On 2 March 2010 16:13, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is the Movie
> Graph Argument (MGA).
> It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be
> abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience thesis,
> which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be associated with
> computation (a purely mathematical notion), and not with anything physical.

I seem to be frustratingly unable to get my point across (maybe it
wasn't a very good point!)  No, I clearly recall the 8th step and the
MGA (although a detailed restatement of the latter on the list would
be very nice).  I'm sure you haven't forgotten how many discussions
we've had on these topics.  Consequently, whenever you make a
statement clearly "assuming comp", as you say above, I always have
this in mind.

Therefore, when I asked my question about EQM, it was because I wasn't
sure on what basis you would take the view that *Everett himself
assumed comp*.  I wondered if it was because, as you say, it is more
or less the default theory of mind amongst physicists, and that
consequently you feel justified in attributing it to him.  Or is there
something aspect of EQM, or the SWE, that inescapably entails comp as
a theory of mind, irrespective of the originators' assumptions?

That's my question.  Sorry about the confusion.

David

>
> On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he characterizes
>>> the
>>> observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of the
>>> wave
>>> packet reduction, by showing it to appears through "physical interaction"
>>> in
>>> the memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse as
>>> being a way for not using a magical dualism between mind and matter. He
>>> does
>>> not mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but his reasoning
>>> presupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself, which is a
>>> computational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation are Turing
>>> emulable).
>>
>> When you say "Turing emulable" - i.e. literally "*capable* of being
>> emulated by a TM" - it's not clear to me that this should be taken to
>> be equivalent to "actually being computed by a TM or its equivalent".
>> In the latter case (i.e. something achieved through an actual occasion
>> of computation) I can see that digitalism and its consequences are
>> entailed, but in the former case, I don't see why this necessarily
>> follows.  To be merely *capable* of being computed is surely not
>> equivalent to an actual occasion of computation?  I'm obviously
>> missing something, because you typically use the term "Turing
>> emulable" as a knock-down statement to the effect that digital
>> mechanism is to be assumed as a consequence, but I still don't see
>> why.  Do you perhaps mean it to be taken in conjunction with the
>> assumption that digitalism is the default (and hence Everett's)
>> explanation for mind in physics (i.e. the desire to avoid "magic
>> dualism")?  In that case computation, and hence Turing-emulability,
>> would indeed be a prerequisite for "being capable of having a mind",
>> and I could see why your arguments would apply.
>>
>> If I could clear up this confusion it would help my understanding of a
>> lot of threads in the list.
>
>
> I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is the Movie
> Graph Argument (MGA).
>
> It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be
> abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience thesis,
> which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be associated with
> computation (a purely mathematical notion), and not with anything physical.
> A nice thing when you remember that physicist have not yet succeeded in
> defining what is, in general, a physical computation (cf notably the
> implementation problem, etc.)
>
> Already in UDA-step-7, (where I recall that the protocol is that we are in a
> "concrete physical universe executing integrally a UD"), to be capable of
> being computed (or Turing emulated) ENTAILS  being computed (by that UD,
> soon or later, but the first person invariance makes this "soon or later"
> irrelevant for the first person experience).
>
> But in step 8, that is by the MGA, consciousness is attached to the
> mathematical (and thus arithmetical) notion of computation. All "actuality"
> notions (now, here, actual, current, etc.) becomes indexical, that is
> relative computational (mathematical) state.
>
> If you want I will (re)send the MGA. Less people get it than the UDA-seven
> first steps (and even some part of the seven step is not always well
> understood). Only in my french papers and books the argument is developed in
> detail. Maudlin found (later) a very similar argument, but since the last
> explanation of MGA on this list, I have understood that MGA is more precise
> than Maudlin, and even more simple (no need to even mention the
> counterfactuals; yet still subtle, but then the mind body problem is subtle.
> Many scientist miss it entirely. Some people take a long time to understand
> the term 'qualia').
>
>
> In my older (french) presentation of the UDA, the MGA was the first step. It
> is *the* argument showing that the mind body problem is not solved by
> mechanism per se, as many materialist believe. The MGA argument (UDA-8) is a
> proof by reductio ad absurdum. It shows that comp+physical supervenience
> entails that consciousness has to be attached to a physical movie of a
> corresponding physical computation "in real time", which is absurd because
> the movie don't compute at all. The movie does describe a computation, but a
> description of a computation is not a computation. That last point still
> makes problem for some other, I think. You may search in the archive (last
> year notably) on MGA, MGA1, MGA2, MGA3 (but I am not entirely satisfied by
> MGA3: the absurdity comes before).
>
> It is really the movie graph which "eliminates" the possibility to invoke
> physicalness, if we keep comp. WE have to choose between digital mechanism,
> or materialism. This solves also the question "what is now", "what is here",
> etc. It reduce all this to the handling of indexicals in the manner of
> Kleene, Post, Gödel, etc.
>
> With comp, physics get a purely mathematical justification or
> (re)definition, with both the quanta and the qualia distinguished and
> explained. Propositional  physics, or observable logic, is given by the
> logic of the "provability and consistency predicate (and truth variants),
> with atomic formula the sigma_1-sentences (with or without oracle, ...).
> In plotinian like terms, Physics is the border of Mind, or the border of
> God. Actually, the border of something unameable, undefinable. (Assuming
> Mechanism).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>>> On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge
>>>>> from
>>>>> a relative state measure on all computational histories.
>>>>> The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of
>>>>> the
>>>>> identity thesis.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was
>>>> actually asking you.  I assumed, when you made you comment about
>>>> Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the
>>>> context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to be
>>>> true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the
>>>> "primitively physical" to be the case.  When you mention UDA as you do
>>>> above, I can only assume that you intend the reader to understand your
>>>> comment in the context of the comp hypothesis.  Of course, I
>>>> understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be
>>>> derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment about
>>>> EQM would necessarily follow.  But my question was whether you were
>>>> intending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWE itself
>>>> under any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body
>>>> (or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:
>>>>
>>>>> Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task
>>>>> and
>>>>> derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of
>>>>> all
>>>>> computations (by UDA).
>>>>
>>>> What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening)"?
>>>> Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or
>>>> that his approach implicitly presupposes it?  I'm confused.
>>>
>>>
>>> Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he characterizes
>>> the
>>> observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of the
>>> wave
>>> packet reduction, by showing it to appears through "physical interaction"
>>> in
>>> the memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse as
>>> being a way for not using a magical dualism between mind and matter. He
>>> does
>>> not mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but his reasoning
>>> presupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself, which is a
>>> computational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation are Turing
>>> emulable).
>>>
>>> This is hardly original: comp is the implicit hypothesis of all
>>> materialist
>>> or physicalist. (Thus, it is normal some takes some time to understand
>>> that
>>> comp is incompatible with (weak) materialism).
>>>
>>> On the contrary, those who believed (without evidences) that the collapse
>>> of
>>> the wave is a real phenomenon are obliged to refer to a non comp dualist
>>> theory of mind. Since Descartes, we can say that comp is the default
>>> hypothesis of all rationalist. Comp is just Mechanism made clear
>>> mathematically by the discover of Turing, Post, Church.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
>>>>>>> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
>>>>>>> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
>>>>>>> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
>>>>>>> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the
>>>>>>> mind-body
>>>>>>> or consciousness/reality problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst
>>>>>> continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to
>>>>>> enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum
>>>>>> Mechanics either".
>>>>>
>>>>> UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge
>>>>> from
>>>>> a relative state measure on all computational histories.
>>>>> The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of
>>>>> the
>>>>> identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to an apparent
>>>>>  "body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only ascribe
>>>>> an
>>>>> infinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations of your
>>>>> parts
>>>>> below your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay of the
>>>>> first
>>>>> person experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person "body"
>>>>> is
>>>>> a
>>>>> function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers. Negative
>>>>> interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from the
>>>>> statistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by Bp & Dt,
>>>>> for
>>>>> probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds + there
>>>>> is
>>>>> a
>>>>> world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard
>>>>> calculus",
>>>>> an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.
>>>>>
>>>>> Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue his task
>>>>> and
>>>>> derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the collection of
>>>>> all
>>>>> computations (by UDA).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  I think I've asked before about the distinction
>>>>>> between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".
>>>>>
>>>>> A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being
>>>>> computed.
>>>>>
>>>>> "is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which is recursive
>>>>> (computable), Sigma_0.
>>>>>
>>>>> "can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable), Sigma_1.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  It's
>>>>>> only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e.
>>>>>> if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse that is
>>>>>> in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).
>>>>>
>>>>> It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines inherit) a
>>>>> "multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.)
>>>>> equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physical part
>>>>> of
>>>>> the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1) is
>>>>> the
>>>>> same as the one described by the physicists.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> But if
>>>>>> - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is
>>>>>> "primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,
>>>>>
>>>>> Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT (never)
>>>>> computed
>>>>> nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p,
>>>>> and
>>>>> 1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense all UD*
>>>>> is
>>>>> processed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". A priori,
>>>>> the
>>>>> results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a
>>>>> statistic
>>>>> involving all universal machines and all their computations (emulated
>>>>> infinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of
>>>>> physics
>>>>> seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the
>>>>> difference
>>>>> of points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly the mathematical
>>>>> reason
>>>>> why the non computable take refuge below our substitution level, giving
>>>>> rise
>>>>> to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of
>>>>> universal machines).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm
>>>>>> no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalism makes
>>>>> the
>>>>> notion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without any explanation
>>>>> power
>>>>> for the "appearance of the primitively physical". On the contrary, the
>>>>> appearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (= completely
>>>>> except for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief
>>>>> (knowledge,
>>>>> observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.
>>>>>
>>>>> UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem. Mind
>>>>> is
>>>>> whatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matter is
>>>>> what
>>>>> mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it related to
>>>>>> what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind from the
>>>>>> starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind - 1-
>>>>>> p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a primitively-
>>>>>> physical 3-p pov?
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and are
>>>>> even
>>>>> not
>>>>> definable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it applies. The
>>>>> 1-p
>>>>> are accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in some sense".
>>>>>
>>>>> If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role with
>>>>> consciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but it has
>>>>> also
>>>>> to
>>>>> be different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference of all
>>>>> universal machines.
>>>>>
>>>>> If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is the power
>>>>> four
>>>>> of the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for "power two",
>>>>> would
>>>>> be empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be, matter
>>>>> exists
>>>>> in
>>>>> some primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidences for it,
>>>>> beyond our animal instinct.
>>>>>
>>>>> Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test them. It is
>>>>> all
>>>>> what I say.
>>>>>
>>>>> Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotinian theology, when
>>>>> Materialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think,  has a
>>>>> tendency
>>>>> to eliminate the persons.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain
>>>>>>> here (uda, auda)  can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
>>>>>>> Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's
>>>>>>> "theology".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
>>>>>>> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
>>>>>>> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
>>>>>>> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that
>>>>>>> they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the
>>>>>>> mind-body
>>>>>>> or consciousness/reality problem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical)
>>>>>>> universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the
>>>>>>> physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the
>>>>>>> computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes
>>>>>>> prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent with the
>>>>>>> question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of
>>>>>>> passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a
>>>>>>> notion of entanglement of computation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to
>>>>>>> all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique
>>>>>>> coherent structure accounting for all observations?  What is its
>>>>>>> internal and external logic?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent
>>>>>>> structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major
>>>>>>> interest
>>>>>>> of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third
>>>>>>> person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum
>>>>>>> observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique
>>>>>>> coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of
>>>>>>> realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an
>>>>>>> open problem to really count the number of complete boolean
>>>>>>> structures
>>>>>>> capable of attributing values to anything observable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those
>>>>>>> few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some
>>>>>>> subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical)
>>>>>>> computation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share
>>>>>>> the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some
>>>>>>> computation:
>>>>>>> this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the
>>>>>>> indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes
>>>>>>> difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that
>>>>>>> "really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to
>>>>>>> use
>>>>>>> the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds
>>>>>>> or many-universes.   "Universe" becomes defined by the complete
>>>>>>> boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen
>>>>>>> from a first person perspective).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the
>>>>>>> seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark
>>>>>>>> here...
>>>>>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical
>>>>>>>> structures.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but
>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>> do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
>>>>>>>> somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Inyuki
>>>>>>>> http://www.universians.org
>>>>>>>
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