On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:

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On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because hecharacterizes theobserver by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology ofthe wavepacket reduction, by showing it to appears through "physicalinteraction" inthe memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse asbeing a way for not using a magical dualism between mind andmatter. He doesnot mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but hisreasoningpresupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,which is acomputational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation areTuringemulable).When you say "Turing emulable" - i.e. literally "*capable* of being emulated by a TM" - it's not clear to me that this should be taken to be equivalent to "actually being computed by a TM or its equivalent". In the latter case (i.e. something achieved through an actual occasion of computation) I can see that digitalism and its consequences are entailed, but in the former case, I don't see why this necessarily follows. To be merely *capable* of being computed is surely not equivalent to an actual occasion of computation? I'm obviously missing something, because you typically use the term "Turing emulable" as a knock-down statement to the effect that digital mechanism is to be assumed as a consequence, but I still don't see why. Do you perhaps mean it to be taken in conjunction with the assumption that digitalism is the default (and hence Everett's) explanation for mind in physics (i.e. the desire to avoid "magic dualism")? In that case computation, and hence Turing-emulability, would indeed be a prerequisite for "being capable of having a mind", and I could see why your arguments would apply. If I could clear up this confusion it would help my understanding of a lot of threads in the list.

`I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is the`

`Movie Graph Argument (MGA).`

`It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be`

`abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience`

`thesis, which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be`

`associated with computation (a purely mathematical notion), and not`

`with anything physical. A nice thing when you remember that physicist`

`have not yet succeeded in defining what is, in general, a physical`

`computation (cf notably the implementation problem, etc.)`

`Already in UDA-step-7, (where I recall that the protocol is that we`

`are in a "concrete physical universe executing integrally a UD"), to`

`be capable of being computed (or Turing emulated) ENTAILS being`

`computed (by that UD, soon or later, but the first person invariance`

`makes this "soon or later" irrelevant for the first person experience).`

`But in step 8, that is by the MGA, consciousness is attached to the`

`mathematical (and thus arithmetical) notion of computation. All`

`"actuality" notions (now, here, actual, current, etc.) becomes`

`indexical, that is relative computational (mathematical) state.`

`If you want I will (re)send the MGA. Less people get it than the UDA-`

`seven first steps (and even some part of the seven step is not always`

`well understood). Only in my french papers and books the argument is`

`developed in detail. Maudlin found (later) a very similar argument,`

`but since the last explanation of MGA on this list, I have understood`

`that MGA is more precise than Maudlin, and even more simple (no need`

`to even mention the counterfactuals; yet still subtle, but then the`

`mind body problem is subtle. Many scientist miss it entirely. Some`

`people take a long time to understand the term 'qualia').`

`In my older (french) presentation of the UDA, the MGA was the first`

`step. It is *the* argument showing that the mind body problem is not`

`solved by mechanism per se, as many materialist believe. The MGA`

`argument (UDA-8) is a proof by reductio ad absurdum. It shows that comp`

`+physical supervenience entails that consciousness has to be attached`

`to a physical movie of a corresponding physical computation "in real`

`time", which is absurd because the movie don't compute at all. The`

`movie does describe a computation, but a description of a computation`

`is not a computation. That last point still makes problem for some`

`other, I think. You may search in the archive (last year notably) on`

`MGA, MGA1, MGA2, MGA3 (but I am not entirely satisfied by MGA3: the`

`absurdity comes before).`

`It is really the movie graph which "eliminates" the possibility to`

`invoke physicalness, if we keep comp. WE have to choose between`

`digital mechanism, or materialism. This solves also the question "what`

`is now", "what is here", etc. It reduce all this to the handling of`

`indexicals in the manner of Kleene, Post, Gödel, etc.`

`With comp, physics get a purely mathematical justification or`

`(re)definition, with both the quanta and the qualia distinguished and`

`explained. Propositional physics, or observable logic, is given by`

`the logic of the "provability and consistency predicate (and truth`

`variants), with atomic formula the sigma_1-sentences (with or without`

`oracle, ...).`

`In plotinian like terms, Physics is the border of Mind, or the border`

`of God. Actually, the border of something unameable, undefinable.`

`(Assuming Mechanism).`

Bruno

On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemergefrom a relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon ofthe identity thesis.Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was actually asking you. I assumed, when you made you comment about Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to be true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the"primitively physical" to be the case. When you mention UDA asyou doabove, I can only assume that you intend the reader to understandyourcomment in the context of the comp hypothesis. Of course, I understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment about EQM would necessarily follow. But my question was whether you wereintending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWEitselfunder any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body (or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue histaskandderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection ofall computations (by UDA).What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening)"? Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or that his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused.Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because hecharacterizes theobserver by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology ofthe wavepacket reduction, by showing it to appears through "physicalinteraction" inthe memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse asbeing a way for not using a magical dualism between mind andmatter. He doesnot mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but hisreasoningpresupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,which is acomputational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation areTuringemulable).This is hardly original: comp is the implicit hypothesis of allmaterialistor physicalist. (Thus, it is normal some takes some time tounderstand thatcomp is incompatible with (weak) materialism).On the contrary, those who believed (without evidences) that thecollapse ofthe wave is a real phenomenon are obliged to refer to a non compdualisttheory of mind. Since Descartes, we can say that comp is the default hypothesis of all rationalist. Comp is just Mechanism made clear mathematically by the discover of Turing, Post, Church. BrunoOn 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with EverettQuantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches isthatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of themind-bodyor consciousness/reality problem.Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilstcontinuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'dlike toenquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with EverettQuantumMechanics either".UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemergefrom a relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon oftheidentity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to anapparent"body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can onlyascribe aninfinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations ofyourpartsbelow your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay ofthe firstperson experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person"body" isafunction depending on all possible universal machine/numbers.Negativeinterference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from thestatistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by Bp& Dt,forprobability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds +there isa world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard calculus", an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue histaskandderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection ofall computations (by UDA).I think I've asked before about the distinction between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being computed."is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which isrecursive(computable), Sigma_0."can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable),Sigma_1.It'sonly in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply(i.e.if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiversethat isin fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machinesinherit) a"multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeleretc.)equation of physics consists in showing that the sharablephysical partofthe lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with pSigma_1) is thesame as the one described by the physicists.But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is "primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT (never) computednor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is1-p, and1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a senseall UD* isprocessed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". Apriori, theresults of any observation for any observer moment depends on astatisticinvolving all universal machines and all their computations(emulatedinfinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws ofphysicsseems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the differenceof points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly themathematicalreasonwhy the non computable take refuge below our substitution level,givingrise to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of universal machines).I'm no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalismmakesthenotion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without anyexplanationpowerfor the "appearance of the primitively physical". On thecontrary, theappearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (=completelyexcept for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief(knowledge,observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem.Mind iswhatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matteris whatmind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).Is it related towhat I've been saying about the non-computability of the mindfrom thestarting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. thatmind - 1-p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from aprimitively-physical 3-p pov?I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, andare evennotdefinable in the language of a Löbian machine on which itapplies. The1-pare accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in somesense".If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role withconsciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but ithas alsotobe different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference ofalluniversal machines.If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is thepowerfourof the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for "powertwo",wouldbe empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be,matter existsinsome primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidencesfor it,beyond our animal instinct.Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test them.It isall what I say.Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotiniantheology, whenMaterialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think, has a tendency to eliminate the persons. BrunoActually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work Iexplainhere (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (orSchmidhuber), except that it has been published many yearsbefore, andrelies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with EverettQuantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches isthatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of themind-bodyor consciousness/reality problem.This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a(physical)universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted bythephysicalists, but which can no more taken as such by thecomputationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreamsbecomesprevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalentwith thequestion of how does the dreams glue together. It is theproblem ofpassing from first person to first person plural, and thisneeds anotion of entanglement of computation.If you define a universe by the coherent structurecorresponding toall what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique coherent structure accounting for all observations? What is its internal and external logic? Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherentstructure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as externallogic, andsome quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the majorinterestof Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic thirdperson description level. Such a logical completion of thequantumobservation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories). But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion ofrealties (first person and first person plural), and it is justanopen problem to really count the number of complete booleanstructurescapable of attributing values to anything observable.This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I meanthosefew who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am awareof somesubtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical) computation.The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that wesharethe quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share somecomputation:this really means that we (human population) are multiplied bytheindeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happeningsmakesdifficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and ifthat"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I preferto usethe expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of manyworldsor many-universes. "Universe" becomes defined by the completeboolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations asseenfrom a first person perspective).All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who misstheseven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument. Bruno On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark here... http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical structures.On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com>wrote:Hello,I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes,but howdo we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.Inyuki http://www.universians.org--You received this message because you are subscribed to theGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . 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