (!) one of those levels is
what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think
about what really exists or ways that things *seem*
On 2 March 2010 16:13, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is the Movie
> Graph Argument (MGA).
> It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be
> abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience thesis,
> which
On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he
characterizes the
observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of
the wave
packet reduction, by showing it to appears throug
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