On 23-Apr-02, Wei Dai wrote:
> I think it's pretty obvious that you can't predict someone's
> decisions if you show him the prediction before he makes his
> final choice. So let's consider a different flavor of
> prediction. Suppose every time you make a choice, I can predict
> the decision, write
On Wed, Apr 24, 2002 at 04:51:18PM +0200, Marcus Hutter wrote:
> In "A Theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence based on
> Algorithmic Complexity" http://www.idsia.ch/~marcus/ai/pkcunai.htm
> I developed a rational decision maker which makes optimal
> decisions in any environment. The only assu
H J Ruhl wrote:
> In any event in my view your argument makes many assumptions - i.e.
> requires substantial information, isolates sub systems, and seems to allow
> many sub states between states of interest all of which are counter to my
> approach.
Imo the assumption of a limited information e
I think it's pretty obvious that you can't predict someone's decisions if
you show him the prediction before he makes his final choice. So let's
consider a different flavor of prediction. Suppose every time you make a
choice, I can predict the decision, write it down before you do it, and
then
Welcome to the list, Marcus. I think your analysis is very good.
For some predictions there might be a fixed point; for example,
I can predict that I will not commit suicide in the next 5 minutes.
Even knowing that prediction I will not try to contradict it. For other
things there might not be a
Dear Marcus:
I have some basic issues with your post.
The idea I use is that the basis of what we like to think of as our
universe and all other universes is "There is no information".
This is not really an assumption in the sense that you can not extract
anything from nothing as one usually
Dear Everyboy on the Everything list,
After having followed the discussions in this list for a
while I would like to make my first contribution:
The paradox between computability and free will vanishes through
careful reasoning:
That a part of the universe is computable is defined
as follows:
I thought the debate between Brent Meeker and Wei Dai was quite
interesting regarding self-predictability in a deterministic universe.
(Perhaps the same issue would come up in a nondeterministic universe,
where one sought to predict the probability distribution of one's future
actions.)
The issue
Explorations of the definitional basis of a universe and its effect on the
idea of decisions:
First examine a deterministic universe j such that [using notation from a
post by Matthieu Walraet]:
TjTj Tj
Sj(0)
Dear Matthieu:
At 4/19/02, you wrote:
>On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote:
>
> >
> > 5) I do not see universes as "splitting" by going to more than one next
> > state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see.
> >
> > 6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as p
On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote:
>
> 5) I do not see universes as "splitting" by going to more than one next
> state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see.
>
> 6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as part of a state to state
> transition are in effec
On 18-Apr-02, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 05:39:39PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Keeping to the idea of a deterministic universe - wouldn't the
>> mathematical description of the universe include a description
>> of the brain of the subject. And if the universe is computable
>> it f
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 05:39:39PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Keeping to the idea of a deterministic universe - wouldn't the
> mathematical description of the universe include a description of the
> brain of the subject. And if the universe is computable it follows that
> the behavoir of the su
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I
> > don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there
> > is an algorithm that correctly predi
As a quick contribution to the discussion:
1) What do we mean by the state of a universe?
I mean a fixed configuration.
2) What do we mean by the transition to the next state?
I mean a new fixed configuration is realized.
Successive fixed configurations are not joined by a continuum of
interv
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I
> don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there
> is an algorithm that correctly predicts your decision and then you make
> that de
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 02:08:56PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Why are you in principle unable to compute your own choices? Do you refer
> to unable to predict or unable to enumerate or both?
I mean there is no algorithm which your brain can implement, such that
given the mathematical descrip
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2002 at 08:36:29PM -0700, H J Ruhl wrote:
> > I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the
> > concept of a decision.
>
> I was also having the problem of figuring out how to make sense of the
> concept of a decision
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 01:39:59PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Exactly. So what does the assumption about the complete mathematical
> description add?
It's so that your preferences are well defined.
> > As a positive theory, decision theory is going to be wrong sometimes (e.g.
> > not predict
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 12:26:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Perhaps "contradictory" is too strong a word - I should have stuck with
> > "incoherent". But it seems you contemplate having different wishes about
> > the future evolution of the world and yo
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 12:26:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Perhaps "contradictory" is too strong a word - I should have stuck with
> "incoherent". But it seems you contemplate having different wishes about
> the future evolution of the world and you want to find some decision
> theory that te
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 11:57:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a
> > complete computable description then that description includes you and
> > whatever decision process your brain implem
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 11:57:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a
> complete computable description then that description includes you and
> whatever decision process your brain implements. To treat the universe as
> computable
Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a
complete computable description then that description includes you and
whatever decision process your brain implements. To treat the universe as
computable and your choices as determined by some utility function and
decision t
On Wed, Apr 17, 2002 at 08:36:29PM -0700, H J Ruhl wrote:
> I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the
> concept of a decision.
I was also having the problem of figuring out how to make sense of the
concept of a decision. My current philosophy is that you can have
pref
Dear Wei:
I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the
concept of a decision.
I see either a global computational arrival at a next state from the
current state or a transition to a next state that is at least partially
the result of information received from an exter
How many people here share my interest in decision theory as it relates to
the all universes hypothesis? I recently found two papers that seem
relevant:
---
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~blipman/Papers/axiom.pdf
Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework
for Bounde
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