-Original Message-
From: Jonathan Colvin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:20 AM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
...
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
ethical basis or a purely
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?
I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my copy,
but
-Original Message-
From: Jonathan Colvin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:51 AM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Hal Finney wrote:
To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what
is an OM.
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for
a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing as an
observer-moment. I'm happy with using the
Le 08-juin-05, à 07:51, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Hal Finney wrote:
To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what
is an OM.
We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.
Consider, for example, someone's brain when he is having a
particular experience. He is
On Tue, 7 Jun 2005, Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for
a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing as an
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?
I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my
copy,
but
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose,
for
a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing
as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing as
an
observer-moment. I'm happy with using the
I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information you
need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over time
due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no interactions
Paddy Leahy wrote:
[quoting Hal Finney]
Here's how I attempted to define observer moment a few years ago:
Observer - A subsystem of the multiverse with qualities sufficiently
similar to those which are common among human beings that we consider
it meaningful that we might have been or might be
Le 08-juin-05, à 14:18, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on
an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of
ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?
I have little doubt that
Russell Standish writes:
On Mon, Jun 06, 2005 at 01:51:36PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
In particular, if an observer attaches sequences of meanings to sequences
of prefixes of one of these strings, then it seems that he must have a
domain which does allow some inputs to be prefixes of others.
FYI
-Original Message-Subject: Killing the Observer-
Phenomenal ConsciousnessNew essay at the Center for
Naturalism (CFN) on phenomenal consciousness:Killing the Observer
[Note: A shortened version of this paper appears in the Journal of
Consciousness Studies, May/June, 2005. That
Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
were copied and started diverging.
Yes, this is exactly my
-Original Message-
From: Hal Finney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 6:11 PM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Brent Meeker writes:
But the problem I see is that we don't know with certainity the
present
Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I
suppose, for a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think
there is such a thing as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest
there is no such thing as an observer-moment. I'm
Jonathan Colvin writes:
[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]:
The situation is different when I am considering my copies in
the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two
copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because
that means there is 1/2 chance that I will become the
[Russell Standish wrote]:
The AP is a statement that observed reality must be consistent with
the observer being part of that reality.
Famously, this can be interpreted as either a trivial tautology (Brandon
Carter's original intention, I think), or an almost-obviously false
principle of
rmiller wrote:
At 05:22 PM 6/8/2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
rmiller wrote:
At 02:45 PM 6/7/2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
(snip)
Of course in this example Feynman did not anticipate in advance what
licence plate he'd see, but the kind of hindsight bias you are
engaging in can be shown with
At 11:08 PM 6/8/2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
(snip)
You should instead calculate the probability that a story would contain
*any* combination of meaningful words associated with the Manhattan
project. This is exactly analogous to the fact that in my example, you
should have been calculating the
If we're allowing ourselves a little informality, then I'd appeal to
the notion of observer moment. Within any observer moment, a finite
number of bits of the bitstrings has been read, and processed by the
observer. Since only a finite number of bits have been processed to
determine the meaning of
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