Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
On 2 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
Take the self-duplication experiment as a simple illustration, where
after having been read I am reconstitued at two different places.
Nobody (not even God) can compute where I will find myself after the
duplication.
That has
Juergen Schmidhuber writes:
Hal:
Approximate probabilities based on approximations to the
K. complexity of a string are no more computable than precise ones.
There is no fixed bound B which allows you to compute the K. complexity
of an arbitrary string within accuracy B.
You should
Step n owns 2^(n-1) initial segments.
Bruno, why are we discussing this? Sure, in finite time you can compute
all initial segments of size n. In countable time you can compute one
real, or a countable number of reals. But each of your steps needs more
than twice the time required by the
Bruno wrote:
Juergen Schmidhuber:
Even the set of all real #'s is not formally describable.
You cannot
write a program that lists all reals. In infinite but
countable time
you can write down a particular computable real, but
Bruno wrote:
Juergen Schmidhuber:
Even the set of all real #'s is not formally describable.
You cannot
write a program that lists all reals. In infinite but
countable time
you can write down a particular
Why assume non-computable stuff without compelling reason?
Shaved by Occam's razor.
Jacques:
On the contrary. Why assume the lack of *any* given type of
mathematical stucture? A true everything-hypothesis surely would not.
Occam's razor says: don't add extra distinctions such as a
Why assume non-computable stuff without compelling reason?
Shaved by Occam's razor.
Jacques:
On the contrary. Why assume the lack of *any* given type of
mathematical stucture? A true everything-hypothesis surely would not.
Occam's razor says: don't add extra distinctions such as a
Jacques Mallah wrote:
I agree with
Alistair Malcolm that Turing machines are not enough
A continuous structure is a perfectly good
mathematical structure, but no Turing based scheme can include it.
Why assume non-computable stuff without compelling reason?
Shaved by Occam's
Juergen Schmidhuber wrote:
In absence of
evidence to the contrary we assume that the presence of your consciousness
(whatever that may be) is detectable by a computable process, namely, the
one employed by you, the observer, who decides that he exists, via some
sort of computation taking
Bruno:
Honestly it is still not clear. How could ever S(U)=TRUE be computable ?
As a computer scientist I guess you know that even the apparently simple
question does that piece of code computes the factorial function is not
computable.
Sure, it's not even decidable in general whether a
[I sent this privately by accident]
James Higgo writes:
What that postulates is that everything exists, and that means you exist and
I exist in an infinity of all possible variations. I'm perfectly comfortable
with this, as I am an MWI-er.
In this view, the only reason you ever get a
Why can't the simplest possible program be taken as computing a universe
which includes us? We tend to say it computes all universes as though
it computes more than one. Then it is fair to object that the program
is too simple, because it computes more than one universe.
But this is a semantic
In a message dated 99-10-21 11:53:14 EDT, James Higgo writes:
Yes but the everything universe has the shortest algorithm, containing just
one bit of information. The sub-universes do not need algorithms, just the
WAP.
and Juergen Scmidhuber replies
Ah! The point is: the information
Bruno wrote:
I don't take the notion of observer for granted.
Neither do I, of course. The observer O is something computable that
evolves in some universe U.
The problem is that to be in a universe has no clear meaning
But it does. There is a computable predicate S such that S(U)=TRUE if
14 matches
Mail list logo
